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Setting the scene 
Ana Rita Neves and William Becker 
European Commission, Joint Research Centre 
On October 2014, a group of Asian and European leaders gathered in Milan, Italy at the 10th 
Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Summit. On this occasion, the group decided on the need to 
further study approaches and concrete steps for enhancing connectivity between Asia and 
Europe in all relevant fields.  Two years after, at the 11th ASEM Summit held in July 2016, in 
Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, the leaders of the ASEM political forum agreed to:  
• Mainstream connectivity in all its dimensions, including political, economic, digital,
institutional, socio-cultural and people-to-people, into all ASEM activities;
• Establish a working group, called the ASEM Pathfinder Group on Connectivity, with
the aim of exploring how ASEM could add value in the area of connectivity.
The ASEM Pathfinder Group on Connectivity was tasked with providing a commonly agreed 
definition of connectivity for the ASEM context. This definition, endorsed by all 53 ASEM 
partners at the 13th Meeting of ASEM Foreign Ministers in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar in November 
2017, is presented in Box 1.   
Box 1: Definition of ASEM connectivity adopted by ASEM. 
Connectivity is about bringing countries, people and societies closer together. It facilitates access and 
is a means to foster deeper economic and people-to-people ties. It encompasses the hard and soft 
aspects, including the physical and institutional social-cultural linkages that are the fundamental 
supportive means to enhance the economic, political-security, and socio-cultural ties between Asia and 
Europe which also contribute to the narrowing of the varying levels of development and capacities. 
Bearing in mind the Asia-Europe Cooperation Framework (AECF) 2000, ASEM connectivity aims to 
establish the sense of building ASEM partnership of shared interests. It upholds the spirit of peace, 
development, cooperation and mutual benefit. It will also adhere to and effectively implement relevant 
international norms and standards as mutually agreed by ASEM partners. 
ASEM Connectivity covers all modes of transport (aviation, maritime, rail and road) and also includes, 
among others, institutions, infrastructure, financial cooperation, IT, digital links, energy, education and 
research, human resources development, tourism, cultural exchanges as well as customs, trade and 
investment facilitation. 
ASEM connectivity covers all the three pillars of ASEM - economic, political and socio-cultural. It should 
be result-oriented, and in support of the following key principles: level playing field, free and open trade, 
market principles, multi-dimensionality, inclusiveness, fairness, openness, transparency, financial 
viability, cost-effectiveness and mutual benefits. It should also contribute to the materialisation of the 
principles, goals and targets of The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Sustainability is one of 
the important quality benchmarks for the connectivity initiatives in the ASEM context. 
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Connectivity in the ASEM context is a broad concept, ranging from physical infrastructure 
(i.e. transport, energy and information and communication technologies), financial 
cooperation and economic/trade links to political, institutional and human connectivity, 
including education and research, tourism and cultural exchanges. The definition underlines 
the link between connectivity and sustainable development, in particular the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). 
Although the ASEM group had a definition of connectivity, they were still lacking evidence to 
inform policy making on the state of connectivity between the 51 ASEM member countries. 
This was the reason why the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) Centre 
Competence Centre on Composite Indicators and Scoreboards was called to contribute. The 
JRC is the European Commission’s in-house science service and its main mission is to carry 
out research to support European Union (EU) policies. One of its main challenges is to bridge 
the divide between science and policy.  
In November 2017, the JRC took up the mission of developing a measurement framework for 
ASEM sustainable connectivity. Only by measuring connectivity, policy makers could better 
understand how countries are connected to each other as well as in which areas countries 
are frontrunners and in which areas they are lagging behind. 
The multidimensional nature of ASEM Sustainable Connectivity meant that this concept 
could not be captured by a single indicator. Thus, the approach used was to develop a 
framework of relevant indicators which could be combined into composite indicators or 
indexes— aggregations of indicators that make large and complex data set accessible by 
offering a ‘big picture’ overview. In addition, they serve as an access point to the underlying 
data, enabling users to drill down and explore the wealth of information presented in the 
indicator framework.  
In fact, we built two indexes, one measuring connectivity and facilitators of connectivity in its 
five dimensions: Physical, Economic/Financial, Political, Institutional and People-to-people 
and other measuring sustainability linked to connectivity in its three dimensions: 
Environmental, Social and Economic/Financial. We put 49 indicators in this framework, but 
to arrive there we reviewed more than 200.  A particularity of measuring connectivity is that 
it suggests the use of bilateral data, i.e. data which measures connections between pairs of 
countries. In total, 16 bilateral datasets specifying the levels of flows and connections between 
51 country pairs were included.  
With this approach, we were able to assess how well connected a country is according to the 
ASEM definition and the extent to which this may be reflected in a country’s sustainability. 
In order to make all the information accessible and reachable to everyone, we developed a 
new online data-powered tool – the ASEM Sustainable Connectivity Portal1. The Portal allows 
users to: 
• Understand in which domains a country is performing better or not so well;
• Explore the relationships between connectivity and sustainability and its underlying
components;
• Explore the various types of connections between European and Asian countries.
1 https://ec.europa.eu/asem-sustainale-connectivity 
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For example, by using the Portal (e.g. the Connectivity Map feature) one can discover that: 
• Asia and Europe are leading trade partners, with $1.5 trillion of annual merchandise 
trade 
Trade between ASEM countries accounts for about half of all world merchandise 
trade. Two major hubs stand out: Germany and China. These countries together are 
responsible for one quarter of the overall trade in the ASEM group, and are the main 
trade bridges between the two continents. 
• Foreign direct investment (FDI) between Asia and Europe reaches close to $90 billion 
annually  
This is nearly the same size as FDI flows within Europe. Over half of European 
investment in Asia comes from the UK and Germany, exceeding $32 billion. In fact, 
the UK invests twice as much in Asia than in Europe, with India receiving the greatest 
share. Likewise, China and Japan are the main Asian investors in Europe, collectively 
amounting to $12 billion. 
• 400,000 tertiary education students move annually between Europe and Asia 
International graduate student mobility provides access to quality education abroad, 
as well as the opportunity to improve language skills and explore different cultures 
and societies. The United Kingdom is the top destination for Asian students, with 
nearly three quarters coming from China, India and Malaysia. Chinese students 
represent almost half of Asian students in Europe. Australia is the favourite 
destination for European students, followed by Japan.  
• Over 200,000 scientific articles are the fruit of collaborations between Asian and 
European research institutions every year 
Cross-continental collaboration in the form of co-authorship of scientific publications 
represents close to one third of research collaborations in ASEM countries. Countries 
such as China, Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany, Russia and France provide 
an intercontinental bridge for scientists. Cross-bloc collaboration is stronger on the 
Asian side than on the European side, since European countries also have a strong 
internal collaboration network supported by large EU-funded research programmes. 
• 13 million people have migrated between Asia and Europe 
Germany, the United Kingdom and Australia host the largest number of cross-bloc 
migrants (around 2.5 million each). Large movements of migrants from the United 
Kingdom to Australia and from Russia and Kazakhstan to Germany are associated 
with historical, cultural and language ties. Russia is the main country of origin of 
migrants to Europe, followed by India. 
 
Flows and connections between countries can now be measured and in this way we can 
understand more precisely how they connect to each other. 
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Data also tell us that Asia-Europe connectivity is aligned with most of the Sustainable 
Development Goals, in particular the ones linked to the social dimension of sustainability.  
If we plot on the vertical axis Connectivity – higher score is better, and on the horizontal axis 
– Social Sustainability, further to the right is better, then we see that better connected
countries are associated with better performance on social sustainability (Figure 1). Those
countries tend to have lower levels of poverty, lower levels of corruption, less inequality, more
students in tertiary education, more freedom of the press, and tend to be more inclusive to
minorities (which were the indicators we used to measure social sustainability).
Figure 1: Relationship between the ASEM Connectivity index and the Social Sustainability sub-index. 
The ASEM Sustainable Connectivity Portal came at a time in which connectivity is very high 
on the ASEM political agenda. The Portal was part of the EU contribution to the 12th ASEM 
Summit, held in Brussels, Belgium in October 2018. Moreover, the EU has put forward 
sustainable connectivity in its 2018 ‘Connecting Europe and Asia – Building blocks for an EU 
Strategy’. The EU strategy has set out an approach to connectivity which is sustainable, 
comprehensive and rules-based, with policies that should be economically, fiscally, 
environmentally and socially sustainable in the long term2.  
The main purpose of the ASEM Sustainable Connectivity Portal and its accompanying study3 
was to provide evidence to support and ramp up the policy debate on sustainable 
connectivity between Asia and Europe. 
2 European Commission (2018). Joint Communication to the European parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank, Connecting Europe and Asia - Building blocks 
for an EU Strategy, JOIN(2018) 31 final.  
3 Becker, W.,  Domínguez-Torreiro, M., Neves, A. R., Tacao Moura, C. J., & Saisana, M. (2018). Exploring ASEM Sustainable Connectivity: 
What brings Asia and Europe together? Luxembourg. doi: 10.2760/738153. 
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With the aim of continuing linking science and policy in the area of sustainable connectivity, 
the JRC joined efforts with a group of partners to set up the first ever scientific conference on 
Asia-Europe Sustainable Connectivity – AESCON. The conference is organised in 
collaboration with the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF), the Economic Research Institute for 
ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) and the Center for China and Globalization (CCG). 
With this conference, we expect to: 
• Bring together researchers, data and policy analysts in an academic forum to share 
the latest research as well as to discuss the global and local challenges associated to 
connectivity; 
• Initiate a network of researchers with interest on Asia-Europe sustainable connectivity 
and create new collaborations; 
• Identify pathways to provide further support ASEM sustainable connectivity policy 
making with science. 
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Opening remarks by Stephen Quest 
Director-General of the Joint Research Centre, European Commission 
 
It is a pleasure to be with you today, and even if we have had to adapt ourselves to new and 
challenging circumstances, I am very happy that we have found a way to enable this 
conference to go ahead.  
This first scientific conference on Asia-Europe sustainable connectivity comes at a crucial 
moment. Our world is confronted with a number of serious challenges all at the same time. 
While we battle with the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, we also need to step up our efforts to 
deal with climate change and meet the Sustainable Development Goals. We need to deal 
with technological changes that have a serious impact on the lives of many, changing the 
ways we work and live. And we face important economic and social challenges. 
Science clearly has a role in helping us to meet these challenges, and in my remarks today I 
would like to focus on three areas where I believe we can usefully strengthen our efforts and 
make a real difference. Allow me to mention them briefly: 
First, we need to strengthen the interface between science, policy and the political level.  
I head up the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre, and with over 2,000 scientists, 
we provide scientific support across the entire range of European Union policies.  
I took the lead of this organisation in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic and immediately 
witnessed how policy makers looking to scientists to provide the information they require to 
make the right choices.  
During my first months in my new position, we have made serious efforts to deepen the 
connection with policy makers, and it is my strong conviction that much can be gained by 
further strengthening mutual understanding.  
On the one hand, scientists need to invest in understanding real policy needs, and to 
understand and accept that it will not be scientific evidence alone that will determine 
political choices.  
At the same time, policy makers need to be much more specific in what they would like 
scientists to provide, and understand that science does not necessarily bend in the light of 
policy preferences.  
In this context, I am very pleased that the organisers of this conference have been able to 
bring together people from these different worlds….. It therefore provides an excellent 
opportunity for scientists, policy makers and the diplomatic community to explore ways to 
maximize the contribution of science.  
Second, we need to strengthen our scientific efforts. Artificial intelligence, super-computing, 
5 and 6G, new ways of digital cooperation, these are just some of the tools that will help us to 
find new answers, especially in the areas that our conference will be dealing with. 
The Joint Research Centre’s expertise and multi-disciplinary experience will certainly play its 
role. We will be fully mobilised to support the recovery package, which will both support the 
European Union in recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic and drive investment in the twin 
green and digital transitions. 
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On the specific field of sustainable Connectivity, the Joint Research Centre is already very 
active: 
For example, our scientists of the Competence Centre on Composite Indicators and 
Scoreboards have: 
• identified the most relevant and available indicators to measure connectivity in its 
physical, economic, political, institutional and people-to-people forms.  
• provided an online interactive tool to make information accessible and reachable to 
everyone, from researchers and policy analysts to businesses and policymakers. 
• and were involved in the dissemination of European standards for the construction 
sector in South East Asian countries. Major constructions in Asia have been designed 
adopting these standards. 
Strengthening international cooperation is the third area we need to focus on. The challenges 
we all face are global challenges; therefore the answers must be found through global 
cooperation. 
The European Commission is a strong advocate of multilateral international cooperation and 
attaches great importance to its relations with our Asian partners. It believes that AESCON 
can promote connectivity is areas such as transport, energy, IT as well as human and 
institutional.  
Let me give you a concrete example: our study on ASEM sustainable connectivity in 2018 
found that over 200,000 scientific articles were the fruit of collaborations between Asian and 
European research institutions every year. It is my firm belief that this number of cross-border 
scientific collaborations has the potential to be even higher. 
Strengthening the interface between science, policy and politics, strengthening our scientific 
efforts and strengthening international cooperation…all these three elements come together 
in this conference, which is itself an excellent example of European and Asian cooperation.  
I believe that our cooperation will bring valuable results and the JRC is certainly committed 
to contribute.  
I wish you a fruitful conference 
Thank you. 
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Opening remarks by Toru Morikawa 
Executive Director, Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF) 
Good Morning for the participants from Europe Good Afternoon for the participants from 
Asia.  
It is a pleasure to welcome you today on behalf of the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF), one of 
the partners of AESCON – the Asia-Europe Sustainable Connectivity Scientific Conference. 
My name is Mr MORIKAWA Toru, and I am the Executive Director of the Asia-Europe 
Foundation. 
ASEF is an intergovernmental, not-for-profit organisation  which brings together the people 
of Asia and Europe. We respect diversity, facilitate innovation  and link civil society to the Asia-
Europe Meeting Process, in short “ASEM”, which is an intergovernmental cooperation forum 
with partners from 51 countries and 2 institutions in Asia and Europe. ASEM has been an 
important driver  in the relationship between its partner countries.  ASEF is the sole 
permanently established institution of the ASEM Process. 
As the sustainable connectivity has become the focus of cooperation in the ASEM Process, 
AESCON is organised to bring together researchers and policy analysts from Asia and Europe. 
We are grateful to the other partners and EU as donor  to organize this important meeting. 
Taking the actual pandemic of Covid19 into account, we commend the timeliness of the 
meeting.   
Please allow me talk a bit more about ASEF.  For more than two decades, ASEF has been 
enhancing dialogues, enabling exchanges of ideas  and encouraging collaborations, 
providing human connection  through our projects and activities in seven thematic areas: 
culture, education, governance, economy, sustainable development, public health and 
media. I wish  you consider ASEF as a possible partner of your future work to promote the big 
idea of “Sustainable Connectivity.” 
The growing links between Asia and Europe  are already among the most important inter-
regional relationships  in the world.  According to an article of the World Economic Forum 
before the pandemic,  Asia and Europe are global leading trade partners, trading more 
between them  than between any other regions in the world, with USD 1.5 trillion in trade; 
both continents also bring people and societies together  with millions of people having 
migrated between the two regions.  
With this in mind, we pose a number of questions; How to draw more benefit  from the huge 
potential of the exchange  between the two regions  to the people in the two regions and 
beyond? How to enhance the connectivity  between the two regions in a more sustainable 
way?  What are the gaps to be addressed?  How can we cope with  or avoid its negative 
impacts?  And now, how to overcome the challenges  caused by the COVID-19 pandemic?  
Where do we focus  and allocate our limited resources?   
We wish  through the reports and the discussion in these events, our participants and 
partners, are able to share their best practices, find commonalities  and learn from each other, 
for enhanced mutual understandings among them and further, to provide food for thoughts 
to different policy makers of the ASEM process. 
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We hope that  this event will open up the doors  for collaboration with many more like-
minded organisations. With that, I will end my speech by wishing  all of you  will benefit  from 
the exchange of friendships, knowledge and ideas in this meeting.  May this conference  be 
the precursor to more initiatives  to enhance the sustainable connectivity  between our two 
regions.  
Thank you. 
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Opening remarks by Koji Hachiyama 
COO, Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) 
 
It gives me immense pleasure to welcome all of you to this high powered and academically 
rich Asia Europe Scientific Conference on very important subject of Asia-Europe Connectivity.  
After months of uncertainty, we are gathered in a virtual setup, meeting under the shadow 
of  COVID-19 pandemic, which has disrupted normal life,  business, and connectivity in Asia 
and other parts of world. It is a timely reminder to all present here that connectivity entails 
not just infrastructure and strategies for trade and economic cooperation, regulations and 
soft infrastructure. It entails connectivity and cooperation in all aspects, especially in 
knowledge exchange, sustainable development, security, mobility of people. Most of all, if 
Asia-Europe region must be future ready to meet the challenges of Digital transformation 
and Fourth Industrial Revolution, digital connectivity with safe, secure and reliable data free 
flow is absolutely essential. Then we can realize completed digitalized society.  In 2020, Asia 
and Europe can cooperate to build the hard and soft infrastructure and develop international 
norms and standards of digital connectivity in the ASEM region, which can also be applicable 
to other parts of the world. 
Asia and Europe represent a sizeable part of the global community. Since its inception in 
1996, the Asia-Europe Meeting, or ASEM, has played a key role as a forum for dialogue and 
cooperation in connecting Asia and Europe. I am particularly pleased to see this conference 
form an important event of the 13th ASEM which will be held next year in Cambodia.  
ERIA is particularly proud to be associated with Asia-Europe connectivity and the ASEM 
mechanisms. ERIA was a forerunner of connectivity-related studies in the ASEAN region. It 
developed the concept of holistic connectivity, which takes into account the physical, 
institutional, and people’s aspects of connectivity in a community or region. Our connectivity-
related research is also helping closer economic cooperation between Asia and Africa, and 
Asia and Europe. 
To support the ASEM Summit, ERIA prepared the ‘ASEM Connectivity Vision 2025’ jointly with 
Mongolia in 2016.  In 2018, ERIA supported the European External Action Service (EEAS) and 
prepared the “Brussels Report on Strengthening Asia Europe Connectivity’ for the 12th ASEM 
Summit. ERIA also supported the ASEM Pathfinders Group on Connectivity (APGC) in 
developing an Inventory of ASEM Connectivity activities to draw out tangible areas of 
cooperation in connectivity (TACC) in ASEM.  
In 2019, ERIA is supporting the ASEM Chair, Cambodia, through a plenary study on Inclusive, 
sustainable and future ready ASEM. Scholars and policy experts from Asia and Europe are 
contributing to this plenary project, which will be presented to the ASEM leaders in the 
summit.  
I am sure that our efforts will continue to bring the people of Asia and Europe closer together, 
and to integrate the two regions as deeply as possible.  
I wish this conference every success over the next days. 
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Opening remarks by Miao Lu 
Co-founder and Vice-President, Center for China and Globalization (CCG) 
It is with great honour to speak at the Asia-Europe Sustainable Connectivity Scientific 
Conference. It is an innovative idea to measure and value the connections between Europe 
and Asia with Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). I much appreciate and admire this 
research dimension and it is worth of learning by other institutions and scholars as well.  
The European Union (EU) and China are two of the biggest traders in the world. In 2019, China 
was the third largest partner for EU exports of goods (9%) and the largest partner for EU 
imports of goods (19%). For Europe, currently China is the EU's second-biggest trading 
partner behind the United States. China highly values the relation with EU and is eager to 
strengthen joint actions with EU and seek for multilateral solutions in order to deal with 
various global challenges and issues. We can strength the ties in people-to-people 
exchanges, fight against climate change, seek for stronger cooperation in business, promote 
the enforcement of intellectual property rights and also work together towards on other 
goals of the SDGs. China is the biggest overseas education market in the world. Amid US’s 
harsh rhetoric, it is likely that U.S. will no longer be the top choice for Chinese students 
seeking for an oversea education. Alternatively, it is estimated that European countries may 
replace US in the future in the overseas education destination.  
All in all, these circumstances show the existing and necessary connectivity and collaboration 
between Asia and Europe. We are living in an integrated world and it is less possible to 
overcome the challenges without collaboration. Particularly with the absence of Trump 
Administration in the multilateral institution, China would like to be a main actor and 
promotor of multilateralism. Moreover, think tanks between two regions can also seek for 
more fields and areas to strengthen the partnership. Center for China and Globalization 
(CCG) as a leading non-government think tank in China is focused on global movement of 
people, international education, globalization, regional connectivity and global governance. 
CCG is the only official Chinese partner of Munich Security Conference and Paris Peace 
Forum and has hosted several activities during these two significant events. In August, CCG 
has jointly released the Chinese language version of the World Migration Report 2020 with 
International Organization of Migration (IOM). We are eager to play more roles in the China-
EU joint research and events of people-to-people exchanges, education, trade, IP, climate 
change and so on.  
I believe this conference will be a productive one with the exchanges of researchers and 
policy analysts from various countries and it will definitely deepen the understanding and 
promote the connectivity between the two continents. It will be a great chance to host this 
event in China and CCG is keen to co-organise it if possible. Finally, wish a great success of 
the Asia-Europe Sustainable Connectivity Scientific Conference in advance.  
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Keynote by Romana Vlahutin: Sustainable 
Connectivity – The European way 
Ambassador-at-Large for Connectivity, European External Action Service 
The European Union (EU) is built thanks to connectivity which is sustainable, comprehensive, 
and rules-based. Connectivity is the EU’s DNA. Our Single Market demonstrates that every 
day.  
After the COVID-19 pandemic, investment in connectivity, in addition to supporting recovery, 
also helps the development of more sustainable, inclusive and resilient economies. 
The EU’s Connectivity strategy is an inclusive platform open for cooperation with all partners. 
Our prosperity and stability is underpinned by connectivity, within the EU itself, its immediate 
neighbourhood and further beyond. Our offer for partnership is based on our key principles: 
sustainability and level playing field. The EU's approach relies on adherence to market rules, 
EU and international requirements and standards, and a level playing field, in order to deliver 
benefits for all parties concerned and in all the countries along the planned routes. 
Infrastructure needs are vast and no country can meet them alone. Both public and private 
capital is indispensable and may only be achieved through due diligence and guarantees 
which reduce risk, for which the EU has the know-how and experience. Cooperation at 
regional and global level is indispensable. 
Given the high costs and long-term nature of such investments, it is critical for us that 
projects are financially, environmentally, socially and fiscally sustainable, are fully transparent, 
and allow a level playing field for our businesses. The present crisis shows why these criteria 
are so important to ensure that all parties concerned benefit, in particular the users, the 
general public and the economy. 
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Connectivity needs a strong rules-based 
multilateral framework – for everyone's sake 
Shada Islam 
Managing Director New Horizons Project & Senior Advisor European Policy Centre 
In September 2019, Friends of Europe released the discussion paper “Connectivity needs a 
strong rules-based multilateral framework – for everyone's sake”. The publication underlines 
the compelling need to multilateralise connectivity by drawing up binding international 
norms, standards and regulations. 
We all know that connectivity generates high rewards. Infrastructure is indispensable to 
Agenda 2030 and achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It improves 
livelihoods, increases mobility and empowers people. Connectivity increases countries’ 
economic competitiveness by improving trade ties and making them more attractive to 
investors. It also plays a role in peace-building and conflict resolution. 
But there are challenges – increased connectivity has engendered fierce global competition. 
An increased number of connectivity actors strains an already tense environment. It can lead 
to duplication of projects – or the implementation of those with contradictory aims – a lack 
of basic standards for sustainability and labour conditions, as well as insufficient consultation 
with civil society or the private sector – both of which stand to lose or gain much through 
connectivity projects. 
We put forward three recommendations for improving connectivity – both in the region and 
beyond. And the name of the game is multilateralism. 
• A plurilateral code of conduct should be created. The EU has already signalled its intention
to engage on enhancing connectivity and finding complementary rules and regulations.
Its Strategy for Connecting Europe and Asia calls for fiscal, environmental, social and
economic sustainability, as well as rules-based frameworks. This could become the basis
of a new rulebook for connectivity which connectivity actors sign on to.
• The Multilateral Cooperation Center for Development Finance (MCDF) – established by
China’s Ministry of Finance and eight multilateral financial institutions – should be
reinforced. Its aim is to foster high-quality infrastructure connectivity investments through 
information-sharing, capacity-building and project preparation. This Center could be built
upon to include all connectivity actors and regions which receive connectivity investment.
It could as well become a dialogue mechanism for exchange on connectivity projects.
• Create an International Connectivity Forum for consultations with the private sector and
civil society. For any infrastructure project to succeed, it must have community backing
and support. And the private sector must be in the loop as well for local training,
procurement exercises and employment. Members of this Forum could keep an eye out
for corruption and project delays, provide community insights, and so on.
• These are the potential building blocks for creating a more connected region – and a more
connected world. They can also help to overcome key challenges to connectivity, such as
transparency, communication, sustainability, inclusion and so on.
We have seen that connectivity can create a healthy sense of competition, but for it to 
succeed it is important to know when to compete, and when to cooperate. What we need is 
connectivity cooperation and collaboration, not connectivity conflicts and confrontation. 
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People-to-People 
Connectivity 
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EU-India Cooperation in Higher Education as an 
Enabler of the ASEM Sustainable Connectivity 
Zane Šime 
Member of the Latvian Political Science Association, Latvia 
Introduction 
There is no better moment for discussing the ASEM connectivity than AESCON, a gathering 
which takes place against the backdrop of recent scholarly appraisals of Mogherini’s focus on 
the EU’s global presence and engagement (Bargués-Pedreny, 2019, p. 2). Likewise, AESCON 
is organised in the wake of the reiterated references to such earlier coined terms as ‘Asian 
century’ (Dams & Verbij, 2019, p. 30), and reassessments of ‘Chindia’ (James, 2019). These are 
just two re-emerging terms which mark the comprehensive shift of the nodes of gravity 
towards Asia and scholarly interest from across ASEM in this process. This article offers a brief 
introduction to smaller-scale developments in higher education and research with a 
particular focus on the Latvia-India ties as a constitutive part of the EU-India relations. Despite 
its compact scope, this two-way stream of interaction is relevant in terms of understanding 
more nuanced developments shaping the overall evolving ties across ASEM. Additionally, 
India is a good choice for further examination of student mobility patterns because its 
leading academic staff have earlier analysed the international higher education 
developments in the globalisation context (Sharma, 2016, pp. 258-259). India along with China 
are well known major sources of large volumes of internationally mobile students, which has 
led Chinese policymakers to view its outgoing students as “people-to-people ambassadors”. 
It has encouraged European scholars to analyse this Chinese approach through the lens of 
the EU educational diplomacy and a student as ‘a soft power projector’ towards both sending 
and receiving countries (Bislev, 2017). Perhaps such a perspective holds the potential to be 
relevant also in the case of other groupings of international students, such as talented and 
ambitious Indians. 
By summarising the latest higher education developments taking place in Riga, the capital 
of Latvia, this extended abstract offers a more nuanced picture of what bilateral 
developments are supporting the EU-India cooperation. The importance of bringing 
attention to specific locations supporting the EU-India ties lies in their capacity to raise the 
future generations of academics, policy-makers and opinion-leaders who would promote 
“shared values and understanding” (Joint Research Centre, n.d., p. 12; Becker et al., 2018, p. 23) 
and be better equipped to uphold the goals enshrined in the Joint Communication 
“Elements for an EU strategy on India” through their first-hand familiarity with the EU sector’s 
relevant for their chosen profession and career.  
Concluding remarks provide a good example of diverging trends, namely, if the macro-
picture offered by the ASEM Sustainable Connectivity Map indicates rather modest 
connections in higher education between the EU and India, then, thanks to a steady rise of 
new collaborative ties and bigger inflows of students, in certain national settings the situation 
is quite the opposite. The importance of a continuous examination of such convergence or 
divergence between macro and micro trends is worth keeping an eye on not solely for the 
mere purpose of tracing the statistical fluctuations. It is also vital for a better grasp of the 
dynamics shaping the EU-India educational diplomacy, especially taking into consideration 
earlier acknowledgements among the experts working for the European institutions that 
18 
“traditional diplomacy is no longer the main channel by which states project their image 
abroad” and “EU’s influence in Asia is its attractiveness to students and researchers 
worldwide” (Vandewalle, 2015, p. 4). 
India-Latvia Higher Education Ties 
This extended abstract is presented in the aftermath of the conference “India-EU 
Engagements: A Decade in Reflection and Way Forward” held at the end of 2019 in Manipal, 
India. The main findings of the (forthcoming) article “The Ripple Effects of EU’s Science 
Diplomacy Towards India” were briefly presented with an emphasis on the valuable 
contribution the Manipal Centre for European Studies of the Manipal Academy of Higher 
Education is delivering in terms of strengthening the current limited student exchange 
between the EU and India. The data on student flows taken from the ASEM Sustainable 
Connectivity Map and complemented with some additional data sources demonstrated 
that, by and large, the next generations of Indians are gaining international academic 
exposure in an ‘Asian Century’ spirit. A lion’s share of Indian students is acquiring a familiarity 
with the Anglo-Saxon and Chinese academic tradition and higher education system. As the 
ASEM Sustainable Connectivity Map displays, the EU hosts some 10% of all Indian students 
studying abroad. Modest numbers of Indian students travel to the EU with the support of 
Erasmus+ Programme (Vandewalle, 2015, p. 15) and via the cooperation networks established 
by two Jean Monnet Centres of Excellence or national initiatives. Latvia is far from the top EU 
Member States on this list of most frequently chosen destinations. While macro-statistics 
paints a rather gloomy picture for the future of the India-EU strategic partnership, the micro-
picture of certain EU national contexts offer a much more encouraging perspective.  
Despite the limited connectivity shown by the ASEM Sustainable Connectivity Map of 164 
Indian students studying in Latvia and one Latvian student studying in India (Joint Research 
Centre, 2019), the most recent statistics of specific EU Member States paint a much more 
dynamic picture. While the tiny statistics of one Latvian student studying in India has 
remained unchanged throughout the academic years of 2015/2016, 2016/2017, 2017/2018, 
2018/2019 (Ministry of Human Resource Development, 2019), Latvia has experienced a steady 
rise of Indian student inflow. In the 2014/2015 academic year – 164, in the 2015/2016 academic 
year – 429, in the 2016/2017 academic year – 750, in the 2017/2018 academic year peaking to 
1233 Indian students studying mostly at the Riga Technical University (518 students), Turiba 
University (259 students), Information Systems Management Institute (181 students), but also 
Transport and Telecommunication Institute (77 students) and EKA University of Applied 
Sciences (54 students), Rīga Stradiņš University (44 students), Rezekne Academy of 
Technologies (39 students) and a list of other institutions hosting less than 20 Indian students 
each (Ministry of Education and Science, 2018, pp. 78, 81-86; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018). 
The described pattern follows the overall tendency of Latvia to host an increasing number of 
international students who are mostly pursuing their studies in Riga. India forms one of the 
widest represented countries of origin (Leiškalne, Briede, & Lopatinskis, 2018, p. 6; Ministry of 
Education and Science, 2018, p. 78).  
One of the explanations for such an increase in Latvia’s hosted Indian students is the earlier 
efforts in strengthening outreach activities. Besides the research and innovation section of 
the EU Delegation to India (Vandewalle, 2015, p. 9), several EU Member States or higher 
education and research institutions based in the EU Member States support accessibility of 
information about study opportunities in the EU. In the case of Latvia, a group of universities 
joined forces to promote the availability of information about study programmes in Latvia. 
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On 31 January 2014, the Study in Latvia Centre was established in Chennai by a consortium 
of Latvian higher education institutions with support of the Latvian Ministry of Education and 
Science (Nagarajan, 2014; Riga Technical University, 2014).  
All in all, an increased familiarity of Indians with Latvia and its higher education is of 
importance not solely for the bilateral ties between Latvia and India, but also for promoting 
wider awareness and familiarity with those EU Member States which are not the traditionally 
prioritised partners for closer interaction. To clarify, earlier analysis state Germany, France and 
the United Kingdom as the primary interlocutors (Kugiel, 2019, p. 2). It should be added that 
international students who have chosen Latvian higher education institutions benefit from 
exposure to an intellectual environment where such public diplomacy elements as 
educational scholarships offered by other ASEM Partner Countries (namely, France, 
Germany, Japan, South Korea) are highly valued (Tabuns, 2019, p. 224). Thus, it is fair to argue 
that Riga offers a conducive environment for the further evolution of ASEM collaborative 
encounters. 
Conclusions 
The examination of EU-India and Latvia-India student exchange patterns remind about an 
earlier assessment of the partnership expressed by Damodaran (1985, p. 366): “The Indo-
European relationship is at a reasonably high level, but by no means at the highest level; it is 
comprehensive, but not exclusive. Almost all individual European countries have much 
greater commitments to some other regions of the world and other individual countries than 
to India. This is a good thing.” It captures a balanced assessment and an overarching view on 
the EU-India relations as a far from a two-way or isolated process, but as ties which are shaped 
with due consideration of other orientations and opportunities that international exposure 
to various collaboration options and destinations offer. No matter what have been the 
fluctuations in statistics of student flows to one or the other study destination over the last 
years, certain long-term patterns captured more than 35 years ago by one of the most iconic 
Indian diplomatic and intellectual voices resonate with the current interactive patterns.  
The steady and considerable increase of Indian students at the Latvian higher education 
institutions demonstrates that there is a considerable value in the earlier expressed intention 
to develop the ASEM Sustainable Connectivity Portal as a continuously updated data 
repository (Joint Research Centre, n.d., 35; Becker et al., 2018, p. 12). Subsequent inputs of more 
recent statistics would allow bringing the ASEM macro-picture up to speed with certain 
major shifts in quantitative landscape characterising some of the most dynamic EU national 
contexts, such as Latvia.  
If Latvia or any other entity engaged in promoting EU-India educational diplomacy would 
aim at tailoring it as a component of a ‘SMART4 public diplomacy’ (Golan, 2014) or draft an 
earlier suggested long-term public diplomacy strategy (Tabuns, 2019, p. 230), then ASEM 
Sustainable Connectivity Portal with continuous data inputs might be a helpful reference 
point both in the drafting phase of new initiatives and the performance evaluation after their 
implementation. 
4 Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic, and Time-bound objectives. 
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Implementation People-to-People Connectivity 
through SHARE Scholarship to strengthen 
ASEAN Identity 
Missy Oktavia Manullang and Yuliana Prasetyawati 
LPSR Communication & Business Institute, Indonesia 
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development reflects the interconnected nature of current 
global challenges. This reveals the need for connectivity as a joint response to achieve the 
Agenda’s goals. Connectivity and sustainability mutually reinforce each other, as so 
connectivity is largely driven by the social pillar of sustainability. In Asia and Europe, the 
Association of South East Asia Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union (EU) bring regional 
experience of creating a framework for connectivity but faces various challenges. Thus, to 
accomplish the systematic project of connectivity, ASEAN has moved towards a regional 
platform through public diplomacy under the ASEAN Community. There is the need to 
strengthen the "we-feeling", referred to as ASEAN identity in serving as a concerted effort in 
building a well-connected community of shared responsibilities.   
ASEAN and EU as dialogue-partners created SHARE through multilateral diplomacy sessions 
and it was formulated based on the ASEAN Socio-cultural Community Blueprint 2025, the 
ASEAN Work Plan on Education 2016-2020 and the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on Higher 
Education of 2015. The project consists of three main components that is Policy Dialogues, 
ASEAN Qualifications Reference Frameworks and Quality Assurance, ASEAN Credit Transfer 
System (ACTS) and ASEAN-EU Credit Transfer Systems (AECTS) which are implemented 
through a scholarship. SHARE is a joint effort by ASEAN and the EU to strengthen Regional 
Cooperation in ASEAN. As stated by SHARE Project Leader from the British Council: 
“Diplomacy, generally is about building relations between countries and ideally for mutual 
benefits or in the worst case, to stop us going to war with different countries. So, that’s what 
diplomacy is about. So, seeing education and culture and all these things, that is part of 
diplomacy, what it does is built trust between different countries or in this case different 
Regions” (G. Slaven, personal communication, July 19, 2018). 
The EU provided 10 million euros of financial support towards ASEAN as their commitment 
in being a dialogue-partner and assisting countries in need.  As stated by the EU Program 
Manager of Education and Culture: “Most importantly, this assistance is the European Union’s 
commitment towards countries in need, especially as one of ASEAN’s Dialogue Partners. 
Certainly, the European Union is very enthusiastic of this Programme. We are not 
implementing the Bologna-Process on ASEAN, but we provide technical inputs. Therefore, 
The EU is very happy and excited to wait for SHARE’s results” (D. Nugroho, personal 
communication, July 3, 2018). 
There are 33 Universities in ASEAN included in the SHARE Programme, such as the University 
of the Philippine, University of Indonesia, National University of Management Cambodia, 
National University of Laos, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, University of Yangon, 
Chulalongkorn University and Viet Nam National University. So far, the SHARE programme 
has sent 400 students Intra-ASEAN. The scholarship includes school fees, living expenses, 
round-trip flights, visas, health insurance, textbooks and other study related expenses for one 
semester. SHARE will foster people-to-people connectivity in ASEAN through a deeper 
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promotion of social and cultural understanding Intra-ASEAN as well as increasing student 
mobility. 
Stoeckel research on social interaction across individuals with different national backgrounds 
found the effectiveness of the inter-group interaction building a collective identity. The 
sample includes almost 1500 students at 38 German universities. Participants who studied 
abroad showed a significant increase in their identification with Europe. However, the longer 
the study duration, the weaker the identification. Three-wave panel data set used by Stoeckel 
allowed him to confirm the stability on identity change. Data shows that studying abroad 
leaves a stable imprint even months after the student returns to their own country and was 
not just a short-lived effect of their excitement on an adventurous journey. Contact with other 
international students proven to be significant in building a shared European identity, while 
contact solely with nationals of host country shows a different impact (Stoeckel, 2016). In 
contrast, Jonsson (2010) questioned the plausibility of Southeast Asian regional identity by 
2020. On a state level, this might be achieved if there is a political will. However, to make 
ASEAN truly regional, the sense of belonging to a common identity must be “imagined” at 
the individual level. Identities are in a constant flux that must be negotiated: They are 
contested depending on political and socio-economic developments. 
Acharya & Layug (2012) states that ASEAN Identity remains important in shaping political 
security, regionalism and international relations in the Asia-Pacific. Southeast Asians only 
need to work on its ASEAN cohesion, unity, and clear regional purpose of the trajectory of 
Asia-Pacific regionalism and its role in it. However, just as important, they must ensure 
Southeast Asian people sense of ownership, in its ongoing search for ASEAN Identity and its 
role in building Asia Pacific Community; if not, community building and regional identity 
projects will be satisficing but unsustainable. 
The purpose of this research is to study the “how” in the implementation of people-to-people 
connectivity through SHARE scholarship program to strengthen ASEAN identity. 
Methodology used is qualitative research along with educational diplomacy concepts and 
common ingroup identity model. Data was gathered through in-depth interview with 
SHARE implementers and awardees allowing detailed information. 
The main finding of this research is that SHARE has a role in strengthening people-to-people 
connectivity and thus, strengthen the ASEAN identity. It facilitates awardees in obtaining 
information on the host country and its society through direct-contacts. Information 
obtained, then it becomes an important component in generating a positive contact 
experience between awardees and their contact partners, hence an interpersonal 
relationship will be established. Interpersonal relationships established through people-to-
people contact will become the main condition to strengthen ASEAN Identity. This research 
has shown ASEAN Identity as a secondary identity possessed by ASEAN people after their 
national identity. As the Director of ASEAN Community Affair stated: “ASEAN Identity is 
something that you or how a person view or associate themselves with the vision of ASEAN. 
That is ASEAN identity. To me, it is like, you could be Indonesia and ASEAN, and you could be 
Singaporean and ASEAN. It is not a zero sum. You can have both identity, and more and more 
people actually growing this.” (Y. Lee, personal communication, October 2, 2018) 
ASEAN Identity is of high importance in a regional cooperation as it strengthens bilateral 
diplomacy between member states, as people-to-people connectivity does. ASEAN Identity 
will push ASEAN people to be more understanding of each other. It has been stated that 
ASEAN Identity is very important, but especially for younger generation; being able to see 
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themselves as a part of ASEAN Vision will be a positive contribution to future ASEAN market-
forces. 
Awardees that experience positive direct contact in their host countries claim to feel a 
stronger identification towards ASEAN. They felt the ASEAN Identity growing and take root 
in themselves. Thida explicitly identify herself as both Cambodian and ASEAN: “Re-adjust no, 
but I do act different. I just feel more mature. Going abroad doesn’t make me forget who I 
am, and how to live in Cambodia. It just made… well just like ASEAN Identity, I am Cambodian 
but also ASEAN.” (T. Sann, personal communication, October 14, 2018) 
This shows the role of SHARE to strengthen ASEAN Identity through people-to-people 
connectivity. When students experience host country first hand, a sense of care will arise. The 
same thing was felt by Fernando as he senses the ASEAN Identity. While in Vietnam, 
Fernando lived in a dormitory with three students from Laos. After returning to Indonesia, 
Fernando began applying for work in other ASEAN member states. 
Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM) developed from the theories of social identity such 
as Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory to intergroup behaviour based on 
the process of social categorization. CIIM explains in inter-group social interaction, contact 
conditions that accentuate a shared ingroup identity will improve the perception and 
attitude within individuals involved. Shift in the perception toward contact-counterpart from 
an outgroup to a more inclusive ingroup will then allow interpersonal relationship to 
cultivates (Gaertner, Rust, Dovidio, Bachman, & Anastasio, 1994). In this research, inter-group 
interaction is interaction between awardees and host nationals. Awardees will be the 
representation of their country and host nationals as the representation of host country. 
Prior intergroup research has closely related “willingness to communicate” as a condition to 
shift perceptions and thus, cultivates interpersonal relationship. This condition is a 
behavioural manifestation of a shared-identity among individuals involved as the common 
ingroup identity they shared encourages a stronger desire to communicate (Pettigrew & 
Tropp, 2006). In SHARE, “willingness to communicate” reflected through awardees 
motivation in applying for the scholarships. 
CIIM highlights the function of shared ingroup identity in shifting the cognitive between 
individuals involved on perceiving others (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2014). Previously, based on the 
motivation they had, it appeared awardees have acknowledged a shared ingroup identity 
among them and students or nationals in the host country. However, based on the results of 
this interview, the awardees had some negative perceptions of the host countries before 
direct contact was possible. This perception was obtained from media coverage. On top of 
that, lack of awardees insight or awareness in regards of the host countries also results in 
negative perceptions. Then, through the facilitation of SHARE, a positive cognitive shift 
occurred within the awardees. Thus, it cultivates a positive interpersonal relationship 
between the inter-group individuals involved. 
To conclude, this research found out the explorative nature within the awardees supported 
them in the process of cultivating interpersonal relationship and hence strengthen the 
ASEAN Identity within them. Educational Diplomacy through SHARE is a way for awardees 
to see, recognize and interact directly with the host nationals; to foster a stronger sense of 
cares and allow the ASEAN Identity to grow and take roots. This research also supports the 
second condition of the Common Ingroup Identity categorisation happened within the 
awardees, a dual identity. 
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The Filipino Diaspora: A comparative analysis of 
OFW Remittances from ASEAN and EU 
Maria Angela G. Zafra 
Strategia Development Research Institute, Inc.; Ateneo de Davao University, School of 
Business and Governance, Philippines 
 
An Overseas Filipino Worker (OFW) is a person of Filipino origin who is temporary living 
outside the Philippines as a migrant worker. As of 2018, the Philippines Statistics Authority 
(2019) estimates that there are 2.3 million OFWs around the world, 96.2% of which have 
existing work contracts. OFWs contributed a total of 32 billion USD in 2018, most of which 
were sent home to the Philippines, through remittances. OFWs contribute to the economic 
growth of both the Philippines as the country of origin and the countries where they work. 
In a largely domestically driven economy like the Philippines, more remittances inflow just 
means more domestic demand, and increasing domestic demand induces more economic 
expansion. At the same time, OFWs who are professionals and highly skilled workers are 
employed in industries and economic activities that fuel the economic activities and 
contribute to the economic growth of the countries that they work in. 
This paper analyses OFW activity within Asia and compares it to the activity within Europe. 
More specifically, it analyses OFW remittances from ASEAN and EU from the lens of 
supranational organizations that promoted an integrated economy from among member-
states. The analysis includes implications for the Filipino workforce in light of significant geo-
political changes such as Brexit and ASEAN integration and corresponding implications for 
the Philippine economy. 
This study utilizes secondary data available from the ASEM Sustainable Connectivity Portal. 
The analysis is also supplemented by data from other databases such as the Philippine 
Statistics Authority. OFW-specific data is retrieved from the Commission for Filipinos 
Overseas. This is corroborated with secondary qualitative data from the official reports of 
government agencies that monitor foreign migrant workers.  
Figure 1 describes the distribution of OFW by country of destination for work. Middle Eastern 
countries continue to lead in the receipt of OFWs, followed by East Asian countries such as 
Japan, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Amongst other ASEAN countries, OFWs are mainly employed 
in Malaysia and Singapore. Europe represents one twelfth of OFWs. Unlike OFWs, majority of 
the stock of migrant Filipinos are based OECD countries – the United States, EU countries, 
and Australia (Asis, 2017) 
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Figure 1: Distribution of OFWs by work abroad, 2018. Source: Philippine Statistics Authority (2019) 
 
OFW activity is part of the economic and financial cluster of the ASEM Connectivity Score 
with personal remittance (received and paid) as the primary indicator. Figure 2 shows that 
personal remittances are the strongest indicator for economic connectivity for the 
Philippines while trade was the weakest. OFW remittances has reached US$ 30.2 billion for 
the first eleven months of 2019 (Noble, 2019). In contrast, the trade deficit was US$ 34.6 billion 
during the same period (ING, 2020).  
 
Figure 2: Economic and financial scores for the Philippines. Source: ASEM Sustainable Connectivity 
Portal dataset (2018). 
 
Amongst ASEAN member-states, the Philippines is third in personal remittances in terms of 
intensive connectivity given the country’s 105 million population against the smaller size of 
Brunei (430 thousand) and Cambodia (16 million). However, in terms of extensive 
connectivity, the Philippines is responsible for the largest flows of remittances in ASEAN.  
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Figure 3: Personal remittances for ASEAN countries, intensive (left) and extensive (right). Source: ASEM 
Sustainable Connectivity Portal dataset (2018). 
An analysis of OFW remittances in Figure 4 reveals that cash remittances make up the 
majority of personal remittances and both figures continue to grow on a year-to-year basis. 
OFW remittances contribute to 11% of the country’s GDP. In contrast, the business process 
outsourcing, the largest industry sector in the Philippines, contributes to 9% of GDP. 
Figure 4: Personal and cash remittance of OFWs, million US$, 2009-2019. Source: Bangko Sentral ng 
Pilipinas (2020). 
Figure 5 disaggregates personal remittances inflow to Philippines by country of destination. 
Amongst Asia-Pacific countries, Malaysia makes the largest contribution to the inflow of 
remittances, which is intriguing given that there are more OFWs in Singapore than its 
neighbouring country. Remittances from Italy and the United Kingdom make up the largest 
inflow, but these are still smaller compared to the top Asia-Pacific countries. Given the 
importance of the UK, monitoring OFW activity in the region will be critical with Brexit 
looming on the horizon. 
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Figure 5: Personal remittances inflow to the Philippines. Source: ASEM Sustainable Connectivity Portal 
dataset (2018). 
From a policy perspective, the paper also analyses the policy landscape in ASEAN and EU and 
identifies the enablers and barriers for Overseas. Furthermore, a closer look will be taken on 
the Philippine government’s policies for migrant workers to identify gaps in the mechanisms 
to protect the welfare of citizens who choose to become overseas Filipino workers. 
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The aim of this paper is to understand the mechanisms through which accounting on the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) 9 and SDG 17 contribute to transform European and 
Asian countries using statistical and machine learning models. All the SDGs can only be 
realized with strong global partnerships and cooperation. Economic activities, are being 
pressured to direct their actions towards sustainable performance, more specifically in its 
social and environmental facets. Countries can to deal with these pressures using 
collaborative efforts to share ideas and foster innovation. Sustainable development requires 
radical and systemic innovations. In this paper, we present results of a study conducted on 
the ASEM Sustainable Connectivity Portal dataset for Asian and European countries in order 
to examine the relationship between innovation and sustainable performance. Data analysis 
was carried out mainly through Cronbach’s Alpha reliability analysis of scales, descriptive 
analysis of measures, and especially cluster analysis and analysis of variance (ANOVA). The 
main results categorise the countries into more sustainable, less sustainable and relatively 
sustainable, according to their performance profiles. The study also highlights the 
relationship between size of the country and its effect on the collaboration. The literature 
review as well the evidence suggests a greater relevance of the relationship between 
collaboration and sustainable performance. The study contributes to the advancement of 
the sustainable connectivity by highlighting the relationship between innovation and 
sustainable performance. 
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Abstract 
Considering the urgency of growing equality through one of the largest and most potential 
industries, tourism, leads to the context of how tourism contributes to inclusive growth. This 
research aims to investigate whether tourism-based development can lead to the 
inclusiveness of the city by modifying the conceptual framework of Tourism-Driven Inclusive 
Growth Diagnostic (TDIG-D) from Bakker (2018). The new conceptual framework does not 
only focus on proximate factors that influence the quantitative outcome of tourism-driven 
inclusive growth measurement but also other possible determinants of the growth process 
and the distribution of the outcome growth. The job quality reflects the factor that affects the 
growth and distribution of the outcome, while participation in planning and implementation 
represents the factor that influences the process to achieve inclusiveness through tourism 
development. 
Keywords 
Inclusive growth, inclusive tourism, inclusive city, job quality, participation 
Introduction 
Cities are facing more challenges as more rapid urbanization is predicted that 70% of the 
world population will live in an urban area (World Bank, 2018). Unpreparedness urbanization 
actors in facing economic and social competition are one of the core reasons for income gap, 
crime and social conflict, discrimination, urban pollution, and evidence that urbanization is 
not yet in the right path in providing equal living conditions for all citizens. Bringing up the 
equality issues as well as talking about inclusiveness. Making the city more inclusive has 
essential role to ensure the poor and vulnerable group in accessing all opportunities to 
improve their quality of life, take them out from poverty, and involve or engage in 
development process (World Bank, 2009; Klasen, 2010; Haan, 2013; Aoyagi & Ganelli, 2015; 
Kanbur & Rauniyar, 2009; Ali, 2007; Chou & Huque, 2016). 
Making use effectively of inclusive cities must be applied in the potential sector, and it could 
be different between cities, regions, or even countries. Among those sectors, this study chose 
tourism as a potential sector especially for developing countries to generate economic 
growth. The tourism sector has generated 10.4% of all global economic activities and provides 
about 319 million jobs in 2018 (WWTC, 2019). In contrast, we cannot deny that the rapid 
tourism development also leads to environment and wildlife degradation, social issues, and 
some human-made disasters. Given those positive and negative impacts of the tourism 
industry on society, it is remaining the question of whether tourism development has a 
positive or negative sign to the inclusiveness of growth in the city. 
31 
From the previous studies, the determinations of inclusive growth are rarely focusing on 
specific sectors, such as the tourism sector. There is one conceptual framework which 
consists of tourism constraint to achieve inclusive growth proposed by Bakker (2018), but it 
did not cover all main principle of inclusive growth. In order to fill those gaps, this study 
proposes a new framework of Tourism Driven Inclusive Growth by developing the existing 
one, concerning not only in inclusive and productive employment but also in how they can 
help to reduce poverty and generate the community to participate or get involved in the 
development process. The poverty context is used to represent the outcome of tourism-
driven inclusive growth, quantity and quality of the job will reflect the equal outcome 
distribution, and participation context will show whether the development process itself is 
inclusive or not. This framework is expected to become the guideline to reveal what is the 
factor that influences inclusive growth and help to arrange in which limitation the policy 
should address. 
 
Methodology 
This study was based on work performed by previous research related to tourism-driven 
inclusive growth or T-DIGD Framework. Tourism-Driven Inclusive Growth Diagnostics (T-
DIGD) was made by adapting the Growth Diagnostics framework by Hausmann et al. (2005) 
which is figuring out the policy priorities by identifying the binding constraints on economic 
activity. T-DIGD framework consisted of constraints that influence the possibility of marginal 
group excludes from the tourism benefits. The existing framework was modified by 
constraints from various evidence of various cases. Collected references were discussed and 
built new insight into the new framework. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
According to Bakker’s T-DIGD framework, inclusiveness of growth from tourism activities 
focus on availability and access of opportunities caused by tourism activities and its outcome 
both monetary and non-monetary, but the great sense of inclusive growth has not included 
yet. Overview for some previous research built the new T-DIGD framework which consisted 
of poverty reduction, equal distribution of opportunities and social involvement or 
participation. Tourism development which can create inclusive city is expected to distribute 
more opportunities to marginalized groups, such as poor people, than non-poor people 
(Ashley,2000; Scheyvens & Biddulph, 2018). The constraints which may cause the uneven 
access of the poor to the opportunities are different among individuals as different 
circumstance they are experiencing (Truong et al., 2014). Tourism impact on poverty 
reduction is also influenced by broad regulation, destination assets, and characteristics, 
institution structure, and type of tourism product (Winters et al., 2013). 
As tourism development occurs, the real, direct, and general outcome that can be felt by the 
poor is an increase in income through higher numbers and more accessible job/employment 
opportunities. The importance of job/employment for building inclusive cities trough the 
tourism sector is not just the quantity but also the quality. Whether the jobs/employment 
provided by tourism development as ‘decent’ or ‘good’ job is expected to reveal which their 
limiting factors in achieving inclusive city are. The growth and access to job/employment 
opportunities may be influenced by the capacity of human resources, infrastructure, 
business  environment,  and  how  the  policy  or  government  positions  tourism  to  generate  
productive job/employment (Bakker, 2018) while the quality itself covers satisfaction to the 
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job/employment such as on the wage, working hour, safety, and security of working place 
(Findlay et al., 2013; Drobnic et al., 2010; Diaz- Chao et al., 2016; Esenaliev & Ferguson, 2019). 
In order to ensure that the tourism development process itself is inclusive, the ways tourism 
generate their participation level were applied in the proposed framework. Same as the 
above ideas, making tourism can contribute to the inclusive city means to remove the 
limitation of the poor to participate in the tourism development process. Tosun (2000) 
categorized those challenges and limitations into three: operational, structural, and cultural 
limitations. Operational limitation focus on operational procedure which can influence the 
capacity of people to participate in tourism such as political and administrative system, how 
the information is distributed, and how people respond to the information (Tosun, 2000; Kim 
et al., 2014). Structural limitations are more about financial matters such as income level, elite 
dominant or power structure, and the roles of stakeholders who involves in the process, while 
cultural limitations can be defined as self-awareness and capacity to response the offered 
opportunities (Tosun, 2000; Mensah, 2017; Kim et al., 2014). 
 
 
Figure 1: Modification of Tourism-Driven Inclusive Growth Diagnostic (T-DIGD) Framework. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
The remaining question of whether the tourism industry can contribute to the inclusiveness 
of the city or not has led to the concept of the Tourism-Driven Inclusive Growth framework 
(T-DIGD). It consists of the constraints that can affect the exclusion of some vulnerable groups 
in the society in accessing the opportunities in job/employment, participation, and even 
benefits from tourism development. Implementation of this framework to the real case with 
appropriate qualitative and quantitative measurements will give a detailed mechanism of 
correlation between tourism and inclusive growth. This framework also can be one of the 
tools to drive tourism-based city development policies and further related research. 
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The achievement and the preservation of the energy security condition - namely “the 
availability of energy at all times, in various forms, in sufficient quantities, and at affordable 
prices” (International Energy Agency, 2019) - represents one of the key factors in order to 
ensure and to support the economic growth, development and modernization of the 
countries in the global scenario. 
Within the framework of the ASEAN-EU Plan of Action 2018-2022, ASEAN and EU have been 
engaged to enhance their energy cooperation, working together to have free access to 
energy reserves in the global markets as well as supporting common initiatives to combat 
climate change, to cut polluting emissions in order to promote a cleaner energy transition 
(ASEAN Official Website 2017). 
We can observe that in the energy sphere ASEAN and EU energy share two relevant issues: 
• a similar energy landscape, characterized by the depletion of existing hydrocarbon 
reserves, high energy demand and consequent rising imports, the need to diversify 
the energy mix necessary for the electricity production, mainly using renewable 
sources in order to meet the international commitments to cut emissions; 
• ASEAN and EU share the same approach in terms of diversification of the energy mix 
and the development of a regional energy grid, mainly fuelled with renewable sources, 
which will allow them to produce “clean electricity” that it will be progressively 
allocated to satisfy rising domestic demand (Indeo, 2019). 
At present ASEAN is the fifth largest economy in the world (if we conceive ASEAN as a single 
country) and one of the most dynamic and fastest growing economic regions: in the next 
years, ASEAN region will rise its energy demand to support this economic growth. As a matter 
of fact, according to IRENA & ACE’s comprehensive report (2016) the expected population's 
increase in the ASEAN region - from around 615 million in 2014 to 715 million by 2025 - will 
lead to a 4 percent annual growth in energy demand until 2025, amounting to a rise of 50 
percent over 2014 level, and electricity demand will double between 2014 and 2025. 
Hydrocarbons (oil, natural gas and coal) will cover most of this expected increase of the 
energy demand: this scenario will impose to ASEAN countries the urgent need to address 
and to rebalance two different issues and problems: 
• with the exception of coal, the region has limited indigenous oil and natural gas 
supplies (Brunei Darussalam and Indonesia excluded): in order to satisfy the growing 
domestic demand ASEAN countries have to increase energy imports, exposing 
regional energy security to a condition of high vulnerability. 
• these (imported) fossil fuels will further boost carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and 
exacerbate local air pollution, worsening the effects of the climate change in this is 
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highly vulnerable area, posing a particular threat to farmers and coastal communities 
especially in Vietnam’s Mekong Delta. 
In this context, renewable energy sources (RES) appear the best option to increase ASEAN 
and EU energy security through greater diversification of the energy mix and by reducing 
demand for imported fossil fuels. 
EU policies to strengthen energy security are primarily focused on the geographic 
diversification of energy suppliers and import routes - mainly aimed to reduce the 
dependence on oil and gas imports from Russia - and the efforts to increase domestic 
production of renewable sources to produce clean electricity (European Commission, 2014). 
At present, the EU is the only major economic actor producing more than 50 percent of its 
electricity without greenhouse gas emissions, accounting for 28.5 percent renewable energy 
and 25.5 percent nuclear energy (Eurostat, 2019). 
ASEAN countries have adopted the Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation (APAEC) 2016-2025, 
which includes the ambitious goal to achieve 23 percent renewable energy in total primary 
energy supply by 2025: the realization of the key objective implies a two-and-a-half-fold 
increase in the modern renewable energy share compared to 2014 (ASEAN Official Website 
2017). 
In addition to their commitment to increase RES production, both EU and ASEAN are 
engaged to implement ambitious regional energy grids, mainly fuelled with renewable 
sources: as a matter of fact, the project to create an ASEAN Power Grid follows the EU attempt 
to create an EU-Mediterranean electricity ring and the EU Northern electricity ring (involving 
Scandinavian and EU Northern countries), building regional interconnections and producing 
“clean electricity” through RES, mainly solar and wind (Indeo, 2019). 
EU's goal to develop energy transport infrastructures, mainly the key cross-border 
interconnections between member states, overlaps with the leading idea to shape the 
ASEAN Economic Community which calls for a well-connected ASEAN to drive an integrated, 
competitive and resilient region also in the energy sphere. 
The ASEAN Power Grid (APG) project has been conceived as an inclusive initiative aimed at 
realizing an integrated regional energy system. This project will become the centrepiece of 
the regional power architecture, encompassing all the 10 members of ASEAN. 
It is expected to enhance electricity trade across regional borders, which would provide 
benefits to meet the rising energy demand with clean and sustainable electricity supplies 
delivered through integrated infrastructures. 
The APG project is an interesting project of regional cooperation because it is conceived to 
combine the different renewable energy sources that ASEAN countries are able to produce 
(ASEAN Center for Energy, 2015). As a matter of fact, ASEAN region can benefit of a huge and 
differentiated renewable potential which can support the ambitious strategy to increase 
endogenous production of clean electricity. Lao is the leading ASEAN country about hydro-
power potential, and at present this country exports electricity to Thailand, Vietnam, China, 
Cambodia and Myanmar. Moreover, solar power is widely diffused in the region (Vietnam, 
Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia) and appears as one of the most profitable sources, thanks 
to the very high strong irradiance which characterizes the area. Geothermal energy is 
another interesting option to increase RES production in Southeast Asia, considering the 
existing huge potential, which accounts for 25 percent of the world’s geothermal generation 
capacity. Most of the regional capacity is located in the Philippines and Indonesia, which 
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could give a relevant contribution to implement this regional “clean energy” grid 
(International Energy Outlook, 2017). 
The landscape of political cooperation and good relations which characterizes ASEAN region 
appear the main preconditions of the success in the implementation of the ASEAN Power 
Grid project, which will help these countries to diversify the energy mix, reducing the 
dependence on imports thanks to the distribution of regional-produced clean electricity. 
In the EU case, a regional electricity grid has been successfully created only in Northern 
Europe - as the result of the fruitful cooperation among Nordic countries (Finland, Sweden, 
Denmark and Norway) able to produce clean electricity by the wind - while the instability 
scenario in North Africa (previously identified as a potential producer of clean electricity, 
mainly from solar due to the huge solar power potential of these semi-desertic land) has 
frozen all European projects to realize an integrated energy grid in the southern shore of the 
Mediterranean (Indeo, 2019) 
 
Conclusions 
Starting from a similar energy security scenario, the cooperation between ASEAN and EU in 
the energy sphere have to be mainly tailored to improve bilateral dialogue about common 
issues and to work together in the international scenario. 
ASEAN and EU common goal to shift their energy system from hydrocarbons to renewable 
sources is not only linked to economic issues or ensuring security of supplies, but also reflects 
their mutual engagement to address climate change. As signatories of the Paris climate deal, 
ASEAN and EU have to align their positions in the international fora, pursuing a 
comprehensive approach to tackle the impact of climate change and promoting sustainable 
development, as a promising framework of enhanced cooperation. 
In economic terms, the ASEAN region will need to invest $27 billion annually in renewable 
energy capacity, a total of $290 billion by 2025, in order to meet the 23 percent renewable 
energy goal: the EU must support this ambitious program, both in political and economic 
terms, given the relevant impact of this “clean” energy shift promoted by ASEAN working 
together to enhance the international visibility of their attempts and engagement to 
promote a decarbonisation process. 
The convergence of strategic energy interests among ASEAN countries and their good-
neighbourhood relations makes realistic the creation of a regional integrated power grid, 
which could be a reference model also for the EU, within which member countries appear 
more interested to preserve their own energy security condition rather than working 
together to achieve a shared and common goal. 
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Background 
Up to today, the electricity system in most parts of the world is characterised by a 
unidirectional power flow of electricity centrally generated in large, mainly fossil-fuel based 
power plants. While this supports capital accumulation and scale economics, it also leads to 
environmental and economic problems (Giotitsas, Pazaitis, & Kostakis, 2015) ⁠. These issues 
include high costs of infrastructure, the vulnerability of the system reliability when the system 
is exposed to terrorist attacks or extreme weather events and market failure, such as 
monopolistic utilities and prices that fail to reflect local scarcity and surplus. With decreasing 
costs for renewable energy technologies and supporting policies in many countries around 
the globe, the share of electricity generated from renewable sources is growing rapidly. In 
addition to the centralised approach, more and more decentralised and distributive 
alternatives have emerged in recent years. Distributed electricity systems (DES) such as 
rooftop solar, distributed wind power or small biomass plants that generate energy close to 
where energy is consumed are extensions of the existing system. If more electricity is 
generated than needed, the distributed energy owners have different options on how to 
handle the electricity surplus. They can a) waste/curtail the electricity; b) store the electricity 
surplus; c) feed the electricity into the grid; or d) trade electricity in a local energy market, if 
this is permitted in the respective jurisdiction.  
A local electricity market is an electricity exchange platform on the distribution level of the 
grid between interconnected participants, such as small-scale energy generators, 
consumers and prosumers (consumers who also generate electricity). When we think of a 
local electricity market, we can think of a software, rather than an analogue exchange 
platform. In the first step, electricity is generated, measured and logged into smart meters. 
In the next step, both generators and consumers send their bids (or calls) to the market 
platform. Supply and demand are matched according to the market mechanism. After the 
deal is made, the smart meters are updated. Due to the nature of electricity, market 
participants cannot track the specific electrons that are exchanged. The electricity can either 
be supplied by the main grid or from distributed storage.  
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Figure 1: Simplified depiction of a local electricity market (LEM). 
 
The increasing number of research papers on "local electricity markets" and "local energy 
markets" shows that the scientists' interest in the topic is increasing. One reason for this 
growing interest is that local electricity markets can give an incentive for participation in 
demand-response mechanism and therefore increase the much needed flexibility in the 
system. While there are many comparisons and analysis of local electricity markets in Europe 
(Mengelkamp, Diesing, & Weinhardt, 2019; Sousa, Soares, Pinson, & Moret, 2019), the concept 
is still quite new in China and not a lot of research has been done. Both, in the legislation of 
the European Union (EU) as well of the Peoples Republic of China, the term “local electricity 
market” is not mentioned in the above mentioned sense. However, similar concepts and pilot 
projects can be found in the two regions. In order to find similarities and differences between 
the implementation in the EU and in China, government publications from both regions 
were screened for concepts connected to the phenomenon “local electricity market”.  
 
Short overview of “Local electricity market” policies in the EU and in China 
In the EU, the major energy market reforms are based on the three Electricity Directives, 
which were adopted by the EU Parliament and the Council in 1996, 2003 and 2009 (European 
Parliament and Council, 1996, 2003, 2009). These directives introduced a European electricity 
market and common rules for the internal electricity market, as well as the unbundling of 
distribution and transmission systems and consumer rights for the free choice of the 
provider. In the next Electricity Directive in 2018, the terms “active consumers” and 
“renewable self-consumers” were defined (European Parliament and Council, 2018). In 2019 
with the “Clean Energy Package for all Europeans”, the role of “active consumers” is 
strengthened again (European Commission, 2019). Although the implementation of the 
guidelines may differ in each of the EU member states, these laws now allow consumers to 
store, sell and consume their self-generated electricity. Consumers can also participate in 
demand mechanisms or energy efficiency programmes. 
China’s last round of market reforms started in 2015, with the “Deepening Reform of the 
Power Sector” (“Document No.9”) (CCCPC & State Council, 2015). In addition to the market-
based instruments, the “energy internet”, China’s version of the smart grid, is also 
highlighted. In 2017, the National Energy Agency (NEA) announced the implementation of 
market pilots for distributed energy (NEA, 2017). Details of what these markets could look like 
41 
are published and put up for discussion one year later (NEA, 2018). In 2019, a list of market 
pilots for decentralised energy was issued by the government (NDRC, 2019).  
 
The concept of a “local electricity market” in the EU and in China 
Table 1 shows an overview of the “local electricity market” concepts in the EU and in China. 
 
Table 1: Comparison of “local electricity market” concepts in the EU and in China. 
Component EU China 
Regulation 2018/2001/EC directive, Clean Energy 
Package for all Europeans⁠ 
Outline of the pilot program for distributed 
power generation market trading, Distributed 
Generation Management Measures, List of the 
market-oriented trading pilots for distributed 
generation 2019 
Concepts Renewable energy community, citizens 
energy community, active consumer, 
renewable-self consumer 
Distributed energy owner, trading pilots for 
distributed power generation 
Participants Renewable self-consumers, individually or 
through aggregator 
Distributed energy owners, mostly commercial or 
industrial consumers 
Market mechanisms Sell through renewables power purchase 
agreements, electricity suppliers and peer-
to- peer trading arrangements 
3 options: 1) direct trade, 2) entrusted sales, and 3) 
sales to grid 
Pilot projects Many projects with different objectives, e.g. 
EMPOWER, P2P Smart Test, EcoGrid, NOBEL 
26 pilot projects announced in 2019 
Project developer Cooperation of different stakeholders, often 
universities as driving force;  cooperation of 
academia with industry partners, usually 
with government support 
Government in the centre, in cooperation with 
industry and research institutions 
 
Conclusion 
Neither in EU legislation nor in Chinese legislation can we find the term “local electricity 
market” with the definition used in academic texts. Instead, we find the phenomenon 
described in other terms. While the EU's texts emphasize the role and rights of consumers, 
the focus in China is on technical regulations and the definition of market mechanisms. The 
two jurisdictions are alike in that a strategy is defined at the highest, central level, which is 
then implemented at the level of the member states (EU) or provinces (China). Nevertheless, 
the influence on the content differs considerably in the two regions. While in China a 
selection of market mechanisms is defined at the central level, the design of the market 
mechanisms in the EU is mostly at the project level. Moreover, in the EU, main participants 
are residential households, while in China, the focus lies on commercial and industrial 
enterprises. 
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Introduction 
This papers looks at institutional aspects of economic cooperation in the energy sector, 
especially the interplay between the European Union (EU) energy law and the provisions of 
the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) entered into by and between the EU and Singapore. The so-
called regulatory exemptions regarding interconnectors serve to exemplify the intricate 
nature of this interplay. As far as those exemptions are concerned, the research builds 
prevailingly on the case law referred to in this extended abstract which is regrettably hardly 
more developed than academic literature (Szydło 2009, Däuper and Wüstehoff 2009, Talus 
2013, Talus 2014).  
Anticipating the unquestionable complexity of this field, I shall commence by clarifying the 
concept and importance of interconnectors, proceed to discuss axiological convergence and 
continuity between FTA and EU energy market regulations and conclude by pointing out 
disruptions in the continuity between FTA and EU market regulations. 
 
Interconnectors as critical pieces of infrastructure in international trade   
The definition of interconnectors under EU energy law differs with reference to energy and 
gas markets. From the energy market perspective legislation adopts strictly intra-EU optics 
whilst the gas market approach encompasses international considerations.  
In either instance the interconnector acts as a gateway to the common market and is a key 
to the business of manufacturers and importers. The attempt to capture gas pipelines with 
third countries within the EU regulatory framework poses challenges from an international 
law viewpoint concerning the scope of EU territory and its territorial jurisdiction as well as the 
ascertainment of jurisdictional link vis-à-vis territorial reach of decision-making powers and 
practice of EU institutions and Member States.  
 
Axiological convergence and continuity between the FTA and EU market regulations 
It its chapter dedicated to the energy sector, the FTA focuses on removing or reducing tariffs 
nontariff and barriers as well as cooperating to foster regulatory convergence with or towards 
regional and international standards. According to Article 7.4 FTA both the EU and Singapore 
shall ensure that the terms, conditions and procedures for the connection and access to 
electricity transmission grids are transparent and do not discriminate against suppliers of the 
other Party. The FTA includes numerous other commitments to non-discrimination, i.a. in the 
field of export licensing procedures, customs laws and penalties imposed for a breach 
thereof. Notably, the parties to the FTA also agreed to avoid unnecessary or discriminatory 
burdens on economic operators. The language of the FTA resonates within Article XI:1 GATT 
1994, which stipulates that no prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other 
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charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other 
measures, shall be instituted or maintained.  
The principle of non-discrimination forms one of the cornerstones of the EU law; under 
jurisprudence constante it ‘permeates’ the legislation and application thereof. This principle 
manifests itself both in horizontal and vertical relations, i.e. respectively among market 
operators and between undertakings and the state (or the EU). Horizontal non-
discrimination in the access to infrastructure is enshrined in Article 32 item (1) Gas Market 
Directive as well as Article 6 item (1) Energy Market Directive and cascaded into multiples 
other acts. General principles set out in the directives are complemented by i.a. regulations 
on the access to networks (Regulation 715/2009 and Regulation 2019/943) as well as network 
codes, especially establishing the rules of capacity allocation mechanisms. This non-
discriminatory access to infrastructure enjoys duplicate protection under the EU law by 
means of public enforcement through regulatory measures and remedies addressing 
competition concerns, beside private enforcement thereof. The EU law also guarantees 
vertical non-discrimination in the adoption and execution of measures related to gas and 
energy markets (Article 3 items 1 and 2 Directive (EU) 2009/73/EC; Article 3 items 3-5 Directive 
(EU) 2019/944). EU rules on state aid and services of general economic interests (public 
service obligations) complement the aforesaid regulatory framework (Talus 2013). 
There exist, however, measures under the EU law the application of which requires a great 
deal of caution from a viewpoint of international trade concerns. Those entail the certification 
of third country transmission system operator, third country investor scrutiny under 
Hydrocarbon Directive 94/22/EC, Foreign Direct Investment screening under Regulation (EU) 
2019/452 and, last but not least, regulatory exemptions.  
 
Disruptions in the continuity between FTA and EU market regulations 
Regulatory exemptions under EU energy law (Article 36 Gas Market Directive, Article 64 
Regulation 2019/943) result in a long-term waiver of the application of energy market rules 
including third party access with respect to i.a. interconnectors (Gökҫe 2019). Their purpose 
is to overcome the risk pertinent to capital-intensive investments in the energy infrastructure 
and allow the investor to recoup its investment outlays incurred. The grant of such 
exemptions requires an examination of several market-related conditions regarding the 
distortion of competition and functioning of European market. Unlike in the gas industry, in 
the electricity market the regulatory exemptions are not premised over a lack of adverse 
impact on the security of supplies. Each decision of this nature requires an approval of the 
European Commission and, in the light of a recent General Court judgment (T-883/16), it has 
to be in line with the energy solidarity principle.  
The regulatory exemptions normally encompass obligations, e.g. determine restrictions in 
booking the capacities (e.g. Article 3 Porto Empedocle LNG Terminal decision, point 71 of 
Shannon LNG Terminal decision) or impose a maximum import through „unregulated” 
capacities (e.g. OPAL Gas Pipeline initial decision of 2009).  
This is clearly a doubled-edged sword in international trade as it either gives preferential 
treatment to the investor, limits their unbridled usage of their infrastructure or blocks non-
discriminatory access to the installations for other market players. At least two disputes are 
now pending before the Court of Justice of the European Union regarding the application of 
these exemptions on the electricity market T-738/18 (refusal to grant the exemption) and on 
the gas market C-848/19 P (revisiting the conditions during the term of the exemption).  
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The latter concerns the OPAL Gas Pipeline. The background to this dispute offers ample 
exemplification of how complex and intertwined regulatory exemptions are (Pirani and 
Yafimava 2016, Yafimava 2017). Originally, under the initial decision of 2009 the utilization of 
the OPAL Gas Pipeline was subject to conditions intended to address concerns about market 
monopolization and security of supply yet not devoid of controversy (Szydło 2019, Däuper and 
Wüstehoff 2009). They were, however, challenged by the Russian Federation under the 
World Trade Organization regime. Those conditions were subsequently amended, prior to 
any determination by the WTO and for reasons beyond the international trade law concerns, 
bringing further upheaval. This time several controversies arose with respect to the 
functioning of the market and security of supply (Godzimirski 2018), leading to the 
annulment of the OPAL Gas Pipeline amendment decision of 2016. The General Court 
judgment is now under appeal.   
As showcased in a dispute adjudicated by a WTO panel of the Dispute Settlement Body 
(WT/DS476/R, final report of 10 August 2018, the Appellate Body review pending), the nature 
of those exemptions and conditions imposed by the European Commission in decisions 
according them may give rise to discriminatory treatment and quantitative measures 
tantamount in their effects to quotas. In its final report the WTO panel found that ‘two 
challenged OPAL conditions, that is, the 50% capacity cap and 3 bcm/year gas release 
programme, are inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994’.  
This, however, lacks direct effect within the EU. International agreements concluded by the 
EU become an integral part of the EU legal system (Case 181/73 Haegeman). The conclusion 
of the agreement makes it directly applicable. However, direct applicability does not equate 
direct effect. The determination of the latter requires a two-prong test, i.e. verification 
whether the ‘nature and the broad logic’ of the agreement does not preclude direct effect 
and the provisions thereof are ‘unconditional and sufficiently precise’  (Joined Cases C-659/13 
and C-34/14 C & J Clark International). Agreements found to lack direct effect include the 
GATT (Joined Cases C-659/13 and C-34/14 C & J Clark International) (Cannizzaro, Palchetti and 
Wessel 2011, Leal-Arcas 2019). This position is likely to apply to the FTA too.  
Those observations are relevant in particular in the context of Singapore’s investments in 
renewable energy generating installations (compare Article 7.3 (1) FTA) and LNG import 
traded via Singapore. Both spheres of economic cooperation contribute to the attainment of 
climate goals pursued by the EU and Singapore. EU law offers sufficient safeguards to accord 
the rights to Singaporean investors, yet certain measures need to be applied with a degree 
of caution.  
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Introduction: China, a key (f)actor of connectivity and climate governance 
China has become a major player in infrastructure development, especially in Eurasia, as well 
as a key actor within the international climate change regime. This has been illustrated both 
by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – the world’s leading connectivity initiative – and the 
negotiations of the Paris Agreement and its implementation rulebook. In addition, the 
Chinese sponsored BRI, which already encompasses more than 120 countries and around 
40% of the world’s Gross Domestic Product (International Monetary Fund 2020), will play a 
fundamental role in framing future carbon trajectories and thus achieving or not the Paris 
Agreement ‘ well below 2 degrees Celsius’ objectives (2DS) (Tsinghua Center for Finance and 
Development, 2019). 
From this perspective it is not surprising that, at least at the rhetorical level, Chinese leaders 
and major development actors have called for the alignment of the BRI with the Paris 
Agreement.  However, data on Chinese investment by different types of energy projects 
(Zhou et al., 2018; Aminjonov et al., 2019) and some reports on the behaviour of Chinese 
international contractors seem to question such alignment. This research uses both primary 
and secondary research, including semi-structured elite interviews with Chinese 
stakeholders and primary textual sources respectively to determine whether the alignment 
of Chinese infrastructure projects along the BRI with the climate change regime is merely 
rhetorical, a genuine aspiration or whether said alignment is in fact taking place. 
 
Tackling climate change: A green regulatory ecosystem for Chinese investments 
‘Greening’ the BRI and implementing the objectives of the Paris Agreement can build on a 
growing body of green policies for China’s overseas and BRI investments, including the 2019 
Green Investment Principles and the BRI International Green Development Coalition, one of 
whose thematic partnerships is devoted to Green Finance and Investment. Chinese policy 
and major commercial banks involved in the BRI – like the China Development Bank (CDB) 
and the Export-Import Bank of China (Exim) – have also displayed their commitment to 
tackle climate change and sustainability and have recently adopted green frameworks for 
investment (see Figure 1) while increasingly resorting to green financial tools like green 
bonds. In addition, some Chinese financing institutions, like the People’s Bank of China and 
the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, are proactive in leading world initiatives on 
green finance and climate change disclosure like the Network for Greening the Financial 
System and the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures. 
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Figure 1: China’s overseas and BRI green and climate policies. Source: Ren et al., 2017, Sandalow, 2019, 
Ministry of Ecology and Environment of the People’s Republic of China, 2017. 
 
Nevertheless, existing high-level regulation has not overarching led to a change of paradigm 
on BRI projects. Fossil energies are still financed on a massive scale along the BRI (Figure 2), 
while green finance is mainly channelled towards China’s domestic market (Figure 4). 
 
An agnostic BRI that ignores the Paris Agreement, for now 
Chinese projects have a dubious track record on environmental, social, and financial 
sustainability. Despite improvements on field practices and socio-environmental standards 
(Kirchherr et al., 2017), the big picture remains ambivalent. The BRI is largely agnostic: It 
promotes both renewable energies and fossil fuels and sectors like coal still receive 
significant investments (Eder & Mardell, 2019). 
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Figure 2: China’s major policy banks’ cumulative energy investments in BRI countries, by sector, 2008-
19. Source: China Global Energy Finance Database. 
 
Major policy banks – CDB and Exim – still channel most of their investments towards non-
renewable sectors, mainly coal, although the share of non-renewables is decreasing towards 
a parity between renewable and non-renewable energies (see Figure 2). State-owned 
companies’ preference for fossil fuels (Zhou et al., 2018) is due to structural factors like a 
preference for large projects, prior experience in implementing these projects, higher 
regulatory predictability and easier access to finance. Hence, some countries might get 
locked-in high-emission trajectories for decades to come. In Pakistan, 75% of the new 
capacity generation built and financed by China is coal fired (Downs, 2019). In addition, this 
lock-in risk is heightened for BRI countries where the bulk of Chinese investments goes to 
non-renewables in sharp contrast with OECD countries which offer a more balanced picture 
(see Figure 3), arguably due to higher level of economic and environmental governance.  
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Figure 3: China’s energy investments and construction contracts by sector, 2014-19, %. Source:  The 
China Global Investment Tracker Database. 
 
Recent advances in Green Finance are also limited. Chinese banks have displayed a series of 
Green frameworks aligned on international standards. But available data suggests that these 
initiatives remain exclusively aimed to the Chinese market and only a small share flows to 
overseas projects (see Figure 4).  
 
 
Figure 4: Geographical distribution of China’s major offshore Green bonds, 2018, USD million. Source: 
Bank of China, 2019; CECEP consulting, 2018; China Construction Bank, 2019; China Development Bank, 
2018; International and Commercial Bank of China, 2019. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper concludes that alignment of Chinese financing with the Paris Agreement remains 
an aspiration facing multiple challenges, but which also presents multiple opportunities for 
cooperation between different stakeholders along Eurasia. Achieving this aspiration and its 
widespread implementation is an urgent imperative to curb current patterns of 
infrastructure development that are clearly incompatible with the 2DS objectives (Tsinghua, 
2019). Unfortunately, the data gathered in the interviews suggested that the current context 
is not particularly conductive to this end as the slowdown of the Chinese economy, even 
before the COVID-19, casts a shadow on China’s domestic and international climate ambition, 
since it is prioritising pro-growth policies at the expense of sustainability. 
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Introduction 
Sustainability certifications in global agricultural value chains require smallholders in 
producing countries to form and strengthen their farmers’ organizations in order to increase 
the market access, where large-scale global corporations facilitate and monitor such access 
through an internal control system (ICS) established in the field.  Sustainability certification 
schemes emerge in conjunction with growing concerns of environmental governance, 
especially among consumers in the coffee-buying countries. On one hand, efforts to 
democratize markets by increasing the role of civil society in regulating production and 
trade-related activities have grown rapidly.  On the other hand, these sustainability 
certifications and standards could serve as new vehicles of corporate control over global food 
production, trade and consumption. 
Efforts to improve community-cooperative governance structures in the producing regions 
also help with integration, as standards generally require establishment of farmers’ 
organizations and locally adopted codes of conduct.  Global buyers are interested in 
improving the control mechanisms that ensure product quality to meet both technical and 
non-economic requirements of coffee beans for the global market.  Smallholder coffee 
farmers need to establish partnerships with global coffee corporations, not only to ensure 
market access and product quality to meet global requirements, but also to increase access 
for information, technical assistance, empowerment and other capacity building programs.  
The study analyses the institutional dimensions of partnership for sustainability certifications 
between smallholder farmers in Asia and large-scale corporations in Europe and examines 
the impacts of partnerships on farm income Lampung Province, Sumatra- Indonesia. We 
conducted a farm-household survey by employing face-to-face interviews with a sample of 
78 farm households in West Lampung District; 35 farmers were in a partnership and 43 were 
not; and of 93 farm households in Tanggamus District; 63 farmers were in a partnership and 
30 were not.  These households were selected using a cluster sampling method. The Nestle 
corporation’s 4C certification scheme is dominant in Tanggamus and Ecom corporation’s 
Rainforest Alliance (RFA) certification scheme is dominant in West Lampung.  The field 
surveys were conducted in July and August of 2018. The semi-structured interviews for coffee 
traders, local leaders, and government officials were conducted in the period of August-
October of 2018. By then, Nestle also started buying coffee from farmers in West Lampung. 
The partnership farmers were selected randomly within the cluster, using the lists provided 
by the ICS agents of these two companies. Non-partnership farmers were selected randomly 
using lists provided by the head of villages and the extension and ICS agents.  
 
Analytical Frameworks 
We focus our analysis on the impact of the partnerships for sustainability certifications in 
coffee value chains on farm income. This contributes to the knowledge on the transmission 
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of how sustainability certifications could improve market access for coffee, farm income for 
smallholder coffee growers and better crop diversification through the integration of multi-
purpose tree species (MPTS).  We performed the following three components in the 
econometric analysis: 
• Probit model to estimate factors determining partnership participation. The 
regressors include household size, age and education of household head, dependency 
ratio, size of coffee farm, crop diversification or MPTS, size of total farm, ownership of 
motorcycle, car, and coffee processing unit, distance to rural cooperatives (KUBE) and 
distance to collector traders.  
• Ordinary least square (OLS) model to estimate factors determining farm income. The 
regressors are the same as in the probit model above plus a dummy variable that 
distinguishes partnership and non-partnership farmers. We control for observable 
differences between partnership and non-partnership farmers, such as differences in 
farm size, education, and the availability of family labour. This model does not account 
for possible selection bias in contract participation. If unobservable characteristics is 
correlated with both the dependent variable (farm income) and a regressor 
(partnership participation), then the coefficient on that regressor will be biased and 
inconsistent (see Miyata et al., 2009). 
• Treatment-effects model to correct the possible selection bias, which uses the 
participation probit model, calculates the inverse Mills ratio, and includes the ratio as 
a regressor in the income model. This is called Heckman selection–correction, where 
the Heckman procedures are used to produce unbiased and consistent estimates in 
the income model. This analysis is a maximum likelihood estimation in which all 
parameters for both models are estimated simultaneously, rather than as a two-step 
procedure. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Based on our field works, there are at least two forms of partnership for sustainability 
certifications found in the study sites in Lampung Province, namely: (a) sub-contract 
partnership and (b) general trading partnership. The sub-contract partnership between 
smallholder coffee farmers and Nestle Corporations is bound with a memorandum of 
understanding (MoU) and involves the third-party KUBE. The general-trading partnership is 
quite loose, involving smallholder farmers and Ecom Corporations, and occasionally collector 
traders (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Two Forms of Partnerships for Sustainability Certifications in Lampung Province. 
 
Smallholders joining the partnership perform significantly better than those of not joining, 
especially in coffee yield and farm-gate price. Coffee farms within or adjacent to protected 
forests generally have more MPTS than coffee farms in private or communal lands, as the 
Government has been closely monitoring the progress of sustainability principles in forest-
resource management areas. The average land-holding size in West Lampung is 1.71 hectares 
for partnership farmers and 1.48 hectares for non-partnership farmers. In Tanggamus, the 
average land-holding size is larger, 2.22 hectares for partnership farmers and 2.15 hectares for 
non-partnership farmers. Not all farmers can afford to grow 400 MPTS per hectare in their 
parcel. Most coffee farmers in West Lampung (48.6 percent) only control 0.25 to 1.0 hectare, 
while most coffee farmers in Tanggamus (54 percent) control 1.1 to 2.0 hectares. Overall, the 
average farm-holding size is 2.18 hectares for partnership farmers and 2.07 hectares for non-
partnership farmers in the study sites.  
Farmers joining partnerships produce 744 kilogram per hectare, far higher than those not 
joining partnerships (620 kilogram per hectare). The coffee yield of partnership farmers is also 
higher than the national average, whereas the coffee yield of non-partnership farmers is 
lower than the national average.  Partnership coffee farmers generate significantly higher 
farm income than those who do not join.  Farm costs are significantly higher for non-
partnership farmers and their farm income from both coffee and other agricultural products 
are lower.  These results confirm previous studies that a higher farm-gate price and the 
additional premium price for contracts between smallholders and global corporations 
remain important determinants in the implementation of sustainability certifications 
(DeFries et al., 2017; Glasbergen, 2018). 
The probit model for partnership participation correctly predicts which coffee farms have a 
contract in 74.9% of the cases.  Age and education of the household head, the land holding 
size of the coffee farm and distance to rural cooperatives-KUBE are significantly higher for 
partnership farmers, reflecting a more mature character in coffee production for partnership 
farmers.  They have a higher level of education of the household head, larger family size and 
a larger coffee farm compared to that of non-partnership farmers. The distance to KUBE is a 
strong predictor of participation in the partnership for sustainability certifications. There is 
some selection in becoming a partnership coffee farmer or joining contract farming for 
sustainability certifications, but it is in terms of the household head’s age, family size, size of 
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coffee holdings and proximity to rural cooperatives-KUBE, rather than the number of MPTS 
in the coffee farms.  
The OLS model of farm income shows only 13 percent of the variance in farm income is 
explained by the variance of household characteristics and the partnership of sustainability 
certifications. The income of coffee farmers is positively affected by the proportion of 
productive family members and being a partnership farmer. Moreover, other regressors 
show no statistically significance in affecting the farm income of coffee farmers.  The 
coefficient for the partnership variable of 3,754,036 means that being a partnership farmer 
increases farm income by Rp 3.75 million or $ 269.70, which is a large premium.  
The result of the treatment effects regression shows that at least one independent variable 
significantly influences the probability that a farmer will join a partnership for sustainability 
certifications. The variables that significantly affect income level are education of household 
head, family size, the proportion of productive family members, land holding size for coffee 
and agricultural land, and distance from the house to rural cooperatives- KUBE. The 
parameter mils lambda or the correlation between error terms in the selection and outcome 
equation is -0.93 and it is highly significant, implying that there is selection bias in the model.  
The coefficient on the partnership variable in this model (Rp 13.7 million) is higher than the 
contract coefficient in the OLS model (Rp 3.75 million), suggesting that farm income of 
partnership farmers is about Rp 13.7 million (or US$ 985.24) higher than for non-partnership 
farmers. When the farmers were asked how their income had changed since they began the 
partnership, the majority reported that their income has increased. 
 
Conclusions 
The institutional arrangements of the partnership between smallholder coffee farmers and 
corporations are manifested by the effectiveness of ICS in implementing the sustainability 
certifications. The ICS and KUBE connect the incentive systems for both smallholders to 
perform well in meeting the standards of good agricultural practices (GAPs) and 
opportunities for coffee corporations in securing the supply of coffee beans and the quality 
requirements for the global markets.   
There is some selection or self-selection of partnership farmers for sustainability certifications 
based on the following important factors: the age and education of the household head, land 
holding size of the coffee farm and the proximity or the distance from house to rural 
cooperatives-KUBE. The selection seems to be bias towards a more mature character in 
coffee production and towards relatively larger farmers, although land-holding size by “large 
coffee farmers” is relatively small, less than 4 hectares. The partnership farmers earn higher 
farm income than their neighbours who do not join a partnership, particularly due to the 
high number of productive family members aged 15-65.  The treatment-effects regression 
model suggests that there is a selection bias caused by unobserved differences between 
partnership and non-partnership farmers, such as entrepreneurial skills, risk tolerance, or 
intelligence. Farmers joining the partnership expect to receive higher income and access to 
technical assistance and capacity building.    
If the partnership for sustainability certifications raises income, how does it do so, through 
better farm-gate prices, higher yields, more crop diversifications or MPTS, better value chains, 
or some other mechanisms?  Higher income from coffee among partnership farmers is 
mostly brought about by higher coffee yields and farm-gate prices. The farm cost 
components are higher among non-partnership farmers, mostly because of higher imputed 
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expenses for family labour. Total income from coffee farming among partnership farmers is 
significantly higher than that of non-partnership farmers. 
The public policy should establish a clear legal framework with written codes of conduct and 
other necessary consensus provisions that benefit both smallholders and global coffee 
corporations.  Moreover, the roles of ICSs initiated by global corporations in implementing 
sustainability certification schemes have somehow positively affected the trust level between 
smallholders and corporations. The study also calls for further research on the transaction 
costs of joining a partnership for sustainability certifications in coffee value chains. Such a 
comprehensive analysis will reveal the efficiency level of coffee value chains; hence the 
likelihood that the welfare of smallholder coffee farmers will improve. Nevertheless, one 
should note that the sophistication of partnership rules, contracts and regulations might be 
quite specific by crop, geographic characteristics and value systems among the smallholders 
and global corporations.  
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Introduction 
Peatland is an important ecosystem in sustainable development, particularly in the forestry 
sector. It involves multiple ecosystem services for the livelihood of the people and plays a vital 
role in stabilising water flows, preventing devastating peat fires, enriching soil nutrients and 
providing clean water and carbon storage for climate change mitigation (Bonn et al., 2016). 
Indonesia has the fourth largest peatland in the world. About 5.8 Mha of peatlands is under 
business permits for industrial and palm oil plantations (Murdiyarso et al., 2011). The often 
hastily planned, large-scale developments in peatlands are generally publicly justified as 
being essential for poverty reduction. However, many of these developments have several 
negative socio-economic and environmental impacts. Many development schemes by the 
government and private sector have been accused of trespassing on customary (adat) rights. 
As a result of peat fires and smog, local communities are affected by high rates of respiratory 
diseases, loss of crops, negative impacts on transport and tourism and loss of natural 
resources (Silvius & Diemont, 2007). These situations have led to poverty for the communities 
around peatland. Therefore, Indonesia has a role to be a good example for sustainable 
peatland management that pays attention to local economy and environmental protection. 
Following Government Regulation No. 71/2014 about peatland protection and management, 
the Peatland Restoration Agency (BRG) was established in 2016 to restore degraded 
peatlands in seven priority provinces. One of the restoration activities is the revitalisation of 
the livelihood of the people surrounding peatland in order to reduce their pressures on the 
area. Until 2018, BRG has implemented 213 units of livelihood support for the communities 
surrounding peatland (PRIMS, 2019). However, studies in Riau, South Sumatra and Central 
Kalimantan found that many of those units were not delivered to communities whose 
livelihood rests on peatland. Our previous study found that many livelihood supports were 
instead delivered to community groups that are closed with the head of village. Therefore, 
BRG activities have not yet succeeded in revitalising the livelihood of the people who depend 
on peatland (Kartodihardjo et al., 2018; KPRGSS, 2018). This study aims to explore another 
option or strategy to revitalise the livelihood of the people surrounding peatland—using the 
concept of special pilot economic zone, based on sustainable management of peatland 
ecosystem—globally. 
 
Conceptual framework and methodology 
Special Economic Zone (SEZ) is a zone or area that has excellent geo-economics and geo-
strategy to accommodate economic activities. The development of SEZ focuses on the 
strategy of business collaboration (Farole & Akinci, 2011). Four characteristics defined the SEZ 
concept: (1) geographically delineated area, usually physically secured; (2) having a single 
management or administration; (3) offering benefits for investors physically within the zone; 
and (4) having a separate customs area (duty-free benefits) and streamlined procedures 
(UNCTAD, 2019). 
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There are several types of SEZ, and among these types is the special pilot (economic) zone 
(SPEZ). This study explores a particular model for SEZ that pays attention to small–medium 
scale business activities. We found that SPEZ can be a solution for sustainable economic 
zone. Changes on international trade rules and growing international business interest in 
corporate socio-environmental responsibility mean that SEZ management agencies have an 
opportunity to explore investment promotion strategies that relate to social, environmental 
and governance performance. SPEZ has been adapted to sustainable management of 
ecosystem in the case of coastal ecosystem-based management (Nobre & Ferreira, 2009). 
On the basis of the SPEZ concept, this study draws on qualitative and quantitative data from 
literature reviews, document review (policy documents, project reports), interviews with key 
stakeholders, direct observation in the field and the meetings related to the topic of the 
research. Interviews were conducted with key stakeholders such as peat experts, 
policymakers, NGOs, concession holders and communities around peatlands in the case 
study areas. This research utilises the case study of peatland management in Riau, South 
Sumatra and Central Kalimantan, three provinces with large areas of peatlands and the 
prioritised areas by the stakeholders for sustainable peatland management. 
Data analysis utilises an interpretative approach to multiple forms of data collected (Creswell 
& Creswell, 2017). Multiple data from different sources were organised to prepare the 
structure of the evidence. These data was organised through transcription, scanning 
materials and typing up filed notes to understand the general sense of the evidence. Later, 
for a more detailed analysis, a coding process was undertaken to generate a description of 
the situation and themes for analysis based on the SPEZ framework used in this study. 
 
Result and discussion 
We found that the concept of the special pilot economic zone (SPEZ) has the potential to be 
a strategy for revitalizing the livelihoods of the people surrounding peatland area. This 
livelihood revitalization can be accomplished in two ways; (1) By transforming traditional 
cultivation into a more sustainable process; and/or (2) By finding an alternative livelihood 
outside the peatland. The SPEZ on peatland provides an opportunity to develop a sustainable 
bioeconomy for communities on peatlands. These ways contribute to reduce anthropogenic 
pressures on the peatland ecosystem.  
Planning an SPEZ on peatland must be started by; 1. Preparing peatland spatial planning 
(based on landscape approach) that can lead to the legal determination of a particular area 
as an SPEZ. This phase will provide a clean and clear border and the legal power for the 
implementation of the SPEZ. 2. The selection of the SPEZ location must be followed with field 
observation to derive biophysical information of the peatland. This information is important 
to determine peatland suitability for cultivation (Figure 1). 
After the selection of the SPEZ location, five phases of implementation can be carried out. 1. 
Identification of target group, local paludiculture species, and alternative livelihoods around 
peatlands. 2. Analysing the value chain, market demand, and cost-benefit analysis of 
identified species and alternative livelihoods. 3. Conducting natural capital accounting on 
natural resources related to selected species and livelihoods. 4. Preparing social and business 
innovation to develop institutional arrangements and business models that combine 
paludiculture species and/with alternative livelihoods. This can be done through cooperation 
of multiple stakeholders such as communities, local governments, NGOs, and concession 
holders in the area. This partnership will support increasing market creation of peatland 
products, e.g., supporting exporting products or trading across (peatland) regions. 5. 
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Strengthening the capacity of local stakeholders such as the community to self-govern in 
the SPEZ. It includes technical capacity, knowledge, and management skills.  
 
 
Figure 1: Strategy to design a special pilot zone for bioeconomy on peatlands. 
 
This study suggests that stakeholders including policymakers to test the SPEZ concept as 
integrated part of the peatland restoration activities, with landscape approach. These 
strategies are found to have challenges and opportunities in South Sumatra, Riau and 
Central Kalimantan province (Figure 2), especially in terms of regulation for land permit, 
institutional arrangement, market chain for peat products, remuneration of external 
benefits, and perception and capacity of community for cultivation on peat. The SPEZ 
framework can also be applicable to concession holders on peatland and to other tropical 
countries that have peatland restoration agendas. 
 
Figure 2: Potential SPEZ can be linked to existing restoration activities in a peatland ecosystem, e.g. in 
KHG Sungai Bunai – Sungai Sibumbung in South Sumatra Province (Source: PRIMS). 
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To deal with various challenges that arise when implementing the SPEZ on peatland, an 
opportunity can be taken from building connectivity with international stakeholders that 
have more experience on planning and implementing sustainable peatland management 
and SPEZ. The partnership can be done by having business collaboration on peatland areas 
in Indonesia, particularly through paludiculture practices. Connectivity with European 
countries has the potential to support the SPEZ on peatland. The paludiculture concept 
comes from northern European countries like Germany. Peatland development in Indonesia 
is highly influenced by the Netherlands through projects and advocacy through its NGO, 
Wetlands International. According to the ASEM Sustainable Connectivity Portal, research 
connection between Germany and the Netherlands is the top second, with more than 8000 
collaborations. The research related to peatlands, specifically on paludiculture development, 
thus can relate to Indonesia, where Germany has done intensive bi-lateral cooperation, 
mainly through the GIZ (Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit) for climate action. 
Germany has experienced paludiculture development for about 30 years, from the 
production and utilization of suitable species, the use of green harvesting machines, 
measuring ecosystem services and agri-environmental costs, the legal recognition for 
providing subsidies, stakeholder (farmers or land owners) involvement, and increasing 
economic viability through integration with bioenergy production. With this experience, 
there is potential to strengthen the further connectivity between Germany, Indonesia, and 
the Netherlands to accelerate the development of the SPEZ of paludiculture on peatland in 
Indonesia. 
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Emissions embodied in international trade in the 
Asia-Europe context 
Igor Makarov 
National Research University Higher School of Economics, Russia 
 
Global climate change is one of the biggest challenges to the global economy in the twenty-
first century. To address it properly, a combination of mitigation and adaptation strategies is 
required. While the responsibility for adaptation lies primarily with national governments, 
mitigation is one of the key fields of international cooperation. The Paris Agreement that 
came into force in November 2016 substituted the Kyoto Protocol as a key document that 
provides a framework for coordination of national policies regarding climate change 
including greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction (UN, 2015). 187 Parties have ratified 
Paris Agreement. 
One important issue of international cooperation is how to define which country is 
responsible for emissions. In order to fulfil commitments under international agreements 
(the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement), countries prepare national inventories 
containing information about the emissions that take place “within national territory and 
offshore areas over which the country has jurisdiction” (IPCC, 2006). This approach is the most 
transparent and feasible but has some drawbacks. First of all, it does not address 
international trade flows. Meanwhile, around 30% of global CO2 emissions are released 
during the production of internationally traded goods (Sato, 2014). Therefore, an increase in 
the consumption of carbon-intensive goods in one country may not lead to an increase in its 
emissions, but will contribute to an increase in emissions in other countries who are suppliers 
of carbon-intensive products (this phenomenon is called ‘carbon leakage’) (Aichele and 
Felbermayr, 2015; Makarov, 2018). 
Most of the carbon-intensive trade flows are directed from leading emerging to developed 
economies (Table 1). China, Russia and India are three major exporters of emissions embodied 
in trade. This makes them key countries in political discussion about carbon leakage. These 
countries are also especially vulnerable to various barriers at international markets which are 
discussed in the West as a means to address carbon leakage. For instance, the European 
Green Deal in the EU supposes the implementation of border carbon taxes in order to 
address carbon leakage (European Commission, 2019). Similar initiatives are also discussed 
in US (Economists’ Statement, 2019).  
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Table 1: Production-based, consumption-based emissions and emissions embodied in net exports in 
OECD and BRICS in 2015. Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD data. 
Country Production-based 
emissions 
Consumption-
based emissions 
Net exports of 
emissions 
Mt % of 
world  
Mt % of 
world 
Mt % of 
national 
emissions 
OECD, total 12 204.2  37.8% 13 781.2  42.7% -1 581.1  -13.0% 
United States 5 020.0  15.6% 5 794.5  18.0% -785.3  -15.6% 
Canada 556.4  1.7% 547.9  1.7% 9.8  1.8% 
France 311.9  1.0% 445.0  1.4% -131.6  -42.2% 
Germany 765.7  2.4% 853.4  2.6% -84.6  -11.0% 
Italy 346.8  1.1% 423.0  1.3% -75.8  -21.9% 
Japan 1 202.3  3.7% 1 361.0  4.2% -158.2  -13.2% 
Spain 263.3  0.8% 293.8  0.9% -32.1  -12.2% 
Sweden 43.8  0.1% 70.2  0.2% -26.2  -59.9% 
United Kingdom 430.8  1.3% 575.8  1.8% -142.5  -33.1% 
BRICS, total 13 687.5  42.4% 11 853.1  36.7% 1 841.0  13.5% 
China 9 280.8  28.8% 7 977.9  24.7% 1 308.8  14.1% 
India 2 043.4  6.3% 1 918.8  5.9% 124.2  6.1% 
Russia 1 487.6  4.6% 1 167.5  3.6% 320.7  21.6% 
 
Though border carbon taxation is a powerful tool for preventing carbon leakage and for 
stimulating emissions reduction by ‘reluctant’ countries (Branger and Quirion, 2014, Condon 
and Ignaciuk, 2016), it could lead to economic losses in both the exporting and importing 
economies. Moreover, this practice could easily be used as an excuse for protectionism— an 
especially dangerous risk given the growth of populism worldwide, the weakening of the 
WTO and the ongoing trade wars. It is technically very difficult to determine whether 
countries would introduce border carbon taxes to protect the climate or to advance 
protectionist and nationalist agendas. For this reason, the victims of border carbon taxes 
would view such actions as illegitimate. Thus, the introduction of border carbon taxation 
would inevitably decrease the level of trust in the international system and provoke new 
conflicts beyond the many that already exist in international trade.  
For leading economies exporting emissions embodied in trade, such as China, Russia and 
India, the important objective is to find the responses to border carbon taxation in the EU 
and potentially in US. One possible option is the shift towards ‘consumption-based’ approach 
to emissions accounting. It considers emissions that are caused by production of goods 
consumed in a country (including emissions from domestic final consumption and those 
caused abroad by the production of its imports) (Davis and Caldeira, 2010). If this approach is 
used, a large amount of production-based emissions that take place within China, Russia and 
India would be considered consumption-based emissions of Western economies. The 
important issues of responsibility for emissions embodied in trade should be raised here, for 
example, who should take responsibility: an exporter or an importer (Liu et al., 2013). However, 
delving deeper into this discussion is beyond the scope of this article. Much more important 
is the focus on consumption-based emissions itself, which unlike that of production-based 
ones creates a different system of incentives: instead of secondary issues like the location of 
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carbon-intensive production, it helps concentrating on the real reason of growing emissions 
– i.e. the rise of consumption (Makarov, 2018).  
In practical terms, this focus gives access to a broader set of climate policy instruments that 
were not available under a pure production-based approach:  
First, while production-based emissions accounting determines the focus of climate policies 
to be on the supply-side technology solutions (energy efficiency, development of renewables 
etc.), consumption-based accounting increases the significance of demand-side channels for 
mitigating climate change. These channels include strategies aimed at changes in 
consumption behaviour, lifestyles, infrastructure and service provision (Creutzig et al., 2018). 
These solutions have never been popular in the Western economies as they challenge 
conventional patterns of consumption behaviour. However, the leading emerging 
economies that are moving from low to middle and high incomes in fossil-fuel constrained 
world need the different growth models, and demand-side instruments are of prime 
importance. For instance, they are especially necessary in the context of Belt and Road 
initiative: infrastructure projects that would be built within this initiative will determine the 
dynamics of regional emissions for decades.  
Second, consumption-based emissions accounting would give such countries as China, 
Russia and India a chance to adopt fiscally progressive climate policies. Conventional climate 
policy instruments of developed countries like carbon taxes, emissions trading systems and 
subsidies for renewables are all regressive. The major burden of low-carbon transition lies 
therefore on poorer people who pay larger shares of their incomes for dirtier goods which 
become more expensive as a result of regulation. This policy framework faces numerous 
contradictions even in the West (e.g. yellow vests in France) and is totally inapplicable in the 
leading emerging economies countries with their high inequality. Consumption-based 
accounting of emissions and the focus on demand-side climate policies make it possible to 
use more flexible climate policy instruments, which primarily address the excessive 
consumption of wealthier parts of population (Chancel and Piketty, 2015). Simply speaking, 
they may help transform carbon tax to the tax on consumption of carbon-intensive final 
goods. This policy framework is progressive and prevents contradictions between the goals 
of climate change mitigation and poverty/inequality reduction that is crucial for emerging 
economies (Grigoryev et al., 2020). It would further make it possible to launch inclusive low-
carbon transition. 
The move towards consumption-based emissions accounting is not an easy task. It is a 
paradigm shift that requires the coordination of multiple actors and strong political will. The 
conventional regulation of production-based emissions is backed by a 30-year history of an 
international climate change regime, and the rich experience of climate policies in Western 
countries. However, these thirty years have also revealed great limitations. The economic 
development of the largest emerging economies will determine the future of the planet, and 
the stakes are too high to base their climate policies on the models coming from the past.  
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The Eurasian Landbridge: Implications of linking 
East Asian and Europe by rail  
Richard Pomfret 
University of Adelaide, Australia 
 
Introduction 
The paper documents the development of overland rail transport links between the 
European Union (EU) and East Asia and analyses the consequences of the increased 
connectivity. 
 
Development 2011-195 
Between 1500 and 2010 trade between East Asia and Europe was dominated by maritime 
transport.  Physical rail links existed but they were uncompetitive with sea freight, especially 
after the container revolution, when EU-Asia trade grew rapidly.  The situation started to 
change in 2011 when rail services were established between western China and Europe 
(starting with Chengdu-Łódź and Chongqing-Duisburg).6  Since then, services have 
improved dramatically with regular services connecting a large number of China-EU city 
pairs and the annual number of containers travelling by rail is heading for a million in 2020. 
An important initial driver of EU-China rail services was the efforts by car and electronics 
companies to link their European and Asian value chains into Eurasian value chains (Pomfret, 
2019a).  As rail services became more frequent and regular, freight forwarders provided new 
services (e.g. part container loads, refrigerated containers, multimodal connections) with a 
greater variety of destinations.7  This broadened the range of potential customers who were 
willing to pay more than sea freight for faster more reliable transport but unwilling to pay for 
air freight (Table 1).  The rapid growth indicates substantial demand.   
                                           
5 This paper develops and updates arguments contained in online papers at: https://voxeu.org/article/eurasian-landbridge-linking-
regional-value-chains and https://voxeu.org/article/eurasian-landbridge-and-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative.  For more in-
depth analysis, see Pomfret (2020, chapter 3). 
6 Typically cited numbers  for journeys along the Landbridge (e.g. at https://www.mordorintelligence.com/industry-reports/china-
europe-rail-freight-transport-market) are 17 (in 2011), 42 (2012), 80 (2013), 308 (2014), 815 (2015), 1,702 (2016), 3,673 (2017) and 6,363 
(2018).  Numbers are not necessarily balanced in both directions, but on the most frequent route between Duisburg and 
Chongqing of the 1,442 trains 728 were from the EU and 714 from China in 2018.  
7 Eastern European countries (especially the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) have been active GVC participants and 
also increasingly important connecting cities to China (Pomfret and Sourdin, 2018).  Łódź quickly established itself as the Eastern 
European hub for EU-China rail freight (Jakóbowski et al., 2018). 
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Table 1: A comparison of the shipping cost, in USD per container, and time in days for goods transported 
between China and Europe (Jakóbowski et al., 2018, 69).8 
 Shanghai-Gdynia Chengdu-Warsaw Shanghai-Rotterdam 
 Cost Time Cost Time Cost Time 
Air 37,000 5-9 37,000 5-9 37,000 5-9 
Rail 4,500 19 5,000 15 5,000 18 
Sea 2,600 37-42 4,500 43-50 2,200 27-37 
 
The number of city pairs providing freight services has increased rapidly, especially since 2015.  
The process has been essentially market-driven (Pomfret, 2019b).  As more cities offer 
services, some successfully and others not, it is hard to keep track of numbers but in both 
Europe and China over fifty cities are Landbridge termini.  The most reliable volume data are 
those from the Eurasian Rail Alliance (Table 2), which reports growth from 46,000 containers 
in 2015 to 280,500 in 2018 and extrapolating the rough doubling each year they predict a 
million containers will be transported in 2020.9   
Table 2: Volume of Traffic on China-EU-China Container Trains, 2015-18 (UTLC website – www.utlc.com).10 
Year Number of twenty-foot equivalent containers (TEUs) 
2015 46,000 
2016 104,500 
2017 175,800 
2018 280,500 
 
In Europe, indicators of the increased salience of the rail Landbridge include the holding of 
an annual Silk Road Summit attended by hundreds of logistics service providers (the 3rd in 
November 2019 was in Venlo, Netherlands) and the EU Commission engaging in how to 
relate the EU-China service, and the BRI Belt, to the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-
T) as a top priority in 2020 (Walton, 2019).  The Commission’s interest can be traced back to 
the 2007-12 RETRACK project which aimed to induce a modal shift of freight traffic to rail; 
RETRACK’s focus was on developing a high-quality commercially sustainable rail freight 
corridor from the North Sea to the Black Sea (Rotterdam-Constanza), but it also considered 
prospects for establishing “Eurasian land-bridges” to China.11  Connectivity via Russia to China 
has always had a strategic dimension and EU Commission policy is within the framework of 
the European Union Global Strategy (2016).12 
For China, the rail Landbridge has been related to President Xi’s flagship foreign policy, the 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), that was announced in 2013 and officially launched in 2017.  
However, the first trains preceded the BRI, and much of the activity has been driven by local 
                                           
8 All such numbers are approximations, but this table indicates: (1) the prohibitive cost of air transport for all but very high value-
weight or time sensitive items, (2) rail is more expensive than sea but the gap narrows if places are further from seaports (e.g. 
Chengdu-Warsaw)., and (3) rail is faster than sea, with more predictable arrival time. 
9 These numbers remain small compared to maritime freight.  A single ship can carry 20,000 containers.  No more than 5% of the 
value of all freight between Europe and Asia goes by rail (European Commission, 2018, 3).  However, goods for which rail is 
preferred tend to be higher value and more tech-intensive than the bulk goods transported by sea. 
10 The Eurasian Rail Alliance (UTLC) was founded by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia in 2014 to provide services for container block 
trains running between China and Europe. 
11 The RETRACK final report (van Rooijen et al., 2012) view that the TransSiberian was the most immediately relevant route and routes 
via Kazakhstan had the best longer-term potential, while the TRACECA corridor was the least likely to flourish, has proven 
correct.   
12 The TEN-T, including guidelines for the development of a Trans-European Rail Network, dates from July 1996 (Decision No 
1692/96/EC).  However, extension to eastern Europe was slow and, despite statements of intent to look east in 2011, only in 2017 
were Eastern Partnership states included.  The Joint Communication on Connecting Europe and Asia (European Commission, 
2018) recognizes the significance of looking east and includes specific proposals. 
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governments in China rather than at the national level.  Local authorities have offered 
substantial subsidies for freight on trains from their city that are difficult to document with 
any precision.  The central government has imposed a cap of 30% on subsidies in 2020 (Chu, 
2019) and the subsidies are eventually to be discontinued (Jakóbowski et al. 2018, 25).  Given 
the non-transparency, it is impossible to estimate the impact of terminating subsidies, but a 
consensus among users is that most of the services will continue to be profitable without 
subsidies. 
 
Prospects 
Improved connectivity will intensify the economic links between EU members and China.  
Although routes along the Landbridge are currently point-to-point, the prospects for 
economic development in countries along the route (e.g. Central Asia) are good, and this 
would strengthen those countries’ economic links to the EU.  There are also prospects for 
physical reintegration of a geographically regionalized Eurasian continent, as Iran and 
Southeast Asia are brought into the rail network.13  Such developments are often situated 
within China’s Belt and Road Initiative as a political challenge, but it is important to recognize 
the solid economic foundations, as rail offers a competitive service in terms of reliability that 
is faster than sea and cheaper than air.  As a minor point, the development of alternative rail 
routes is potentially important for maritime countries such as Australia as Indian Ocean ports 
(Bandar Abbas, Chabahar, Gwadar) and many Southeast Asian ports are linked to the 
Eurasian rail network. 
Central Asian links are primarily through Kazakhstan to Russia and Europe (Pomfret, 2019c, 
266-71).  Kazakhstan is also the bridge via Turkmenistan to Iran and for transit to Uzbekistan, 
e.g. the Korea-Lianyungang-Tashkent service that goes on to the GM factory (ex-Daewoo) in 
Andijan.  Kazakhstan was an early BRI partner, linking its own Nurly Zhol infrastructure 
program to the BRI.14  Especially since Mirziyoyev became president in 2016, Uzbekistan has 
been keen to increase its transit role, especially by linking to Kashi in China via the Kyrgyz 
Republic, which would shorten the rail route from China to Iran and the Middle East.  
However, the Kyrgyz government is concerned that the most direct route, which passes 
through sparsely populated territory, will bring little benefit to the country and may lead to 
debt dependence (Hurley et al, 2018). 
The Southeast Asian countries have envisaged that the 2015 ASEAN Master Plan for 
Connectivity will be consistent with the BRI and benefit from financing from the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank.  Most obviously, the Singapore-Bangkok-Kunming rail link 
would connect the Chinese rail network to major ocean ports.  Constriction of railways from 
China to ports in Myanmar (and, further east along the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a 
railway from Kashi to Gwadar) will similarly strengthen these infrastructure links.  In all cases, 
however, progress has been slow as resistance to Chinese-funded infrastructure investment 
has been encountered in transit countries (e.g. Malaysia) as well as in least-developed ASEAN 
countries (Myanmar and Laos).15 
                                           
13 Prospects for overland connections with South Asia are limited by geography and by political disagreements.  Pakistan is being 
linked to China via the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor but the geographical challenges of crossing the Himalayas are 
substantial.  Poor India-Pakistan relations and the security situation in Afghanistan inhibit East-West links. 
14 The Nurly Zhol programme for 2015-19 was announced in 2014; 3,000 kilometres of national roads were built and reconstructed, 
15,000 kilometres of regional and district roads repaired, 1,400 kilometres of new railways commissioned, six airport runways 
modernised, the capacity of Kazakh-Chinese border terminals increased to 40 million tonnes per year and the capacity of the 
port infrastructure on the Caspian Sea increased from 17.5 million to 27 million tonnes per year (Yergaliyeva, 2019). The 
programme has been extended to 2020-25.  See also, Belgibayev & Zhang (2016). 
15 Korea and Japan have connectivity programs (Korea’s 2013 Eurasia Initiative and 2015 Eurasia Express rail project) or partnerships 
(the EU-Japan Connectivity Partnership announced in September 2019) that potentially involve improved transport links to the 
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Looking further ahead the prospect of a high-speed rail link is not implausible given the 
speed with which China’s domestic high-speed rail link has been developed and the 
generally favourable terrain through which Landbridge routes pass. 
 
Conclusions 
Economic prospects for continued development of the Eurasian Landbridge are positive.  
The rail option is attractive to traders with high-value goods for which the savings in time-in-
transit over maritime transport and more assured delivery times justify paying a higher price.  
If the price gap can be further reduced by efficiency gains and by scaling-up, then rail’s 
advantage will increase. Improved connectivity will strengthen economic links between 
Europe and China (and potentially intermediate countries too), especially in the creation of 
Eurasian value chains.16  
All of this is tied to ongoing willingness of the EU, China and transit countries to continue to 
facilitate the international rail service.  The current mainlines through Kazakhstan, Russia and 
Belarus work well for Łódź or Duisburg, but for Slovakia, or Hungary faster routes via Ukraine 
are constrained by the state of Russia-Ukraine relations.  The alternative southern route via 
Iran and Turkey could be even better for South-eastern Europe.  Any route can be disrupted 
by a single non-cooperating transit country whether seeking higher transit fees or in political 
dispute, although transit countries have strong financial incentives not to be disruptive in 
order to earn the transit fees.17 
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Climate-Neutral Maritime Connectivity between 
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Introduction 
Shipping between Europe and Asia is a powerful factor of interconnectedness and 
interdependence, as some 98% of the volume of commodities transported between Europe 
and Asia is carried through the seas and oceans that connect the two continents. At the same 
time, shipping accounts for 2.6% of global greenhouse gases (GHG) on an annual basis and 
is not included in most national climate commitments. A study cited by the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) states that over 570,000 premature deaths will be prevented 
between 2020 and 2025 by the introduction of the tighter guidelines.18  
 
Short-Term: IMO Requirements for Low-Sulphur Fuels 
This is why the IMO is pressing ahead with setting tougher targets for reduced GHG 
emissions in a phased process up to 2050 (Figure 1). Starting from January 2020, shipping 
companies have had to stop using fuels with a sulphur content above 0.5%, compared to the 
previous 3.5% ceiling. They can now burn very low-sulphur fuel oil (VLSFO) or marine gas oil 
(MGO) - or install emissions-cleaning devices, known as scrubbers, to continue using high-
sulphur fuel oil (HSFO). Another option ship owners are looking at is liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) as a relatively cleaner fuel. 
                                           
18 Jonathan Saul, ‘Factbox: IMO 2020 - a major shake-up for oil and shipping’, Reuters, 17 May 2019,  
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-imo-shipping-factbox/factbox-imo-2020-a-major-shake-up-for-oil-and-shipping-
idUSKCN1SN2BX.   
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Figure 1: International Maritime Organization process to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Source: HIS 
Markit, 2019. 
 
Surely, there are numerous challenges ahead. The 2020 sulphur cap is a true game changer 
for the shipping industry on a global scale. The drop of sulphur limits for marine fuels is 
forcing most ship operators to switch from burning HSFO to new 0.5% sulphur blends. There 
are estimates that at current crude oil prices the bunker industry may need no less than $4 
billion as working capital to meet the higher fuel bills in 2020 alone. 19 As a result, the bunker 
fuel industry is increasingly seeing credit availability as one of its biggest problems, with fuel 
bills set to rise significantly as a result of stricter emissions controls. In addition, to the extent 
that these costs are passed on to shippers, traders and ultimately consumers and the broader 
economy, it is not unreasonable to expect an increase in working capital requirements across 
the entire shipping sector. 
Another industry struggling to adapt to IMO 2020 has been the world's refineries. Given the 
continued reduction in fuel oil demand for power, and the 0.5% sulphur specification, the 
next wave of upgrading is already under way. Yet, it is expected that that out of the 700-odd 
refineries in the world that used to provide HSFO until recently, some 200 may go out of 
business – and some of them are in Europe and Asia. 
One of the major issues at this stage is whether there will be enough quantities of compliant 
fuel across the globe. While major fuel bunkering ports, such as Singapore, Fujairah in the 
United Arab Emirates or Rotterdam in the Netherlands, are expected to have compliant-fuel 
supplies, analysts and shipping firms point to concerns over what happens at smaller ports.  
Yet another serious issue is the choice of compliant fuel, depending on its cost. VLSFO prices 
have soared with the introduction of the IMO-2020 global sulphur cap. For instance, in 
Singapore prices rose more than 20% in January 2020.20 Many ship operators appear to be 
committed to the transition to a low-sulphur age, but there is no agreement on the best way 
to do this. For many of them the question is: shall we use low-sulphur oil or shall we scrub? 
Or perhaps turn to liquefied natural gas (LNG)? And how are banks going to ascertain which 
                                           
19 Jack Jordan and Tom Washington, ‘Bunker industry faces $2-4 billion IMO 2020 credit squeeze’, Greek Energy Forum, 1 November 
2019, 
https://greekenergyforum.com/publications/ac/opinions/ar/204-bunker-industry-faces-2-4-billion-imo-2020-credit-squeeze. 
20 Marcus Hand, ‘Maersk to hike bunker surcharges on soaring VLSFO prices’, 23 January 2020, Seatrade Maritime,  
https://www.seatrade-maritime.com/bunkering/maersk-hike-bunker-surcharges-soaring-vlsfo-prices. 
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company is ‘green’ and qualifies for a loan? Are there sufficient skills behind the bank counter 
to decide which technology is acceptable and climate-compliant?21 
The truth is that none of the technologies currently available is ideal. Thus, there are concerns 
that some blends of the new VLSFO emit higher levels of black carbon than the heavy marine 
oil they are meant to replace.22 Although LNG contains less carbon per unit of energy than 
conventional marine fuels, it may not deliver the emissions reductions demanded by  
the IMO’s initial GHG strategy and using it might actually worsen shipping’s climate  
impacts.23 And, of course, there are political considerations, too. For instance, presidential 
candidates in the American 2020 elections may be tempted to run on a platform that 
exempts the US from IMO 2020, which may prove to be a huge vote winner, once the costs 
of the new rules become apparent to a wider public. Given the global nature of the shipping 
industry, political developments in the western hemisphere can easily affect maritime 
connectivity between Europe and Asia. 
 
Long-Term: The Way Ahead 
It is important to note that the significant investments needed to decarbonise shipping can 
only be expected to take place if a long-term and commercially viable business case is made. 
Technological developments alone, as important as they are, are not enough - the right mix 
would have to include both technological innovation and appropriate policies at the same 
time. 
The Global Maritime Forum has recently presented its report on the level of investment 
required to decarbonise the shipping sector. The scale of cumulative investment needed 
between 2030 and 2050 to achieve the IMO target of reducing carbon emissions by at least 
50% by 2050, is between $1 trillion and 1.4 trillion, or on average between $50 billion and $70 
billion annually for 20 years. If shipping was to fully decarbonize by 2050, this would require 
extra investments of approximately $400 billion over 20 years, thus raising the total amount 
needed by an extra $500 billion.24 
No doubt, these are daunting figures, but they should not be seen as intimidating, if viewed 
as part of the global effort to address the climate emergency. The entire financial sector is 
looking for green investments more than ever, as governments, asset managers, and the 
public pile on the pressure over climate change. Notably, demand for green bonds currently 
far exceeds supply and this can be seen as a ‘niche’ by banks.25  
Investment needs can be broken down into two main areas: (i) ship-related investments, 
which include engines, on-board storage and ship-based energy efficiency technologies, and 
(ii) land-based investments, which cover fuel production, storage and bunkering 
infrastructure. The biggest share of investment, to the tune of 87%, is needed in land-based 
                                           
21 Michael Grey, ‘Viewpoint: Virtuous lending’, Lloyd’s List, 20 June 2019, 
https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligence.informa.com/LL1127980/Viewpoint-Virtuous-lending. 
22 Greg Knowler, ‘IMO to review black carbon fuel emissions concerns’, JOC.com, 28 January 2020, 
https://www.joc.com/maritime-news/imo-review-black-carbon-fuel-emissions-
concerns_20200128.html?utm_source=Eloqua&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=CL_JOC%20Daily%201%2F29%2F20%20
_PC9156_e-production_E-53854_TF_0129_0617. 
23 Nikita Pavlenko, Bryan Comer, Yuanrong Zhou, Nigel Clark, Dan Rutherford, ‘The climate implications of using  
LNG as a marine fuel 
’,  International Council on Clean Transportation, Working Paper 2020-02, p. 19, https://www.stand.earth/publication/climate-
implications-using-lng-marine-fuel. 
24 Johannah Christensen, ‘How decarbonizing shipping could unlock a global energy transition’, Global Maritime Fund, 23 January 
2020, https://www.globalmaritimeforum.org/news/how-decarbonizing-shipping-could-unlock-a-global-energy-transition.  
25 ‘Shipping’s green $1trn is a profitable investment, not a cost’, Splash 247.com, 30 January 2020,  
https://splash247.com/shippings-green-1trn-is-a-profitable-investment-not-a-cost/.  
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infrastructure and production facilities for low-carbon fuels, while only 13 % of the investment 
needed relates to the ships themselves.26  
But how can necessary resources be mobilised and brought together? An encouraging 
example to consider relates to the so-called Poseidon Principles. This initiative27 aims to align 
the shipping portfolios of signatory banks with the IMO’s emission reduction targets. The four 
Poseidon Principles (assessment of climate alignment, accountability, enforcement and 
transparency) are designed to impel ship owners to make at least a 50% reduction in 
greenhouse gases by 2050 and to help financial institutions in managing critical investment 
risks.  
At present, signatories of the Poseidon Principles represent around $140bn in loans to 
international shipping - about 30% of the total global ship finance portfolio. So far, 16 financial 
institutions have signed up to the initiative are 16 and it is expected that the number of 
lenders will reach 25 by the end of the year. The list of signatories includes BNP Paribas, Credit 
Suisse, ABN Amro, Amsterdam Trade Bank, Crédit Agricole, CIB, Crédit Industriel et 
Commercial, Danish Ship Finance, Danske Bank, DNB, DVB, Export Credit Norway, ING, 
Nordea, Société Générale, and Sparebanken Vest. Notably, Asian lenders, such as China’s 
ICBC, are also reported to have expressed interest in the Poseidon Principles.28  
Ultimately, the shipping industry will have to move towards a climate-neutral mode of 
operation. To ensure everyone does their part, the shipping community and all stakeholders 
will need a strong set of policies to drive and manage the transition. It is up to the IMO and 
Member States to make sure comprehensive measures are put in place. These could include 
a carbon price mechanism where emitters pay and the money collected is then redistributed 
for research, development and deployment of clean shipping technologies. Not least of all, 
there should be meaningful arrangements in support of less developed countries and small 
island states between Europe and Asia, if this process is to be inclusive and sustainable. 
                                           
26 Randall Krantz, Kasper Søgaard, Dr Tristan Smith, ‘The scale of investment needed to decarbonize international shipping’, Global 
Maritime Forum, 20 January 2020, 
https://www.globalmaritimeforum.org/news/the-scale-of-investment-needed-to-decarbonize-international-shipping/ 
27 https://www.poseidonprinciples.org/#home. 
28 Nidaa Bakhsh, ‘More banks pledge to align shipping lending to climate goals’, Lloyd’s List, 22 January 2020,  
https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligence.informa.com/LL1130744/More-banks-pledge-to-align-shipping-lending-to-climate-goals. 
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Abstract 
This paper examines the implications of China’s investment in the port capacity of two groups 
of European Union (EU) member states, in order to assess whether, how and to what extent a 
geo-economic shift from Central- Western Europe to the Eastern Mediterranean region is 
taking place. Firstly, this study focuses on the impact of the growing presence of Beijing’s 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) on the Eastern 
Mediterranean region, where Chinese investment in Greek and Italian maritime 
infrastructure plays a key role for upgrading the geo-economic significance of the area. On 
the other hand, maritime hubs of Central-Western EU countries – namely Belgium, Germany 
and the Netherlands – are likely to suffer a decreasing role within, and because of, China’s 
geo-economic strategy and the impact of the BRI in Europe. Notwithstanding Chinese 
investment in these countries’ ports is notable, Eastern Mediterranean hubs are gaining 
increasing salience for international logistic connectivity within the framework of the BRI. 
Given China’s importance for global maritime trade and logistics, such processes are to affect 
more broadly the role of Europe’s Central-Western and South-Eastern ports as regional 
container hubs. Against this backdrop, this study also emphasizes how the unfolding of 
divergent trajectories between the two groups of EU member states will contribute to the 
polarization of the European politics. In fact, whereas Central-Western EU countries– and EU 
institutions – are increasingly taking a cautious, or even suspicious, posture vis-à-vis China, 
South-Eastern member states seem eager to engage China as an international partner for 
infrastructure development. 
 
Research Background 
In the past decade, Sino-European relations have gained unprecedented momentum in the 
field of infrastructure connectivity. Chinese investment in the European infrastructure 
capacity has become a crucial dimension of China’s relationship with the EU and its member 
states, particularly after the unveiling of the BRI in 2013. Chinese SOEs have played a crucial 
role within EU infrastructures. EU ports, particularly, have become key targets of Chinese 
investment; data show that Beijing’s companies have acquired some 10 percent of the EU 
container maritime logistic capacity (Pandya & Tagliapietra, 2018). In 2008, China’s shipping 
SOE COSCO obtained a concession for the operation of two piers at Piraeus, Greece’s main 
port; in 2016, the company won a tender call and acquired a 67 percent share of the Piraeus 
Port Authority (PPA), becoming the majority shareholder of the main container hub in Greece 
(Pallis & Vaggelas, 2016). COSCO’s investment in Piraeus is of crucial importance as it 
established private control over a public authority with Beijing’s direct involvement. Piraeus 
became the world’s fastest growing container hub after COSCO’s investment pushed the port 
container throughput from 880,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU) in 2010 to 3,36 million 
TEU in 2015. In Mediterranean Europe, Italy is also drawing closer to China as an infrastructure 
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and connectivity partner. In March 2019, the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) on the BRI between Beijing and Rome paved the way for further involvement of 
Chinese SOEs in the Italian infrastructure system, especially in the North Adriatic port of 
Trieste and, to a lesser degree, in Ravenna and Venice. Furthermore, Italy was the only G7 
country to partake in the BRI Forum held in Beijing in May 2017, a move that signalled 
significant political interest towards Beijing’s connectivity projects. 
The past decade has also been a phase of critical challenges for the EU. The unfolding of the 
global financial crisis in 2008, and most importantly the debt crisis of 2010-2011, affected the 
EU cohesion and had a dramatic impact on the Union, where some member states have 
suffered harshly from the economic downturn. China’s growing interest in the European 
infrastructure came timely as a source of much needed investment for some EU countries. 
Whereas Greece’s concession over Piraeus represents the most prominent case in point, 
other countries seem to be increasingly turning to China as a partner for infrastructure 
development, as Italy’s growing interest in the BRI demonstrates. However, countries in 
Central-Western Europe such as Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, pursue a careful, 
yet healthy, relationship with Beijing, welcoming a limited presence of Chinese SOEs in their 
infrastructure capacity (Gaspers & Lang, 2016; Linden, 2018). Importantly, these countries play 
a crucial role for global maritime trade and logistics. Belgian, Dutch and German ports have 
historically represented leading European hubs for maritime commerce, enjoying cutting-
edge infrastructure technology and geographical proximity to the largest industrialized and 
exporting countries in the continent. Against this backdrop, China’s growing interest in 
Eastern Mediterranean ports is likely to impact first and foremost on the commercial and 
logistic attractiveness of maritime hubs located in Central-Western Europe. 
In this scenario, China’s shareholding of the EU infrastructure capacity has been addressed 
from two different perspectives. On the one hand, scholars, along with a number of European 
political and institutional representatives, have warned against the risk that the EU might 
undergo loosening political cohesion due to China’s investment focusing on specific 
countries and the ensuing consolidation of Beijing’s political influence therein (Casarini, 2016; 
Le Corre & Sepulchre, 2016; O’Dea, 2019). Others have gone so far as to warn about the security 
implications of China’s presence in European ports, as Piraeus has recently hosted Chinese 
military vessels. On the other hand, Chinese authorities reassure that Chinese investment is 
driven by a cooperative logic, which is to result in a “win-win” scenario, a dimension 
extensively emphasized in publications and official documents related to the BRI (NDRC, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, 2015). More broadly, seen from 
this perspective, Chinese interest in EU infrastructures is driven by commercial concerns, as 
Beijing’s investment aims to boost international connectivity, making shipping routes 
between China and Europe increasingly functional. Consequently, Chinese authorities 
suggest that Europe’s commercial interests will also benefit from Beijing’s investment. 
 
Research Methodology 
This study compares a group of ports located in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, with 
Italian ports in the North Adriatic Sea and Piraeus, in order to assesses whether, and to what 
extent, Eastern Mediterranean ports are growing more attractive, in commercial and logistic 
terms, vis-à-vis maritime hubs  in  Central-Western  Europe.  In  this  context,  this  study  
assesses  whether  infrastructure development in Eastern Mediterranean ports, fuelled by 
Beijing’s investment, is pushing a growing number of economic actors to relocate their 
distribution and logistic hubs from Central-Western Europe to the Eastern Mediterranean. 
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Against this backdrop, this paper also takes into account EU screening mechanisms on 
incoming foreign investments, in order to understand to what extent stricter public scrutiny 
has actually limited China’s infrastructure investment, and how such regulations have 
impacted on port infrastructure development in the national contexts of these EU member 
states. 
 
Chinese Investment in EU Ports: Ongoing Trends and Prospective Implications 
This research assesses the significance of the Eastern Mediterranean as a strategic juncture 
for reducing shipping times and costs between China and the European markets. In Eastern 
Europe, China invested in railways and land infrastructures to foster overland connectivity. In 
addition, the enlargement of the Suez Canal in 2015 enhanced the strategic importance of the 
area for international commerce. Maritime routes from Shanghai – China’s main port – to the 
North Adriatic Sea stretch over 8,600 miles, whereas the shortest route from Shanghai to 
Hamburg requires 11,000 miles of navigation (Casarini, 2016). Under these circumstances, 
Piraeus acquired enormous importance for Chinese logistical business. In addition, the Italian 
port of Trieste has drawn great interest from China, as it is located in a strategic position for 
maritime connections between Central-Eastern Europe and East Asia, revealing great 
potential for reducing shipping lengths and costs between the two regions. In this area, 
Chinese SOEs, along with the Italian Ministry of Infrastructure and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, have provided financial support for the development of the North Adriatic ports 
forming the Five-Port Alliance (Casarini, 2016)29. In this scenario, a growing number of 
companies have come to view the area as a strategic logistic juncture. Some multinational 
corporations are choosing Eastern Mediterranean ports, particularly Piraeus, as their main 
distribution hubs; other companies are relocating their distribution centres and core 
commercial activities from other areas of Europe to the region. In 2012, Hewlett Packard (HP) 
relocated its European distribution hub from Rotterdam to Piraeus (Van der Putten & 
Meijnders, 2015). The move was motivated by Piraeus’ strategic position for shortening 
shipping times and reducing transportation costs between Asian and European markets 
(Van der Putten & Meijnders, 2015). Huawei, Hyundai and ZTE have also chosen Piraeus as their 
European distribution hub (Van der Putten 2014; Van der Putten & Meijnders, 2015). Greece 
and Italy welcome Chinese SOEs and seem to consider Beijing’s interest and investment as 
an opportunity to boost infrastructure development. In a context of prolonged economic 
stagnation, Athens and Rome seem to view Beijing as a supportive partner for infrastructure 
development. 
In the EU, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands have also attracted relevant shares of 
Chinese infrastructure investment. Antwerp, Hamburg and Rotterdam are among the most 
important container hubs in Europe and the world; Rotterdam, particularly, represents the 
busiest European hub, and one of the main world ports in terms of container volume. Despite 
China’s investment in these ports is notable, however, public infrastructure management in 
Central-Western EU countries has generally allowed only minority shares to Beijing’s SOEs, 
whereas in no case port authorities have been taken over by private companies30. From this 
perspective, this study considers the relative openness to foreign private investment, along 
with the retention of public control over port authorities, the key characteristics of the EU 
Central-Western paradigm of port development. However, port infrastructure development 
in the Eastern Mediterranean provides tangible challenges for the leading role of Belgian, 
                                           
29 The Five-Port Alliance involves Italy’s Ravenna, Trieste and Venice, Slovenia’s Koper, and Croatia’s Fiume. 
30 Zeebrugge represents a partial exception, as COSCO’s shareholding in the port amounts to 85 percent. However, Zeebrugge port 
authority remained under public control. 
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German and Dutch ports in the European context. Whereas Beijing’s focus on the Eastern 
Mediterranean is seen as an opportunity by Athens and Rome, resulting in growing political 
convergence between the two countries and China, governments of Central-Western 
Europe, and EU institutions, have taken a more cautious approach vis-à-vis Beijing. Tellingly, 
EU leaders have come to consider China as “A cooperation partner […] an economic 
competitor […] and a systemic rival.”31 Against this backdrop, this research sees China’s 
growing presence in Greek and Italian infrastructures as a potential trigger of further political 
divide within the EU. 
 
Conclusion 
This research emphasizes how China’s infrastructure proactivity in the EU is triggering crucial 
processes on the geo-economic ground. China’s growing attention to the Eastern 
Mediterranean region is fostering the area’s development into the maritime core of the EU 
infrastructure system, making it the BRI’s main network of port facilities in Europe. To date, 
observers have focused on the implications of China’s investment in EU infrastructures either 
as a driver of a North-South political divide (Casarini, 2015) or in terms of security implications 
for Europe (O’Dea, 2019). The former group underlines that the most tangible consequences 
of China’s investment in the EU infrastructure is likely to result in growing polarization 
between member states eager to attract Chinese SOEs, on the one hand, and countries 
maintaining a cautious approach, on the other. The second group points to the risk of a debt 
trap with Beijing, and the possibility that European ports under Chinese SOEs’ control may 
be employed as dual-use facilities – i.e. serving both military and security purposes – by 
Beijing. Employing a different analytical perspective, this study focuses on the growing 
importance of the Eastern Mediterranean as a crucial geo-economic implication of China’s 
investment for the European port capacity. Located at a strategic juncture for shortening 
Euro-Asian shipping routes and reducing navigation costs, with ongoing improvements of 
the Mediterranean Sea-Red Sea-Indian Ocean maritime connections through the Suez 
Canal, and with EU countries such as Greece and Italy eager to attract Beijing’s SOEs, the 
Eastern Mediterranean holds full potential to emerge as the core maritime region of China’s 
BRI in Europe. Against this backdrop, this research investigates how the BRI impacts on other 
maritime areas of the continent, as sustained infrastructure development fuelled by China’s 
investment makes Eastern Mediterranean ports increasingly attractive as commercial and 
distribution hubs for multinational companies. In this scenario, this study suggests that 
European maritime hubs in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands are likely to undergo a 
dwindling role within the framework of the BRI and the Euro-Asian maritime connectivity. 
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Introduction 
On June 7, 2016, the 28 European Union (EU) Transport Ministers authorized the European 
Commission to start negotiations for EU-level aviation agreements with the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The EU-ASEAN Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement 
(CATA) will be the first block-to-block agreement at such a scale and will cover a wide range 
of areas of gradual regulatory convergence: market access, safety, security, air traffic 
management, social, consumer and environmental protection, fair competition etc. For the 
EU, agreement shall mean a creation of 1.2 billion passenger aviation market (Hololei, 2019). 
As of August 2019, eight rounds of CATA negotiations have been conducted (ASEAN 
Secretariat, 2019) but -by the time of writing- the agreement is still pending.  
An analysis from Tan (2015) reveals three areas where the agreement can take place. First, we 
might expect that EU-ASEAN CATA would provide a fully relaxed or an unlimited market 
access in the form of direct, non-stop flights between the two regions operated by airlines 
designated by both EU and ASEAN sides in term of capacity, frequency and aircraft type. 
Second, the agreement could also go beyond liberalizing 3rd and 4th freedoms flights (i.e. 
direct and non-stop flights as mentioned in the first area), to relax 5th freedom operations as 
well. This means that EU carriers can have intermediate stops with traffic rights in a third 
region, e.g. Middle East or India as well as beyond-ASEAN rights, e.g. to Australia, New Zealand 
and the Pacific. Conversely, ASEAN carriers could secure similar rights somewhere in India or 
Middle East en-route to the EU as well as beyond EU rights, e.g. to the Americas. Finally, we 
can expect that the agreement would lift restrictions on code-sharing that exist in the 
current air services agreements between the respective states, i.e. both sides carriers, EU and 
ASEAN, can begin to code-share freely on trunk routes as well as on each other’s regional and 
domestic networks.      
In the meantime, in April 2016, finally all ASEAN member states ratified the 2010 MAFLPAS 
(2010 Multilateral Agreement for the Full Liberalization of Passenger Air Services) that 
signifies the completion of the first phase of the ASEAN Single Aviation Market (ASAM). 
According to Lee, J.W (2018) the 2010 MALFPAS consists of two protocols. Protocol I allows 
unlimited 3rd and 4th freedoms between all cities whilst protocol II allows unlimited 5th 
freedom between all cities except capital-capital-capital.  
 
Procedural parts 
We analyse the existing situation and potential impacts on airline and airport competition 
using detailed data and Origin- Destination and at flight level. The network efficiency of air 
transport routes can be expressed as the share of trips that use a direct connection from 
origin and destination, as opposed to trips that require two or more connecting flights. 
Analysing this indicator at airport, country and airline levels reveals continuously changing 
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airline network strategies that range from hierarchical hub-and-spoke structures to simple 
point-to-point connections. While the largest growth in air transport activity is currently 
within national markets (especially China, India and Indonesia), a buoyant regional market in 
East and Southeast Asia is already visible. The long-distance market between Asia and 
Europa is still relatively limited (Figure 1), but CATA will probably change the balance among 
the hub airports serving the market, allowing new regional and global players to enter.    
 
 
Figure 1: Share of EU – ASIA passenger trips served by direct connections. 
 
Expected type of impacts 
We might expect several impacts of CATA as described in the following paragraphs. 
First, an unlimited market access in the form of direct, non-stop flights between the two 
regions, in other words full 3rd and 4th freedom rights   operated by airlines designated by 
both EU and ASEAN sides in term of capacity, frequency and aircraft type should result in an 
increasing competition at hub-to-hub operations between the two regions as shown by the 
decreasing HHI index. As market access limitation is eliminated by CATA, more ASEAN and 
EU airlines shall enter to the existing hub-to-hub operation and we can expect a reduction in 
the average travel cost in this operation type. The inclusion of more ASEAN and EU players’ 
shares would also mean a reduction in the share of players from Gulf, Middle East and Turkish 
regions that currently hold the most important shares of the EU-ASEAN air corridors. Finally, 
facing an increasing competition at the hub-to-hub operation, we might expect more 
agreements between airlines from both sides for joint venture operations that shall allow 
competing players on a particular hub-to-hub route to cooperate and engage in joint 
marketing and revenue-sharing. 
Second, unlimited 5th freedom operations where EU and ASEAN carriers can have 
intermediate stops and beyond EU/ASEAN regions with traffic rights in a third region shall 
increase the ‘point-to-point’, ‘behind’, and ‘beyond’ shares in ASEAN and EU regions. 
Additional flights using the 5th freedom are expected to strengthen the position of both EU 
and ASEAN airports, creating additional demand that in turn can help build the critical mass 
for new connections. From the airlines’ perspective, experience in other open markets 
suggests that alliances between EU and ASEAN airlines will be in a better position to exploit 
the new opportunities. 
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Aviation is both the reflection and the driver of the communication and contact between EU 
and ASEAN. Liberalization helps in improving connectivity and provides a safety valve for the 
various geopolitical risks that affect both regions.  
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Introduction 
Aerotropolis is defined as an area centred on a major airport and surrounded by development 
of non-aviation infrastructures, integrated transportation, and service facilities, which is 
functioned to gain economic benefit (Cyrek & Weltrowska-jęch, 2013; Kasarda & Appold, 2014). 
Following the idea of aerotropolis, New Yogyakarta International Airport (NYIA) was initiated 
as a strategic infrastructure project listed in Masterplan for Acceleration and Expansion of 
Indonesia’s Economic Development (MP3EI) (Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
2011). Originally, MP3EI was an ambitious program that served as a starting point to transform 
Indonesia to be one of developed countries in the world by 2025. The masterplan divides 
Indonesia into six main economic corridors, which are Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, 
Bali-Nusa Tenggara, Papua-Maluku Islands (Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2011). 
Figure 1 illustrates the map of economic corridors of Indonesia.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Map of Indonesia economic corridor. Source: Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs (2011). 
 
 
Located in Kulon Progo district, Special Region of Yogyakarta province, Indonesia, the 
establishment of NYIA is anticipated to strongly promote MP3EI’s mission in preparing city 
of Yogyakarta as part of economic centres in Java corridor and tourism centres in the country 
(Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2011, Widiyanto, 2017).  This project was expected 
to be finished by April 2019 (Indonesia, 2017). 
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Apart from its crucial position in national development planning, the establishment of NYIA 
brings different layers of issues. The objective to transform productive land into airport led to 
refusal from local people because they are strongly dependent on the land to earn money 
(Muryanto, 2018; BPS Statistics of Kulon Progo Regency, 2018). Furthermore, this 
infrastructure development also sparks concerns about the environment since there was an 
issue with the delay in its environmental permit (Muryanto, 2017).   
This research aims to analyse the driving forces behind the development of aerotropolis as 
well as the social and environmental impacts of the project in the region. A field work to 
Yogyakarta, Indonesia was performed between 29 January and 9 March 2019. At that time, 
the NYIA project was still under construction.  The approach of this research is a qualitative 
case study that uses multiple methods: interview, focus group, direct observation, and 
documents review. In total, thirteen semi-structured interviews have been executed, which 
consist of a group interview with six participants and twelve individual interviews. The 
participants of interviews were selected based on their involvement in the case of NYIA 
establishment. In practice, volunteers in the field, local non-government organisations, 
researchers, government officials, and local people were selected as interviewees by 
implementing snowball sampling. For the local people, this research only focused on people 
who live in Glagah and Palihan village, because according to Angkasa Pura I (2017), these two 
villages are the most affected villages from airport construction with 1237 and 1139 plotted 
lands each that will be used for the sake of NYIA construction. 
 
Social and environmental impacts 
The establishment of the airport leads the local people in NYIA development area to endure 
four major detrimental issues. The first one is displacement, which caused separation of local 
people into two groups: people who agreed with the displacement and people who 
disagreed. In the struggle to secure their land, issue of exclusion, oppression, and violence 
treatment were experienced by people who disagreed to be displaced. As a result of the 
displacement from their own land, the people were relocated in the areas that have been 
determined by Angkasa Pura (a state-owned company that has an authority to control 
airport management in Indonesia). In this process, people still needed to pay for the land as 
well as for the cost of building construction. The process also leads to social changes since 
the current neighbourhood transforms into a more urban area, which cannot be cultivated. 
The third impact is poor compensation. Again, there is a treatment gap experienced by the 
local people. The compensation money was smoothly received by people who agreed to be 
relocated. In contrast, people whose land refused to be appraised only received a little 
amount of money in the end, which was not enough to support their families. The last 
impacts are loss of livelihoods and identity. When this research was performed, people who 
agreed to be displaced were still waiting for the responsibility of Angkasa Pura to give them 
new jobs as promised before the construction started. In reality, the promising effort did not 
entirely work because the local people of Kulon Progo were not selected to work in the 
project. A different story comes from people who opposed to be displaced since the 
beginning. In this regard, this group of people believed that their identity as farmers who 
supposed to have land that can by far support their families without having to work to other 
people were not acknowledged by Angkasa Pura. This is because the latter perceived that 
the land clearing process was over by exchanging the land with money.  
Apart from social impacts, environmental concern arises as the magnet of NYIA started 
working. The result of the field work indicates that the concept of aerotropolis, which will be 
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implemented in NYIA might lead to higher water exploitation for areas around the airport. 
This refers to the fact that besides airport operation itself, bigger amounts of water will be 
required to support other facilities in the aerotropolis area. Moreover, the establishment of 
NYIA also brings up the issue about shoreline change due to the location of NYIA which is 
widely considered to be a vulnerable landform with respect to natural disasters. The 
urbanization of the airport area, which causes more people to come, will possibly exacerbate 
the current severe condition of Kulon Progo.  
 
Discussions 
Pushpanathan (2010) argue that infrastructure development is considered as an important 
factor in stimulating economic recovery in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) countries after the 2008 global crisis. Therefore, in 2010, the Masterplan of ASEAN 
connectivity (MPAC) was initiated by ASEAN leaders. The formation of MPAC itself is the part 
of a roadmap for the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015 (Almekinders et al., 2015). In 
principle, MPAC aims to promote integrated intra-ASEAN trade and ultimate improvement 
of connectivity between ASEAN and global market (Pushpanathan, 2010; Gunawan, 2017). In 
Indonesia, the MPAC was synergized with MP3EI (Gunawan, 2017). Looking at the order, NYIA 
is established to promote Yogyakarta as a centre of economy in the Java corridor. In MP3EI, 
this corridor is responsible to become centre of industries and services (Coordinating Ministry 
of Economic Affairs, 2011). From here, it can be observed that NYIA development is supposed 
to promote industries and services as what has been mandated for Java corridor. Pointing 
out to the local to global relations, the aerotropolis of NYIA will likely help fostering export 
activity of Yogyakarta’s key commodities so that they can be traded in the global market. In 
terms of services, aerotropolis is likely to invite more people to come as well as more investors 
to invest in hotels or restaurants to support this sector.  
Furthermore, practice of neoliberalism can be clearly seen through the leadership of the 
government of Indonesia. In order to drive economic growth, the government of Indonesia 
enables foreign investors to invest in NYIA establishment through public private partnership 
mechanism. As a leader of Indonesia, President Widodo shows another neoliberalism 
practice by his maneuver to adapt NYIA establishment in the National Medium-Term 
Development. The president also seems to have political reason since he urged to finish the 
airport in the same moment as presidential election by issuing Presidential Decree Number 
98/2017, which specifically aims to accelerate construction of NYIA project so that it can be 
finished by April 2019 (Indonesia, 2017). 
 
Conclusions 
The explanation above reflects sustainability science issue because there are local to global 
relations, which imply that aerotropolis is developed to eventually serve the global economy. 
This case also demonstrates the importance of sustainable development goals, namely 
SDG11 about sustainable cities and communities, where development planning must 
guarantee positive relations between economic, social and environment as well as inclusivity 
for people to participate in urban practice (United Nations, 2019a). Besides that, SDG10 about 
reducing inequality is a fundamental direction for the case of aerotropolis of NYIA because it 
ensures proportionate chance for people to reach equality by enhancing justice through 
relevant policies and regulations (United Nations, 2019b).  
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Introduction 
The ultimate ambition of the paper is to explore whether EU can be the new international 
new regime maker by initiating the liberalism through its effort to negotiate, contract as well 
as sustainably adjust the agreements with third countries based on the externalization of 
Normative Power Europe. Or China will play a more important role in international regime 
making by using its Regional Multilateralism, Normative Power China, under the One Belt 
One Road Grand National Strategy to deal with EU’s liberalism. Can the EU’s liberalism or 
China’s regional multilateralism be winning the battle of regime making?  
 
Statement of Ambitions  
The core aim of the project is to assess EU’s hegemonic powers in international civil aviation 
which was originally proposed as the future research direction by Kassim and Stevens (2010). 
The rise of the European Union (EU) as an international actor in civil aviation over the past 
decade has been a transformative development. As a supranational body within a historically 
state-centric order, its emergence has been as remarkable as it has been disruptive. The EU 
has forced existing organizations, as well as governments, to recognize it as an actor and to 
acknowledge its influence. The impression for much of the past decade has been that its 
powers would continue to expand inexorably.  
As a putative new hegemon (Dobson 2007, Stainiland 2008), the EU introduced 
multilateralism as the new currency of international civil aviation. It established the Single 
European Aviation Market. It gained the power and authority in 2002 to represent EU 
member states in civil aviation agreement negotiations by the historic European Court of 
Justice’s ruling on Open Skies Cases, signed Open Skies Agreements with US and Canada to 
open a new era of international civil aviation history, and implemented a civil aviation strategy 
to sign the Open Skies Agreements with all major civil aviation nations in the world. It also 
initiated a proposal for global environmental protection to ensure the sustainable 
development of civil aviation. Moreover, following earlier interventions in safety and security, 
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the European Parliament adopted a measure on EU Passenger Name Records in order to 
address safety and security issues of civil aviation as recently as April 2016.  
The EU’s rise and expanding influence have been remarkable, and apparently inexorable, but 
the defeat in ICAO of an EU-backed proposal on environmental protection prompted the 
thought that the EU’s power is not absolute. The aim of this project is to assess EU’s influence 
in aviation by examining its capacity for re-writing the rules in international economic 
regulation, namely the international civil aviation regime making rules.  
 
The Background of International Civil Aviation Regimes’ Makings 
Since 1944, international civil aviation has been governed by a state-centric order, 
characterized by US leadership and an embedded bilateralism. Under the Chicago 
Convention, the International Civil Aviation Organization was founded as the UN’s civil 
aviation chapter. The Chicago Convention defines civil aviation rights in terms of state 
sovereignty, and subsequently these rights were traded through bilateral negotiations 
between nations. Due to the fact that the US’s civil aviation power was the strongest in the 
world after the Second World War, US built a global civil aviation regime under its leadership 
on the bilateral principle. Through the deregulation of US aviation industry and the adoption 
of new aviation foreign policy, US was the unquestioned hegemon of international civil 
aviation.  
Although Chicago Convention opened a new page for international aviation by clearly 
defining the air sovereignties of individual countries as well as outlining various aviation 
freedoms, the ICAO was successful in standard-setting and a forum for cooperation in 
technical issues, but had limited operational capacities due to the original institution setting, 
power structure as well as its decision making procedures. The EU has emerged as a new 
power in international civil aviation. It has changed the rules of international civil aviation 
economic regulation, international civil aviation environmental policy as well as international 
civil aviation safety and security policy.  
The EU has introduced a form of multilateralism through its imposition of a new type of air 
services agreement, which it has substituted for bilateral accords. The signing of EU-US Open 
Skies Agreement appeared to signal its status as a new hegemonic power. It has also 
successfully signed similar agreements under the umbrellas of EU’s Neighbourhood Policy 
as well as EU’s Mediterranean Policy with its neighbours. It has signed (been working on 
signing) Open Skies Agreements with other major civil aviation powers. The EU has not only 
been active in international economic regulation. It has also attempted to raise global 
environment protection standards. Following the extra-territorial implementation of its rules 
on noise emissions, it sought to promote its Emission Trading System more globally. ICAO 
not only accepted to put the environmental protection measurements for discussion, but 
also set up the environmental protection group of ICAO, more importantly ICAO has finally 
agreed to set up the international civil aviation standards by 2020 which marked another 
victory of EU in international civil aviation politics. In terms of the safety and security issues, 
after long interactions between European Parliament, European Commission and European 
Council, the Passenger Name Records was adopted by the European Parliament to tackle 
the issues of civil aviation safety and security after terrorist attacks in Europe. There is also 
therefore momentum for EU to promote its safety and security measurements to be the 
international standards. Although the EU is not and cannot be a member state of 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), it has nevertheless succeeded in exerted 
major international influence. 
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Case Study on EU-China Open Skies Agreement Negotiation 
The research will be done through case studies on finding out whether EU or China or maybe 
both in different contexts can make the new international civil aviation regimes between 
Europe and Asia to help the sustainable development of the EU-Asia Civil Aviation.  
China has been very ambitious to boost civil aviation industry by merging state-owned 
airlines to increase capacities, building airports to enable possibilities. If EU can successfully 
sign the Civil Aviation Agreement with China, it shows very clear that EU has been the new 
hegemon of international civil aviation as EU succeeds to persuade China to follow EU’s 
multilateralism as the international principle.  
It should be noted that China has promoted the Belt and Road Initiative in the whole world 
since 2013, it is mainly for the economic booming by making the regimes of Belt and Road 
Region under China’s leadership. Belt and Road Civil Aviation Region is one of the top targets 
that China is hoping to finalize after getting the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank 
established. Therefore China has promised to invest 50 Billion RMB (9 Billion Euro) at the Belt 
and Road Region countries to help their civil aviation industries. In 2018, EU also proposed 
the strategy to connect Asia and Europe which has been in the early stage of the making.  
As the EU and China all have ambitions to connect Europe and Asia, it is definitely worth 
researching whether EU and China will cooperate or compete or cooperate for the regime 
making. It is worth researching because EU and China have extremely different approaches 
on the civil aviation regime making, while EU is targeting on the selected major civil aviation 
countries in Asia, China has included all countries in the Belt and Road Region in 
consideration.  
 
Research Method of Game Theory Analysis 
Game Theory analysis will be used as the method to explore, whether EU or China can make 
new model of international regimes as new regime maker in the world. The four-game 
theory scenarios between China and EU’s rational interactions will be exposed, while the four 
payoffs of China and EU’s each within four different contexts of EU and China’s rational 
behaviour patterns will be compared vertically and horizontally. More importantly the flows 
between four game theory interaction scenarios will be analysed to figure out the pros and 
cons in line with the gains and losses during the flows to identify the most stable scenario for 
the two parties to have the agreements signed, through which building the new 
international regime can be regarded as the fruit produced by the interplays between EU’s 
liberalism and China’s regional multilateralism initiated by the One Belt One Road National 
Grand Strategy of China.  
Game Theory is the best tool for exploratory studies on international negotiations as the 
feature of the game theory is to forecast the strategic decision-making procedures based on 
the forecasting of different players’ actions based on the rational way of thinking.  
 
Conceptual Framework for Analysis  
Figure 1 presents the conceptual framework for analysis, which is based on Game Theory and 
Regimes Theory findings. The conceptual framework shows the possible strategies of the EU 
and the third countries based on the ideologies and values. 
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Figure 1: Conceptual Framework showing Two Way Interactions between EU and Third Countries on 
their Open Skies Agreement Negotiation Options. 
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Table 2 EU-China Open Skies Agreement Negotiation Payoff Scenario  
 
 EU 
China 
 Friendly  Cold 
Friendly C1   E1 
common benefits(Open 
Skies) in conflict with 
each other(5th or 7th or 
8th and 9th), collaborate   
regime 
 
C2   E2 
to avoid certain result (no 
regime) but they have 
conflicts (5th, 7th, 8th or 9th, 
both parties has same 
rights or not). Regimes 
will be made to 
coordinate 
 
Cold C3   E3 
to avoid certain result (no 
regime) but they have 
conflicts (5th, 7th, 8th or 9th, 
both parties has same 
rights or not). Regimes 
will be made to 
coordinate 
 
Scenario 4 China 
approaches EU member 
states  and US if EU is 
cold to China, UK-China 
Open Skies Agreement 
after Brexit 
C4    E4, No Regime 
Note: The research is only the strategic scenario analysis between EU and China (third country), not the action 
analysis which may require different game theory analysis models.  
 
Conclusion 
The research finds out that the EU and China all have potentials of being the new 
international regime maker with the ideology of liberalism or regional multilateralism. But it 
is very important for the EU and China to use the right strategy at the right time for getting 
the best payoffs from the rounds of negotiations. If the EU and China as well as other Asian 
countries will be all rational during the whole process of Open Skies Agreement negotiations, 
the EU-Asia civil aviation market's sustainable development is very possible to be made. 
Needless to say, if the EU or China are not very rational during the negotiation process, their 
regime making process will fail because they cannot attract European and Asian countries 
to be members of their regimes.  
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An inquiry into synergies and tensions between 
the EU’s Connectivity Strategy and China’s BRI  
Constantin Holzer 
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The EU and China are global economic key actors with a profound impact on transeurasian 
connectivity. Both like to posit themselves as proponents of a multilateral global order, 
international trade and environmental sustainability - embedded in a narrative of win-win 
cooperation. In order to guide investments, both China and the EU have recently 
pronounced their own visions for sustainable development on the transeurasian continent - 
the Belt and Road Initiative by China, which was launched by China as early as 2013, and the 
EU's Connectivity Strategy to connect Europe Asia by the EU, launched in September 2018. 
While both visions focus on infrastructure, transport, energy and digitalization, the EU\'s 
Connectivity Strategy is emphasizing sustainable, comprehensive and rules-based, while 
China\'s BRI is stresses the win-win cooperation brought about by the Chinese state-led 
investment model going global. Upon close examination both concepts differ dramatically 
in terms of 1. strategic vision, 2. geographic scope, 3. development methodology and 4. 
available resources. Based on these fundamental differences, this paper is going to examine 
whether and to what extent political-institutional dialogue and cooperation is feasible 
between the EU's Connectivity Strategy and China's BRI. The EUs connectivity strategy is 
undoubtedly an important answer to China's BRI that allows the EU to engage transeurasian 
connectivity and to shape it in its own image. The question of political-institutional dialogue 
and cooperation remains a crucial one however in order to maximize benefits and reduce 
tensions between both initiatives. Increased connectivity has been identified by both the EU 
and China as one of the main aspects for boosting trade and sustaining economic growth 
and the geopolitical dimension of trade and connectivity is at the centre of this question. 
Synergies and tensions between the EU's Connectivity Strategy and China's BRI have to be 
made explicit in order to facilitate a form of dialogue and engagement that contributes to a 
shared vision of sustainable connectivity. 
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Asia, Europe and Africa are getting interlinked through pan regional connectivity initiatives.  
Asia is leading the narrative on connectivity in which the Masterplan on ASEAN Connectivity 
(MPAC), Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Asia Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), and Asia–Europe 
Meeting (ASEM) – all connectivity plans aim to deepen Asia’s economic dynamism and 
extend it to trans-regional partners.  As a significant partner of Asia, EU has put in place 
building blocks towards an EU Strategy on Connecting Europe and Asia with concrete policy 
proposals and initiatives, including through interoperable transport, energy and digital 
networks. The EU-Asia connectivity strategy aims for sustainable, comprehensive and rules-
based connectivity. 
The challenge is how to ensure greater synergy among the connectivity initiatives in the 
region which can result in inclusive and sustainable development, increase social well-being 
of people and deepens trust among partners. A roadmap for developing synergy among the 
connectivity plans and measures must therefore be an important policy agenda. 
‘Connectivity’ has always existed but use of connectivity as a concept for determining 
development strategies and influencing international relations is recent. ASEAN is generally 
credited with popularising the term ‘connectivity’ leading to its MPAC, which was adopted in 
Ha Noi in 2011. The ASEAN approach to connectivity uses the context of community building 
and well-connected ASEAN that will contribute towards a more competitive and resilient 
ASEAN community. The MPAC 2025 broadens this vision to achieve a seamlessly and 
comprehensively connected and integrated ASEAN.   
The AAGC aims to facilitate and enhance economic growth in Asia and Africa through the 
development of institutional and human resource capacity, connecting institutions and 
people, facilitating trade and improving technology and infrastructure of the two continents. 
The AAGC is aligned with Agenda 2030 and provides green projects with priority funding and 
implementation.  
The BRI proposed by China aims to promote connectivity among the Asian, European, and 
African continents and their adjacent seas. It aims to establish and strengthen partnerships 
among the countries along the Belt and Road and realise diversified, independent, balanced, 
and sustainable development in these countries.  BRI is backed by strong financial resources 
commitments from China and decision making on infrastructure projects is based on 
bilateral agreements with other governments.  
The EU Strategy on Connecting Europe and Asia lays out concrete policy proposals and 
initiatives to improve connections between Europe and Asia, including through 
interoperable transport, energy and digital networks. The approach to connectivity with Asia 
is sustainable, comprehensive and rules based. Establishing partnerships for connectivity 
based on commonly agreed rules and standards and contributing to address the sizeable 
investment gaps through improved mobilisation of financial resources and strengthened 
international partnerships are its important features.  
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The Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) connectivity differs from the infrastructure connotations of 
the BRI and the developmental and capacity-building contours of the AAGC.  ASEM is a 
multilateral platform of 51 countries in Asia and Europe with both formal and informal 
institutions, and connectivity related activities are the most visible face of this group, as they 
runs across all three pillars: political, economic, and socio-cultural.  
In a global milieu, the connectivity plans are competing for space, resources, influence and 
results.  Seeking convergence among competing connectivity plans may be a desirable 
policy objective but it is based on the notion that all connectivity plans have similar objectives. 
The contours of the MPAC, AAGC and BRI are different in terms of their origins partnerships, 
resources and the political and economic priorities of the promoters. Putting the strength of 
different connectivity plans behind globally agreed development goals and global 
governance mechanisms, however, can create commonality of purpose and synergy among 
the different connectivity plans.  
The transformational changes in global governance, international relations, aspirations of 
young demography, technological connectivity and future of work are driving the current 
discourse on connectivity. For this reason, free and open Indo Pacific, ASEAN-India 
connectivity, AAGC, BRI, EU-Asia connectivity are seeking greater emphasis on governance, 
standards, transparency, and accountability. The ADBI has helped to further this objective by 
providing the estimated costs for infrastructure in Asia ($ 26 trillion till 2030) which includes 
climate adaptation and mitigation costs.  
Primarily, financing of connectivity plans, transparency in project preparation and 
accountability in project execution are important global concerns emerging from the 
implementation of connectivity plan. The example of BRI is important as it has drawn the 
global attention towards issues of planning and project design, financing and debt 
sustainability, territorial integrity and people’s choices. Controversies in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
Maldives, Laos, Montenegro relate to debt sustainability and underline the disconnect 
between connectivity plan and development strategy.  
Finding the global standards for connectivity projects and activities is difficult but not 
impossible. The global development programmes and impetus for multilateralism can 
provide the way to create greater interlinkages between connectivity plans through 
governments, and regional and multilateral institutions. The Bretton Woods framework 
monitored monetary institutions for fostering peace and building growth in the post war 
years.  Similarly, with connectivity as the new international strategy for growth, it is essential 
that global governance should reach and monitor its various aspects and actors. It is already 
evident in MPAC, AAGC and EU-Asia connectivity that triangular and multilateral 
cooperation for connectivity are producing more inclusive and sustainable plans due to 
greater oversight of project preparation processes and plan outcomes.    
The practical aspects of trans-regional connectivity call for a unified or common regime for 
the carriage of goods and people across continents. Technical specifications, safety 
management frameworks, social and economic well-being of workers in the sector, 
competition policy, customs cooperation are some important beyond the border issues that 
require agreed standards and regulations, especially in rail and road transport. Air and sea 
connectivity have international rules but require calibration around new collaborations and 
routes. Digital connectivity is embedded in most plans but promoting a peaceful, secure and 
open ICT environment, including data protection requires coherent regulatory approach as 
well as policies and incentives to bridge the digital divide. Clearly, the synergy in different 
connectivity plans is incumbent on common rules and standards.   
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The challenge is to find the imperative for global standards and governance rules for 
connectivity plans. This can be drawn from the broad commitment to put people and their 
prosperity at core of connectivity programmes. Employing good governance and 
accountability as drivers, the plans must work towards the goals of sustainable development 
and inclusive growth. When connectivity plans converge with regional, national, and global 
development priorities, monitoring of plans will likely become easier. Finally, the monitoring 
and regulatory mechanisms must ensure that connectivity plans are not used as a foil for 
regional leadership. Nor can they be planned to export the debt problems in promoter 
country or group of countries.  Policy makers are working towards global standards for 
contemporary issues of taxation, digital finance, internet, data ownership and transfer, 
artificial intelligence etcetera.  Global consensus around climate change, sustainable 
development goals, multilateralism and global trade is also being renewed. It is only logical 
that global (and regional) mechanisms for monitoring and regulation of connectivity plans 
should ensure that these plans enhance economic and social well-being among people and 
create trust among partners. The Asia Europe Meeting can be a solid platform to raise the 
efforts among Asian and European partners to set the global standards and regulations 
around infrastructure for connectivity and for the sustainable financing of connectivity plans. 
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Objectives 
The objective of this paper is to discuss and compare the EU and ASEAN sustainable 
development action plans and its implementation. Furthermore, it examines different 
cooperation and dialogue instruments that have emerged in the pursuit of sustainable 
development. Lastly, it assesses to what extend these instruments improve the effectiveness 
of the application of actions plans and sustainable development law. 
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Introduction 
Despite the crisis in the global economy, politics, and social-environment between the 
developed countries and the developing countries, sustainable development law is a 
potential instrument that can manage to resolve disputes between industrialized countries 
and developing countries and reconcile economic development with environmental 
matters. 
Consolidation of sustainable development law that was undertaken by the Stockholm 
Conference in 1972 and the Rio Conference in 1992 has also had an impact on social and 
environmental justice. Indeed, it promotes a double synergy between the protection of the 
environment, economic development, and State action. The recognition of sustainable 
development by the international community represents a significant change to the current 
legal system guaranteed by consistency, rationality, autonomy and structured in hierarchical 
layers. 
However, the emergence of sustainable development in international law and its recognition 
raised concern, questions, and controversy about its legal prospect, sophisticated governance 
and structural limits due to the proliferation of sustainable development standards and the 
growing number of complex institutions. Furthermore, differing practices — e.g., action plans 
and strategies — between the EU and ASEAN point to the need to consider whether there is 
a genuine joint will of both regions to create a new paradigm that can reconcile environment 
protection with economic development. 
Thus, raising the question of whether the EU and ASEAN new dialogue and cooperation 
instruments of dialogue could strengthen the implementation and effectiveness of their 
regional action program for sustainable development. 
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To address the issue, this paper provides, first, a comparative perspective and an analysis of 
different EU and ASEAN regional action programs dealing with sustainable development in 
order to build on points of convergence and reduce points of divergence (1). Second, it 
examines the EU and ASEAN Strategic Dialogue and Cooperation instrument in order to 
assess whether these instruments contribute to a greater effectiveness of the application of 
action plans and sustainable development law (2). 
 
The European Union and ASEAN Action Plans in a comparative perspective 
The EU and ASEAN play an important role in the application and the effectiveness of 
international law related to sustainable development by establishing regional actions plans 
which are consistent with 2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), Agenda 21 and 
regional strategies (e.g. Göteborg Declaration, 15-16 June 2001 and ASEAN Vision 2025). 
The EU and ASEAN both developed multi-annual action plans to guarantee the protection of 
the environment and sustainable development. Among various actions plans, the EU have 
so far seven Environmental Action Programme. Through the EU example, ASEAN also 
established suitable actions plans to the local needs such as ASEAN Sub-regional 
Environmental Programme (ASEPs I, II, III et IV) and Programme on nature conservation and 
terrestrial ecosystems. EU and ASEAN actions plans have three common priority objectives 
that are interconnected: greater effort to protect the environment, supporting economic 
growth and reducing threat hanging over human health and human well-being. Those three 
common objectives are a common ground between the EU and ASEAN. 
Action plans and strategies are soft law instruments that can be used as preparatory work 
for binding legislative acts. Besides, these non-binding instruments encourage the EU and 
ASEAN to work toward common goals such as sustainable development and the protection 
of the environment. 
Furthermore, environmental action plans contribute to the improvement of the 
implementation and the effectiveness of economic and social policies and regulations. For 
example, sustainable use and management of natural resources reduce loss of natural 
capital. Improving the resilience of the natural capital leads to positive effect on human health 
and well-being. Since it has promoted innovation and the protection of natural resources, 
climate change adaptation and mitigation measures improve the resilience of the EU and 
ASEAN economy and society. 
Although the positions of EU and ASEAN converge on three main objectives, their priority 
areas and methods of implementation and enforcement diverge thoroughly. The effective 
implementation of the action plans relies on the capacity of the region to keep it 
homogeneous and compliant. Therefore, the implementation of ASEAN action plans is less 
effective than those in the EU. That is mostly due to the absence of a centralized institution 
with coercive measures and compliance procedures. 
Moreover, both regions choose different priority areas and thematic strategy adapted to the 
context of the region and society. For example, on one hand, ASEP I, II and II have six priority 
areas such as environmental education, urban environment, industries and environment, 
environmental management, marine environment, conservation of nature and earth 
ecosystem. On the other hand, the EU 6th EAP (2002-2012) and 7th EAP (2014-2020) focus on 
climate change, nature and biodiversity, environment and health, management of natural 
resources, waste, green economy with specific objectives for 2020. The 6th EAP have a list of 
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future legislative measures that can be adopted for the period of 2002-2012 whereas ASEP 
measures are soft law and are not binding. 
In the light of these differences and low effective implementation of the action plans, the 
strategic dialogue is key to hold EU-ASEAN relation on track, to promote mutual 
understanding and to enhance the effectiveness of the action plans. 
 
The European Union and ASEAN Strategic Dialogue and Cooperation Instruments: toward a 
greater effectiveness of the application of actions plans and sustainable development law 
The EU and ASEAN constantly sought ways of improving their economic and commercial 
cooperation and dialogue. They consistently attached great importance to political and 
institutional cooperation which is a more traditional type of intergovernmental cooperation. 
Since the conference of Rio (1992), the EU and ASEAN have developed cooperation and 
Strategic Dialogue covering environmental protection and sustainable development. The EU 
and ASEAN engage an informal and regular dialogue on the issue of integrating gradually 
environmental consideration into other policies, such as economic development and trade, 
and plans or programmes. 
Beyond dialogue, sharing of experience and information, good practice and capacity 
building facilitate the conciliation of the action programs, strengthen the implementation of 
sustainable development practice and the solving of the dispute. Strengthening regional 
cooperation and different action programs could contribute to innovation hence give 
satisfaction to States. 
For example, Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM), ASEAN-UE Ministerial Meeting (AEMM) and 
Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue instrument (READI) are innovative dialogue instruments 
which should substantially be used to reinforce and to enhance relationships between EU 
and ASEAN through a more comprehensive and balanced agenda on sustainable 
development, especially in the environment and education sectors, justice and poverty 
alleviation. In addition, those instruments enable EU and ASEAN to focus strongly on the 
implementation of sustainable development projects rather than meeting. Projects have 
been implemented such as Trans-Eurasia Information Network (2010) established by ASEM, 
several seminars on clean energy and climate change. Besides, READY funded eleven action 
plans to support ASEAN integration such as the ASEAN Center for Biodiversity in 2010. 
Funding provided by the EU can be used to support sustainable development action plan, 
ASEAN integration, education and environmental projects, programmes and sectors. 
Despite the reinforcement of the dialogue and the EU-ASEAN relation, efforts must be 
continued, particularly in the area of protection of the environment in order to have a 
harmonized action plan or strategies. Indeed, the EU and ASEAN are faced with the same 
environmental problems such as pollution, biodiversity, forestry, fisheries, hence, despite 
vicissitudes, they must pursue the cooperation in those areas and find new solutions to open 
new horizons for mutual understanding thanks to their Strategic Dialogue. 
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Image Management & Extraterritorial Repression 
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Introduction32 
Authoritarian states try to present a positive image of themselves abroad (Dukalskis, 2018; 
Brazys and Dukalskis, 2019). They invest in foreign-facing media, hire public relations firms, 
and showcase their successes to elite and popular foreign audiences. On its own this may be 
innocuous “soft power” or “public diplomacy”. However, there is also a darker side to these 
efforts. Authoritarian states try to obscure or censor bad news about their governments and 
often discredit their critics abroad. In extreme cases authoritarian states intimidate, physically 
attack, or even murder their (self-)exiled opponents overseas. Extraterritorial repression of 
this sort is facilitated by political, economic, and cultural connectivity. 
Connectivity that is truly sustainable must acknowledge and come to terms with modes of 
coercive political connectivity such as extraterritorial repression (for scholarship in this area, 
see among others: Adamson, 2020; Glasius, 2018; Cooley & Heathershaw, 2017; Moss, 2016; 
Lewis, 2015). States target political opponents abroad in order to blunt the ability of external 
political critics to influence domestic politics. Silencing critics abroad is part of a strategy to 
drive a wedge between external and internal activists so that they cannot effectively work 
together. Perhaps most importantly, targeting challengers abroad is important because it 
undermines their ability to garner the funds and attention necessary to pursue their goals. 
The international advocacy sphere can be considered a market, with groups that wish to 
challenge governments needing to present themselves and their goals as appealing and in 
line with the aims of funders able to support them (Bob, 2005). The effectiveness of these 
efforts depends a great deal on the international standing of the group itself. If a government 
can keep its challengers out of the international spotlight or undermine their credibility, they 
can keep activist causes off the international agenda, thus limiting pressure that rebounds 
back on the government.  
This presentation maps the extraterritorial repression of the world’s authoritarian states. It 
uses a newly constructed and in-progress events database called the Authoritarian Actions 
Abroad Database (AAAD), which includes instances of authoritarian states attempting to 
threaten, threaten the family of, arrest or detain, extradite, physically attack, and/or 
assassinate their citizens abroad between 1991 and 2019. 
 
Constructing the AAAD 
More details are available from the author, and will be published in book form, but in sum 
the AAAD contains publicly available information regarding attempts by authoritarian states 
to repress (self-)exiles abroad from 1991 through 2019. The database was inspired in part by 
the Exeter Central Asian Political Exiles Database (CAPE) (Heathershaw and Furstenberg, 
2019) as well as related work on political exiles featured in Cooley and Heathershaw, 2017: 187-
219) and the conceptual work found in Glasius (2018). The countries included in the database 
                                           
32 All rights and copyright retained by author.  
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are based on those defined as authoritarian in the Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) 
“authoritarian spells” typology after 1991 and for the relevant years. Some adjustments were 
made for states that had become authoritarian after the GWF coding finished or for cases 
omitted from the GWF data for other reasons, such as population size. Other regime data 
gathering efforts were used as guidance in these cases (e.g. Wahman, et al., 2013).  Because 
authoritarian actions abroad of the sort this project is tracking are usually secretive by nature, 
it is likely that for each case recorded there are many more that will never be publicly 
reported or verified. This data is just a glimpse into a dark area of connectivity.  
Searching was done using a three-stage process. First, where similar databases existed, their 
content was used given that researchers had already gathered the information and made it 
public. Second, Google news and Google search terms were utilized in order to identify a 
population of news articles and reports that contain information about the actions of 
authoritarian leaders against exiles abroad. For each search term, the first 10 to 20 Google 
pages were examined and a population of relevant articles were gathered and then re-
examined for data extraction. The search terms were designed to cast a wide net and 
therefore required readers to determine the relevance of each article.  Third, given the 
possibility of recency bias in Google news search terms, Nexis Advance UK was mined with a 
focus on earlier years in the timespan using similar search terms as those from the Google 
news and Google search procedures.  
Information from credible NGOs, international watchdog groups, and credible journalistic 
sources were sought. Where news articles were found, attempts to corroborate each incident 
were made. Often, multiple news sources report on the same event. Ultimately, if 
corroborated, the incident was included in the database. If uncorroborated but the source is 
a credible well-known organization, then the source was included in the database. 
Authoritarian actions abroad are often inherently secretive – indeed they are usually 
designed as such – and so in cases where responsibility was not always clear the coding team 
discussed the case and used its best judgement to determine whether the case should be 
included or excluded. The database was cross-checked and validated by the coding team to 
ensure inter-coder reliability. 
Full definitions and caveats are available from the author, but in terms of targets, the AAAD 
categorizes journalists, activists, opposition figures, former government officials, and other 
citizens. In terms of actions against targets, it covers the following: threatened, family 
threatened, arrested/detained, attacked, attempted extradition, extradited, abducted, and 
assassinated. On the latter, attempts are also included, as is an indicator of how clear it is that 
state agents perpetrated the assassination. The perpetrators of authoritarian actions abroad 
are not always clear. This is by design. Authoritarian governments often use “thugs for hire” 
to intimidate or attack dissidents domestically. Ong (2018) identifies three conditions in 
which the use of thugs is particularly likely: when the actions are illegal or unpopular, when 
the state wants to evade responsibility, and when states have weak capacity where they are 
operating. Taking actions against critics abroad satisfies all three of these conditions. This 
means that the location of responsibility for authoritarian actions abroad is made inherently 
difficult. There are undoubtedly cases in the AAAD where responsibility is misattributed, but 
nothing systematic is suspected. Regardless, this should not preclude attempts to gather 
such data. 
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Overview of Findings 
Tables 1 through 4 give a brief overview of the data. The search procedures detailed above 
yielded 994 discrete cases of authoritarian actions abroad, some of which involved more than 
one person (i.e. when a group of exiles was targeted at once). Table 1 shows the states that 
most frequently appear in the AAAD as instigators of authoritarian actions, with Uzbekistan, 
North Korea, China, Turkey, and Tajikistan the five most frequent violators. This data 
highlights the importance of transnational repressive campaigns, as many of the Uzbekistan 
cases stem from the aftermath of people fleeing after the Andijan massacre in 2005, many 
of China’s cases involve the extraterritorial side of the post-2014 crackdown in Xinjiang, and 
Turkey’s cases are dominated by the post-coup attempt purges and crackdowns after 2016. 
Table 2 shows that citizens and activists are the two most frequent targets. The prevalence of 
activists and journalists – together constituting nearly half of the cases – suggests the 
importance of image management as a motivator for authoritarian actions abroad. Table 3 
shows the most frequent actions. Of particular relevance for connectivity is Table 4, which 
shows select data on the locations in which authoritarian actions took place. Over 28% of 
cases involve European states (including Turkey and Ukraine), suggesting that European 
connectivity does come at a cost for some exiles of repressive states. Russia is the most 
frequent target state with 205 cases, which largely stems from its security connectivity with 
Central Asian states and the cooperation that affords in terms of extradition procedures.  
 
Table 1: Top 10 Countries in the AAAD (N=994) 
Country Total Percentage 
Uzbekistan 189 19.01% 
North Korea 156 15.69% 
China 139 13.98% 
Turkey 89 8.95% 
Tajikistan 60 6.04% 
Russia 44 4.43% 
Syria 43 4.33% 
Iran 48 4.83% 
Rwanda 30 3.02% 
Thailand  29 2.92% 
 
Table 2: AAAD categorised by target 
Target Total Percentage 
Citizen 398 40.04% 
Activist 351 35.31% 
Journalist 134 13.48% 
Former gov official 70 7.04% 
Opposition 41 4.12% 
Total 994 100.00% 
 
 
Table 3: AAAD categorised by action 
Action Total Percentage 
Arrested/detained 191 19.22% 
Threatened 179 18.01% 
Extradition Attempt 160 16.10% 
Extradited 156 15.69% 
Family threatened 153 15.39% 
Abducted 54 5.43% 
Assassination 44 4.43% 
Assassination Attempt 26 2.62% 
Attacked 22 2.21% 
Abduction Attempt 9 0.91% 
Total 994 100.00% 
 
Table 4: Select European states as targets 
Country Total Percentage 
Turkey 60 6.04% 
UK 59 5.94% 
Germany 34 3.42% 
France 30 3.02% 
Ukraine 20 2.01% 
Sweden 18 1.81% 
Switzerland 7 0.70% 
Other EU states 58 5.84% 
Europe in total 286 28.77% 
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Conclusions 
While openness and connectivity can be used by activists and others to push for political change across 
borders, it can also be used by states to silence political threats abroad. For (self-)exiles who rely on the 
protection of borders to shield them from authoritarian states, connectivity brings challenges and 
hazards.  
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Paving the road to peace and prosperity? A 
framework for understanding the conflict impact 
of infrastructure initiatives 
Pascal Abb 
Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution33 
 
The political dimension of infrastructure has recently emerged as a topic of great academic 
and practical interest, mainly as a result of China’s much-discussed Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI) and competing proposals advanced by actors like the US, EU, Japan and Russia. Much 
of this attention has focused on the geopolitical consequences of the BRI, and for good 
reason. From the beginning, it was conceived of as a "national strategy" serving multiple 
economic and political aims, among them the restoration of China to a position of centrality 
in world politics (Swaine 2015). Analyses have covered angles ranging from its impact on 
reshaping international trade flows, its role in boosting Chinese soft power and agency in 
global governance, or how related investments could result in moving recipient countries 
into Beijing's political orbit (e.g. Huang 2016).  
However, a major aspect that has been largely overlooked is the potential impact of 
infrastructure on conflict settings and dynamics. This angle urgently warrants further study, 
since many of the investments envisioned under the BRI and its competitors are intended 
for highly fragile regions that had been underserved by existing infrastructure funding - often 
because this fragility is a warning flag to investors. Under the BRI alone, an estimated 60 
billion has been earmarked for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC; MPDR/NDRC 
2017); a similar project in Myanmar, which is in an early planning phase, could even exceed 
this figure. Other countries with high actual or projected investments include Nigeria, Angola 
and Sri Lanka (AEI 2020). All of these countries are currently mired in, or recovering from, 
serious internal strife, sometimes at the level of full-blown civil wars in regions traversed by 
the new transport corridors.  
Where the link between conflict and infrastructure has been considered previously, it has 
usually come in two forms: first, by treating conflict as an external risk to projects and 
analyzing its impact on overall viability (Araya et al. 2013, Schwartz and Halkyard 2006); or 
second, by promoting the overall developmental effects of infrastructure and arguing that 
this can help to build lasting peace (e.g. Anand 2005). However, there are reasons to believe 
that the interplay between infrastructure and conflict dynamics is far more complex than 
either of these narrow angles suggest. Infrastructure has a potential to deeply transform 
conflict environments, and not necessarily for the better: as will be shown, increased 
inequality, environmental degradation, corruption and human rights abuses are among the 
adverse effects that need to be considered and anticipated. This has major implications for 
project implementation, and a great deal of care is required to avoid causing or exacerbating 
conflicts. 
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Infrastructure and conflict: a framework 
The term "infrastructure" encompasses an extremely broad category of items, ranging from 
connectivity solutions to power grids and municipal sewage systems. It is also a practically 
ubiquitous element of human civilization, shaping, enabling or constraining a wide variety of 
behaviours and thus making for an extremely complex relationship with conflict dynamics. 
The many potential interactions will be broken down here in two sets that tell very different 
stories: one of infrastructure as a driver of progress, peace and prosperity; and one covering 
the flipside of strife caused by inequality, corruption and environmental degradation. The 
effects of any real-life implementation will likely contain elements of both, but dividing them 
by this line helps to explain both the attractiveness which infrastructure holds to conflict 
societies, as well as problematic factors to be targeted by mitigation measures. 
 
Table 1: Potential positive and negative impacts of infrastructure on conflict dynamics. 
Positive Negative 
Jumpstarting economic activity, alleviating poverty 
and inequality 
Corruption, misappropriation and waste of public 
funds 
Statebuilding and strengthening national cohesion Differential provision that only benefits selected areas 
or groups 
Enabling better governance, services and control of 
contested territory 
Environmental degradation and development-
induced displacement 
Symbolizing modernity and creating expectations of 
progress 
Facilitation of repressive methods, securitization and 
militarization  
 Transnational conflicts over financing and resource 
access 
 
Accordingly, when it comes to conflicts, infrastructure projects need to be accompanied by 
a political strategy to realize their positive effects and mitigate against negative ones. 
However, the world's most prominent currently active infrastructure-building initiative, 
China's Belt and Road, follows a decidedly different approach. In promoting the BRI and 
China's overall contribution to conflict-affected states, Chinese officials have expressed their 
faith that its developmental effects will bring about peace (Xinhua 2017), while also reiterating 
their country's long-standing commitment to the norm of political noninterference. How the 
latter is implemented in practice has changed a lot in recent years, but it still encompasses a 
robust commitment not to pursue the political transformation of other regimes, the mutual 
recognition of sovereignty, a preference for dealing with international relations at the 
governmental level, and leaving only very limited possibilities for interventions in the affairs 
of other states (Hirono et al. 2019). Accordingly, the BRI looks set to emerge as a crucial test 
case infrastructure-related effects on conflict settings, and one that is inspired by a very 
different approach to its political dimension. The following section represents a very rough 
first take at the available evidence for how this is playing out. 
 
Peace and prosperity through the 'Belt and Road'? 
Figure 1 plots total Chinese infrastructure investments to BRI countries against state fragility. 
Data on the former was obtained from AEI’s China Global Investment Tracker (CGIT; AEI 
2020), by first limiting the scope to Chinese construction investments in BRI member states 
across four relevant sectors (transport, energy, utilities and telecom). The plotted number is 
the sum total of all such investments in a country since it joined the BRI. This may include 
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projects already agreed prior to the onset of the BRI, but due to the vague, open nature of 
the initiative and the rhetoric surrounding it, is arguably the most reasonable criterion for 
inclusion.  
Data on state fragility was obtained from the State Fragility Index (SFI) compiled by the Fund 
for Peace, by taking the yearly composite index scores for each BRI member since the time 
of joining and averaging them. The SFI is an aggregate of several political, economic and 
social dimensions and exhibits relatively little variation over such short time periods, but this 
average was used for greater precision. 
 
 
Figure 1: Chinese infrastructure investments under the BRI by recipient state fragility. 
 
Figure 1 sketches the overall bivariate correlation, an estimate of the linear relationship 
provided by the regression line, and labels cases that have attracted particularly high 
investments (more than 10 billion USD in total). As these indicators show, Chinese 
infrastructure investments under the BRI are clearly skewed towards high-risk 
environments. Indeed, just 17 of the observed 86 countries would qualify as „sustainable“ or 
„stable“ using the SFI’s ranking system, and investments are heavily concentrated in 
especially unstable states like Pakistan and Nigeria. Purely from a risk management 
viewpoint, this appears counterproductive: infrastructure investments have very long 
amortization periods, and are highly vulnerable to wartime destruction as well as lesser 
political risks like expropriation. Accordingly, we would expect capital to flock to 
environments that exhibit long-term stability, but the opposite is clearly the case for the BRI.  
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Some of this is by design - after all, the BRI was specifically intended to alleviate an unmet 
demand for infrastructure across developing countries in Asia and Africa that had at least 
been partially caused by their often unattractive risk profiles (Deloitte 2019). There is an 
element of path dependence, too: the BRI built on decades of prior Chinese engagement 
with many of its members, often centred around natural resource extraction to fuel China’s 
booming economy. As an industrial latecomer, these often had to be acquired in fragile 
states where Western corporations feared to thread (Alden and Alves 2009). Another reason 
can be found in the BRI’s perception as a geopolitical project designed to further Chinese 
global influence, which caused the US and many of its allies to abstain from participation and 
discourage it in others. This opposition removed many of the world’s wealthiest and most 
stable nations from the pool of potential members, leaving it skewed towards more fragile 
countries.  
Table 2 presents a breakdown of BRI infrastructure investments in three separate groups of 
countries - those with a low fragility score (indicating high stability) of less than 60, a medium 
one between 60 and 90, and a high one of over 90. It also features two key control variables, 
overall GDP and population. 
Table 2: Key metrics of states grouped by fragility. 
 State fragility, grouped 
 low (N=15) medium (N=44) high (N=22) 
Share of total 
infrastructure 
investments 
8.8% 49.7% 41.5% 
Share of GDP 14.2% 72.4% 13.3% 
Share of population 2.5% 67.8% 29.7% 
 
Again, it is immediately evident that less than a tenth of these investments went to stable 
countries. The largest category representing medium-stability countries accounts for almost 
half of the total, while the most at-risk group attracted 41.5%. This is highly notable, 
considering that the latter group represents just over a quarter of the cases, about a third of 
their population, and most strikingly a seventh of their combined GDP. In other words, the 
size of potential national markets accessed by the BRI does not seem to justify the clustering 
of investments in risky environments. This finding is also confirmed by a very simple linear 
model assessing the relationship between a state's fragility and the total amount of Chinese 
infrastructure investments it received, while controlling for GDP and population size. State 
fragility is estimated to be significantly positively correlated with investments, and is in fact 
considered to be the best predictor among the independent variables in this model.34   
The main takeaway from this analysis is to underscore that BRI investments are marked by a 
very high acceptance for conflict risks, especially compared to competing initiatives; that 
they tend to be concentrated in especially conflict-prone national and regional 
environments; and, by implication, that conflict management will be a very urgent and 
complicated task in the BRI's implementation. 
While this data provides clear evidence of correlation, it should be interpreted very cautiously 
when it comes to the question of causation. Highly aggregated data collected over the short 
lifetime of the BRI is, by itself, insufficient to investigate the complex and often locally 
bounded relationships sketched in the earlier part of the paper. Accordingly, this 
                                           
34 Significance was estimated at the 0.01 p-level, the model however has a relatively low overall explanative quality with an adjusted 
R2 of about 0.11. 
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presentation is simply intended to frame the problem and to point out the relevance of the 
BRI to the infrastructure/conflict nexus. The enormous influx of resources into highly fragile 
contexts in the wake of the BRI is likely to yield many possible test cases for the varied effects 
of infrastructure on conflict dynamics. These, however, are best investigated by giving full 
regard to national context conditions and especially the effects of individual projects at the 
local level. 
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China’s Belt and Road Initiative 2.0: Promoting 
Peace and Security in Myanmar? 
Cao Jiahan 
Shanghai Institutes of International Studies (SIIS), China 
 
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as China’s signature foreign policy enterprise, celebrated 
its sixth birthday in September 2019. Doubtlessly, the BRI has so far achieved much tangible 
progress on the ground, while it also triggers some controversies and even criticism from the 
international community mainly due to its ambiguity and grandness (e.g. Schicor, 2018, 
Zhang, 2018). In the long run, it is of great importance for China to win more international 
recognition to guarantee the success of the BRI.  
Notably, when Chinese President Xi Jinping addressed a symposium in Beijing marking the 
fifth anniversary of the BRI in August 2018, he pointed out that the overall layout of the 
initiative had been completed during the previous years and demanded a high-quality shift 
from “big freehand” to “meticulous brushwork” in planning future BRI projects (Xinhua, 2018). 
This statement was widely perceived as a signal for an updated version of the BRI, or “BRI 
2.0,” which takes on board various interpretations and reflects Beijing’s vision for further 
advancing the BRI.  
In this light, people are curious about a number of questions, among which are: In what ways 
will the BRI 2.0 become qualitatively different from the previous version? Can this upgraded 
initiative go beyond the economic dimension to address environmental and social 
challenges? And how much will it promote peace and security in conflict-prone countries 
like Myanmar?  
Exactly in the same month when President Xi made the statement, the Myanmar 
government published the Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan (MSDP) as the strategic 
guidance for the development of the country that provides an overall framework for 
coordination and cooperation across all ministries, states and regions, in order to forge a 
common path towards the emergence of a prosperous, peaceful and democratic Myanmar 
through 2030. Also, it localizes Myanmar’s commitments to the United Nations 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda) and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 
showing strong alignment with the SDG 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions) and 
especially SDG Target 16.5 (Substantially reduce corruption and bribery) and 16.6 (Develop 
effective, accountable and transparent institutions) in a variety of action plans (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1: The SDG16-MSDP-Nexus. 
 
More specifically, the MSDP prioritises peace and stability as the first pillar which is 
considered the prerequisite of achieving socio-economic development in Myanmar. In 
particular, strategy 1.2 of the MSDP is set to “promote equitable and conflict-sensitive socio-
economic development through all States and Regions” (MFP, 2018). To a large extent, the 
MSDP seems to focus more on liberal political reforms and institutional inclusiveness as what 
is discussed by OECD donors in the approach of “peace-development-nexus”.  
In contrast, the BRI does not explicitly address the issue of peace and security in its “Vision 
and Actions” jointly released by several ministries in 2015, while China does believe that peace 
and security can be brought to fragile countries along the Belt and Road like Myanmar 
through building state capacity and providing economic opportunities, for both of which 
infrastructure is a crucial element. This Chinese style of peacebuilding known as the 
“developmental peace” (e.g. He, 2017; Wang, 2018), as well as its narrative regarding the 
relation between peace and development, are substantially different from the “peace-
development-nexus” approach adopted by the MSDP.  
Now what is clear is that, right after President Xi’s state visit to Myanmar in January 2020, the 
“meticulous brushwork” of BRI 2.0 in Myanmar in general and the development of China-
Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) in particular will be greatly accelerated in coming years. 
Meanwhile, Beijing is expected to be increasingly involved in the Myanmar peace process by 
delivering more pressures on Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) for peace talks to 
safeguard border security and economic interests. However, it remains to be seen whether 
China’s approach of “developmental peace” through mega infrastructure projects along the 
CMEC can fit into Myanmar’s priority for national reconciliation and good governance listed 
by the MSDP. Currently, to what degree Chinese efforts in peacekeeping, conflict mediation 
and the BRI-sponsored infrastructure investment in conflict zones are coordinated is still a 
question (Abb, 2018). Since there is a distinct lack of conscious peace and security angle to 
the BRI, whether the BRI 2.0 can provide Myanmar with an alternative model of 
peacebuilding needs to be further observed and evaluated.   
In the longer term, the success of the “developmental peace” approach will largely depend 
on project management on the ground. While BRI-sponsored infrastructure projects will 
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generally enable Myanmar to become a regional hub of connectivity, improving the country’s 
trade, foreign investment and living standards of its citizens, they are also likely to cause social 
and environmental harm and provoke new conflicts in some ongoing conflict areas in 
Rakhine, Kachin and northern Shan states, which may in turn derail and undermine these 
projects. Therefore, the growth and development from infrastructure projects would have to 
be well managed to ensure real benefits and narrowed inequality for ethnic communities 
within conflict-sensitive environments along the CMEC (e.g. Zhou ,2019; TNI, 2019). 
Given the shortage of experience of Chinese companies have in dealing with conflict 
environments, these infrastructure projects along the CMEC will be faced with a wide range 
of security challenges. Furthermore, China’s diplomatic tradition of political noninterference 
together with its emphasis on state-to-state exchanges, have constrained the options to 
manage security problems. Therefore, China needs to develop its own political strategy in 
parallel with the implementation of infrastructure projects. Also, Chinese companies need to 
be equipped with more conflict awareness, technical conflict mitigation capabilities as well 
as stakeholder outreach strategies by learning from and collaborating with developed 
nations when necessary, in order to make the BRI 2.0 qualitatively different and help promote 
peace and security in Myanmar. 
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Enhancing Trade and Investment Facilitation for 
Global Value Chain Integration in Europe and 
Asia 
Eleonora Salluzzi, Rajesh Aggarwal, Mohammad Saeed and Qasim Chaudry 
International Trade Centre (ITC), Geneva, Switzerland 
 
Introduction 
This study aims at studying the key features of global value chain (GVC)  integration in 
Europe and Asia to understand how these have spurred trade and investment connectivity 
in the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) region. It is argued that in Europe and Asia, intraregional 
trade in goods and services, spurred by trade liberalization and regional integration, and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) have proved to be a powerful engine of growth and 
participation in GVCs. 
The study also delves into an analysis of those factors that have hampered technology and 
knowledge spill-overs into some economies in Asia and Europe, preventing businesses to 
innovate, move upstream and capture a larger slice of the GVC pie.  
As a conclusion, the study argues that, in order to strengthen trade and investment 
connectivity, Europe and Asia ought to cooperate to improve soft infrastructure and simplify 
the regulatory trade and investment environment to make engagement in GVCs a success. 
 
Methodology 
The study is mainly carried out through a descriptive analysis of trade and investment 
aspects in Europe and Asia, comparing trade and investment trends in Europe and Asia.  
The study first analyses the key trends of trade and FDI in ASEM in the last few decades, 
showing the patterns of growth of trade in goods, trade in services and FDI across the two 
continents.  
Subsequently, it analyses the areas demanding the attentions of policymakers in Europe and 
Asia to remove existing barriers to GVC integration. In order to investigate the main obstacles 
to further trade and investment integration, the study focuses on the challenges faced by 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to compete, connect and change – using the ITC SME 
Competitiveness (SMECO) methodology – as well as on the non-tariff measures (NTMs) and 
FDI restrictiveness that hamper the integration of businesses in Europe and Asia into existing 
or new GVCs.  
Finally, the study recommends policy actions to further enhance Asia-Europe trade and 
investment institutional connectivity, with trade and investment facilitation at the hearth of 
the dialogue and cooperation. 
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Key highlights 
1) Key trends of trade and FDI in Europe and Asia in the last few decades 
GVCs are extraordinarily present in ASEM, mainly triggered by intense economic activity of 
intraregional trade in intermediate goods. In Asia and Europe, intraregional trade is the key 
factor driving economic growth, and shows how GVCs in both regions are mostly regional by 
nature. In Asia, the share of intraregional trade as a share of total trade increased to 57.3% in 
2016, up from an average of 55.8% during 2010–2014, whereas in Europe the share amounted 
to 60% in 2016 (Asian Development Bank [ADB] 2017; World Bank 2016).  Nonetheless, trade 
in services is increasingly growing in importance, playing a key role in the expansion in trade 
in Asia and Europe during the past few decades. Europe and Asia are also the world’s top 
destinations for FDI.  
2) Key policy determinants of GVC trade in Europe and Asia 
Trade liberalization has enabled Europe and Asia to participate in GVCs, reducing 
significantly tariff barriers to the trade of intermediate and final goods. With production 
clustered around regional hubs, the rise of “Factory Asia” and “Factory Europe” has become 
the paradigmatic model of trade and development policies in GVCs.   
Trade liberalization has been driven by robust free trade agreement (FTA) activity, which is 
intensifying in dimension and scope. In fact, the new generation of modern FTAs that both 
Europe and Asia are negotiating are deep and comprehensive by nature, going beyond mere 
liberalization of trade in goods. Moreover, decreased transport and telecommunication costs, 
business-friendly reforms and regional integration agendas in Europe and Asia have ensured 
that countries could seize greater FDI opportunity to integrate in GVCs.  
Trade facilitation has contributed to make the business environment more conducive to 
trade in the ASEM region, reducing the time and cost to import and export across borders. 
Improvements in trade facilitation performance entail considerable economic gains and 
encourage more backward and forward linkages in GVCs. The entry into force of the WTO 
Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) has provided new impetus for trade facilitation reforms. 
3) Areas demanding attention of leaders in Europe and Asia: barriers to GVC integration  
SMEs are at the bulk of economic activity in Asia and Europe and have many opportunities 
to thrive in the digital commerce era; however, in Asia they are not robustly integrated into 
GVCs. In the different ASEM sub-regions smaller firms face higher costs due to their inability 
to capitalize on economies of scale and show higher gaps in competing and connecting to 
GVCs due to a lack of managerial capabilities and inability to internalize technology.  
Although tariffs in Europe and Asia have decreased, other behind-the-border barriers have 
progressively continued to pose even higher costs on SMEs. NTMs have become increasingly 
important within GVCs to promote access to information and traceability of products; 
however, they make compliance for small-scale businesses extremely difficult and impede 
their integration in GVCs. Procedural obstacles encountered to comply with NTMs are a 
major hurdle for SMEs, which often lack the resources to minimize the impact of trade costs 
arising from such obstacles. 
Despite improvements in the last decade, services restrictiveness still affects the 
competitiveness of Asian economies. Services restrictiveness is particularly detrimental for 
countries connected to GVCs, preventing them from upgrading in the chain. Different levels 
of competitiveness and technological advancement occur among ASEM economies, 
determining their different positioning in GVCs. Inability to exploit services to move upwards 
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in GVCs and to absorb technological and knowledge spill-overs widens the gap among 
better-performing and lagging economies in the ASEM region. 
 
Conclusions: policy recommendations 
It is argued that trade and investment facilitation policies should be further pursued by 
policymakers in Europe and Asia to cope with modern challenges in international trade and 
to advance strengthened connectivity between the two regions. 
It is recommended that policymakers in the two continents should keep pursuing deep and 
comprehensive FTAs, with services, investment and trade facilitation provisions, as a means 
to spur an enabling climate for further trade liberalization. Regional approaches to negotiate 
FTAs should be sought to simplify rules and pursue deeper cooperation in a number of 
domains. 
It is also recommended that policymakers establish a robust cooperation and surveillance 
mechanism on addressing NTMs for increased economic growth in Asia and Europe. In 
particular, a coordinated approach to regional implementation of trade facilitation reforms 
in Europe and Asia would be crucial to promote mutually workable solutions and reduce 
common procedural obstacles to trade.  
Finally, it is recommended that policymakers differentiate investment policies based on the 
country’s level of development, and implement policies geared towards not only investment 
facilitation but also investment absorption to develop or enhance indigenous technological 
capabilities.  
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The Role of Global Value Chains to Strengthening 
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Cungki Kusdarjito 
Dept of Agribusiness, Faculty of Agriculture, Janabadra University, Indonesia 
 
Introduction 
Globalization that started in the 80-90s changes the world economic landscape through the 
Global Value Chain (GVC). GVC allows quite a lot of opportunities for developing countries to 
participate in global trade and improve productivity. Before the rise of GVC, nations had to 
build a deep and wide industrial base before becoming competitive. This is the way the 
United States, Germany, and Japan did. GVC requires liberalization import-export and 
infrastructure improvement. Some policy options, such as improving connectivity with the 
international market, setting competitive pricing, increasing domestic value chain, 
infrastructure, and services, should be established (Taglioni & Winkler, 2016).  
To be sustainable, either economically and environmentally, GVCs should promote social 
upgrades and equalize the opportunities for each people. Some East Asian countries 
demonstrate that participating in GVC may decrease poverty. Yet, before implementing GVC, 
some considerations should be taken into account. there are three theorems in Beijing 
Consensus, i.e. the use of innovation to encourage progress, foreign direct investment and 
the development of human resources by improving education quality () 
 
Methodology 
All secondary data were obtained from the ASEM Sustainable Connectivity Portal. Data used 
for the analysis were extensive aggregated data obtained from “Indicator Explorer” and 
“Connectivity map”. The aggregated data consist of Physical, Economic and Financial, 
Political, Institutional, People to People, Social, and Economic and Financial1. For the 
connectivity, only Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Trade in Goods and Research output with 
international collaboration were selected.  
The analyses used in this research were Biplot Principle Component Analysis (in short PCA), 
Self Organizing Map Kohonen artificial neural networks (in short SOM) for clustering the 
countries and Social Network Analysis (in short SNA) to evaluate the modularity of the 
networks. SOM, as the other neural network model, for each simulation will not guarantee to 
obtain the same results as in the deterministic model, yet the pattern of cluster obtained 
from the learning process will not change too much. This is due to the random number 
attached as the weights during the initial simulation.  
A list of countries and their abbreviation used in this research is shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Country index and abbreviation. 
Index Country Index Country Index Country Index Country Index Country 
1 AT Austria  11 DE Germany 21 NO Norway 31 AU Australia 41 LA Lao 
2 BE Belgium 12 GR Greece 22 PL Poland 32 BD Bangladesh 42 MY Malaysia 
3 BG Bulgaria 13 HU Hungary 23 PT Portugal 33 BN Brunei 43 MN Mongolia 
4 HR Croatia 14 IR Ireland 24 RO Romania 34 KH Cambodia 44 MM Myanmar 
5 CY Cyprus 15 IT Italy 25 SK Slovakia 35 CN China 45 NZ N Zealand 
6 CZ Czech 16 LV Latvia 26 SI Slovenia 36 IN India 46 PK Pakistan 
7 DK Denmar
k 
17 LT Lithuania 27 ES Spain 37 ID Indonesia 47 PH Philippines 
8 EE Estonia 18 LU Luxemburg 28 SE Sweden 38 JP Japan 48 RU Russia 
9 FI Finland 19 MT Malta 29 CH Switzerland 39 KZ Kazakhstan 49 SG Singapore 
10 FR France 20 NL Netherlands 30 GB U Kingdom 40 KR Korea 50 TH Thailand 
        51 VN Vietnam 
 
Results 
Based on the result from PCA, countries in Asia and Europe exhibit different characteristics 
in many aspects. Regionalism in Europe is stronger compared to Asia. Europe is also more 
homogenous than in Asia. Almost all of the Asian countries are located on the opposite side 
of the arrow direction which represents the indicators. It means that their relations are 
negative. For instance, BN(33) and KZ(39) are negatively related to the Social and Institutional 
indicators. VN(51) is negatively related to the Politics indicator. MY(42) and RU(48) negatively 
related to the Environmental indicator. MM(44) and LA(41) are negatively related to the 
Economic/Financial and People to People Connection indicator. On the other hand, almost 
the European countries follow one or more arrow direction. GB(30), FR(10) and DE(11) are very 
strong in Economic and People to People Connection, NO(21) in Sustainability, CH(29) in 
Social and Institutional indicators. The results from PCA also indicate that the Physical and 
Connectivity indicator are highly correlated. A similar result also found between Social and 
Institutional indicator, thus these two indicators are redundant (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1: Biplot PCA. 
 
The result of the SOM-Kohonen is shown in Figure 2 and Table 2. To read the result, node 1, 
symbolized as a circle,  is located at the most left bottom of the diagram and it contains two 
members (countries). The second node located right next to the first node. Nodes that are 
located closely (the neighbour nodes) in the same cluster have some degree of similarity. For 
instance, cluster number 17 (FR, DB, GB) is encircled by cluster number 13 (IT, ES), 14(JP) and 
18 (CN). As shown in Biplot PCA, FR, DB and GB are the top performers and labelled as cluster 
1 in SOM-Kohonen. BE and NL (located in node 9) are closely related to node 13 (IT, ES) and 14 
(JP). Node 9 (BE, NL), 13 (IT, ES), 14 (JP) and 18(CN) are labelled as cluster 2. Node 5 (DK, NO, SE, 
CH), Node 6(IR), Node 10 (PL and PT) in cluster 3 encircled node 9 in cluster 3. Since they 
located in a different cluster, their similarity is not as strong if they located in the same cluster. 
Node 4 (BD, MM) represents the node with less intense development and network compared 
to other clusters. Node 4 (BD, MM) is close to Node 3 (LA, VN, and KH) and node 8 (IN, ID, PH, 
PK, TH), either in the model or geographically. Node 20 (BN, KZ, MN) are countries which rich 
in natural resources (oil and coal), the networks are limited and close to the RU node and 
classified as cluster 4. 
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Figure 2: SOM Kohonen Result. 
 
Table 2 shows the results of clustering by SOM Kohonen. 
 
Table 2: Clustering by SOM Kohonen. 
 Country   Country   Country  
1 AT,FI 
#3 
Political, 
Institutional, 
Social, Economic, 
Sustainability 
7 BG,HR,HU, 
LV,LT, 
MT,RO,SK,SI 
#3   
Political, 
Institutional, 
Environment, 
Financial1, 
Sustainability 
13 IT,ES 
#2 
Physical, Economic, 
Political, Institutional, 
People, Connectivity, 
Environment, Social 
2 CZ,EE 
#3 
Institutional, 
Social, Finacial1, 
Sustainability  
8 IN,ID, PH, PK, 
TH 
#4 
Environment 14 JP #2 Physical, Economic, 
Political, People, 
Connectivity, 
Environment, Social 
3 LA,VN,KH  
#4 
Environment, 
Finacial1 
9 BE,NL 
#2 
Physical, 
Economic, Political, 
Institutional, 
People, 
Connectivity, 
Social, 
Sustainability 
15 AU,KR,SG 
#3 
Physical, Economic, 
People, Connectivity, 
Social, Finacial1 
4 BD, MM 
#4 
Environment, 
Financial1, 
Sustainability,  
10 PL,PT 
#3 
Physical, Political, 
Institutional, 
Connectivity, 
Social, 
Sustainability 
16 LU 
#3 
Economic, 
Institutional, People, 
Connectivity, Social  
5 DK,NO,SE,CH 
#3  
Physical, Political, 
Institutional, 
Connectivity, 
Environment, Social, 
Sustainability 
11 NZ 
#3 
Social, 
Sustainability 
17 FR,DE,GB 
#1 
Physical, Economic, 
Political, 
Institutional, 
People, 
Connectivity, 
Environment, Social, 
Sustainability   
6 IR 
#3 
Economic, Political, 
Institutional, 
Connectivity, 
Environment, Social 
12 CY,GR 
#4 
Political, 
Institutional, 
People, 
Environment 
18 CN  
#2 
Physical, Economic, 
People, Connectivity, 
Finacial1, 
      19 MY,RU  
#3 
Physical, Economic, 
People 
      20 BN,KZ,MN 
#4 
- 
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Figure 3 shows the modularity of the SNA for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (left) and Trade 
in Goods (right). For FDI, three clusters of modularity are identified. RU, KR, VN, and PK 
becomes small cluster along with the European and Asia Cluster. In Figure 3, Trade in Goods 
provides a more complex structure. The European cluster is divided into four sub-clusters. 
The most connection between Europe and Asia mostly occurs between West Europe. Central 
European and east Europe are more closely related to West Europe. Thus, the connection is 
more intense if the country located in the same region or sharing a common history. The 
connection between Central and East Europe with Asia can be improved in the future.  
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Figure 3: Modularity in SNA. 
 
Results from the SNA is shown in Figure 4, CN is the main source of FDI in ID, IN, and MY 
whilst KR is the main source of FDI in China and VN. GB also has a prominent role in IN. Tough, 
the pattern of FDI is not so apparent in Europe. In terms of trade in goods, CN and DE are the 
main player in their respected region, followed by JP and KR in Asia, and NL in Europe. FDI is 
needed for technological transfer, involving SMEs in the process of production and become 
part of the Global Value Chain. NL, SG are small countries, but they have major roles in 
logistics and distribution. ID, IN, PK, TH, PH are located in the same node, countries with a 
high population. 
 
Figure 4: SNA for FDI and Trade in Goods 
 
The results also showed that countries with a shared border with JP  and KR, i.e. CN in Asia 
and DE in Europe (NL, PL, HU) have advantages for FDI from their neighbour.  
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Discussion 
According to Taglioni & Winkler (2016) when entering GVC, infrastructure (physical factor) and 
easiness of doing business need to be improved. Besides, the quality and competence of 
services and efficiency of custom (institution) are also the main factors involve in GVC. Yet, 
based on the SOM analysis, none of the Asian countries is good in institutional indicators. Yet, 
Europe is excel in Institutional indicators compare to its counterpart in Asia. 
FDI in Asia is concentrated in some countries. IN and ID are among the largest recipient of 
FDI, mainly from China whilst VN receive FDI mostly from KR. CN also receives FDI from JP 
whilst ID also receives FDI from GB. Both ID and IN are the largest economy in SE Asia and 
South Asia, therefore they have opportunities to be the economic powerhouse in their region. 
Yet, IN networks are more differentiated compared to ID and ID need to expand its network 
to make GVC more effective 
Central European countries, such as BG, HR, HU, LV, LT, MT, RO, SK, SI are constrained by their 
scale. Some of these countries are trying to capture FDI and flow of trade through modern 
silk-road from China and compete with each other to be the main gates between Asia and 
Europe (especially after BRI was launched in China). But these countries have overlooked the 
potential of the other Asian Countries such as IN, ID, PH, TH, SG and MY which are traditionally 
connected to West Europe for their exports and trades, especially with GB and NL. GB is 
closely related to IN for people to people connection and FDI. 
The networks for some countries which are rich in their natural resources such as BN and KH 
are very limited. Thus, these countries need to improve the networks and participation in GVC 
to diversify their economy, in anticipation when their oil depleted or alternative energy is 
used to replace the fossil fuel as the main source of energy.  MM, LA and KH are lack of 
resources in all aspects. Implementing GVC may put their countries at risk to be controlled 
by foreign investors. Inclusion for these countries can be started from the nearest neighbour 
countries, for instance, LA and KH with TH and VN rather than with CN which involving a 
large amount of money. A special zone can be used as a stepping stone to economy wide 
improvements (World Bank, IDE-JETRO, OECD, UIBE, 2017). Open the service sectors in the 
process of integrating into globalization is one of the good strategies. The other issue is how 
to improve involvement in small and medium-size firms in GVC. 
To maximize the benefit of Asia-Europe connectivity, countries should take a specialization 
in GVC. It can be done by maximizing its endowment to participate in the stages of 
production. Failure to meet this may result in the exclusion of some countries in the GVC. For 
instance, ID for alternative and renewable energy, VN for electronic devices, SG for services 
and financial centres, TH for automotive, IN for software and back-office and so on. 
However, without the labour that has adequate skills then development is undertaken will 
not benefit the country's which results in debt pile resulted in recipients’ countries. These 
conditions will result in long-term dependency which is very costly and reduce the 
sovereignty of recipient countries to control their essential infrastructure (Ruby, 2017). The 
higher education institutions can provide training and retraining. They can also help small 
and medium firms enter in GVC. Academics and universities could be more active in tracking 
natural, social, and technological causes of regional differences and could make policy-
oriented initiatives a priority (Yang et. al., 2016). Incorporating more environmental actions 
into the initiative would help achieve long-term global economic prosperity and ecological 
sustainability (Liu et. al, 2015). 
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Conclusions 
GVC allows quite a lot of opportunities for developing countries to participate in global trade 
and improve productivity. Countries like in East Asia can grip the benefits and opportunities 
of globalization. GVC not only stimulates economic growth, but it also creates economic 
polarization into three economic regions, i.e. China in Asia, Germany in Europe and the 
United States in North America. Joining GVC is faster than the old import-substitution route. 
The developing nations that adopted this new strategy are called emerging market 
economies. It shifts the locus of globalization from sectors to stages of production. These 
opportunities can be improved by enhancing the networks outside the traditional networks 
which are still undeveloped. MM, LA, BN, and KH need to improve their involvement in the 
GVC. IN, as the member of G-20 needs to expand their networks, whilst countries in Central 
Europe may exploit the opportunities of GVC and higher education collaboration with Asian 
countries.   
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Coffee and Cocoa Connection: I-EU CEPA 
Potential Impact to Indonesian Farmers 
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Background 
Trade numbers between the European Union (EU) and Indonesia are relatively low 
compared to other trade partners, and on a declining trend. According to ASEM data, trade 
in goods from Indonesia to the EU is at USD 14.5 billion (9.7% of Indonesian exports), and USD 
11.4 billion the other way around (7.5% of Indonesian imports) (ASEM 2018, WITS 2018). Key 
challenges to trade from the Indonesian side include tariff barriers, non-tariff measures, low 
human capital capacity, and low productivity. Relatedly, investment flow from the EU to 
Indonesia is also low at an average of USD 2 billion in three years (ASEM 2018). These numbers 
may drop even more since Indonesia is poised to graduate from the Generalized Schemes of 
Preferences (GSP) program in 2023, while other Asian countries like Vietnam have already 
completed their trade agreement with the EU. This could negatively affect the livelihood of 
many Indonesian producers, consumers, and labourers. 
Indonesia and the EU are currently negotiating the I-EU Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership Agreement (I-EU CEPA). This research paper analyses the potential impact of  
I-EU CEPA on trade and investments by looking at key export commodities for Indonesia to 
the EU member states: coffee and cocoa. The purpose of the research is to demonstrate the 
positive economic and social impact that can potentially be brought by I-EU CEPA to 
Indonesia and to encourage its utilization to strengthen the connectivity between Indonesia 
and the EU. 
The research uses qualitative analysis of trade and investment data from ASEM Sustainable 
Connectivity Portal, government statistics, and various trade databases. Further, the research 
studies existing models of private investments in Indonesia and its impact, based on case 
studies in cocoa and coffee sector. The case studies are taken from Nestlé’s work with coffee 
farmers, and Swisscontact’s and Kalimajari’s initiatives in cocoa. 
 
Indonesia’s Coffee and Cocoa Sector 
Indonesia is among the world’s leading producers of coffee and cocoa, producing the third 
most cocoa and fourth most coffee globally (FAO 2015; ICO 2019). These commodities are also 
major export commodities, including to the EU member states, earning US $1,175.4 million 
for coffee exports and US $53.5 million for cocoa exports (Statistics Indonesia 2018; Statistics 
Indonesia 2019). The EU member states together make up 20.8% of Indonesia’s export 
destination for coffee. Indonesia’s coffee is 4% of the total coffee import across the EU, with 
Brazil being the main source (European Commission 2017). Meanwhile, Indonesia’s cocoa is 
not yet a major trading commodity to the EU, which prefers to import cocoa from Côte 
d’Ivoire and Ghana. Despite its strategic importance, Indonesia’s cocoa and coffee sector face 
many productivity challenges and are experiencing a decline according to production data 
from the Ministry of Agriculture.  
 
128 
 
Table 1: Official Production Level and Productivity Rates of Cocoa and Coffee (2012-2017) (FAOSTAT 2019). 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Cocoa 
Production (tonnes) 740,500 720,900 728,400 593,331 659,399 659,776 
Productivity rates 
(tonne/ha) 
0.57 0.41 0.42 0.35 0.39 0.38 
Coffee 
Production (tonnes) 691,163 675,800 643,900 639,412 639,305 668,677 
Productivity rates 
(tonne/ha) 
0.56 0.54 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.53 
 
Cocoa industry actors believe that MOA overestimates production numbers, as private actors 
believe production to be only between 350,000 to 400,000 tonnes annually (Glorya & 
Nugraha 2019). Indonesian cocoa and coffee productivity levels are the lowest among other 
top producing countries like Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire for cocoa, and Vietnam, Brazil, and 
Colombia for coffee. There are a number of reasons for this, including aging trees, diseases 
such as black pod disease for cocoa and coffee berry borer, elderly smallholder farmers, and 
the fact that cocoa and coffee are increasingly low priority crops. Farmers often lack the 
financial resources to invest in seedlings or purchase fertilizers. The products also tend to be 
of lower quality as farmers aim to make quick cash by selling the products soon after harvest 
in the forms of unfermented cocoa beans and green coffee beans. This reduces the 
opportunity to benefit from value-adding operations that could increase the quality and 
returns.  
Government programmes such as providing seedlings or technologies to farmers, research 
and development, and setting national standardization, address the many problems faced 
by these major industries, but often do so inefficiently due to the massive regional 
differences. In the cocoa industry programmes focus on providing subsidized inputs, but lack 
sufficient education or supervision to ensure these inputs are being used correctly. According 
to Neilson & Mackenzie (2016), between 2009 and 2015 cocoa production decreased despite 
the extensive government programs. The coffee industry programmes focus on increasing 
quality, yet are unable to supervise quality creation, and cannot guarantee a consistent 
market for better quality coffee. 
 
Private Sector Investments 
The private sector provides additional solutions to increase cocoa and coffee productivity. To 
analyse the impact of these private sector initiatives, we identified and evaluated three 
initiatives, all of which have some connections with EU member states. The initiatives are 
Nestlé, a Swiss-based multinational company who works with coffee farmers in Lampung; 
Swisscontact, a business-oriented international aid agency who works with cocoa farmers; 
and Kalimajari, a local NGO that arranges contract farming between cocoa farmers and 
buyers, including EU buyers. These private sector initiatives focus mainly on educating 
farmers and providing them with the means to increase their income independently. Nestlé 
and Swisscontact both have established financial intervention programmes that not only 
give farmers access to financial support, but also continued monitoring and supervision. 
Meanwhile, Kalimajari’s contract farming program sets certain obligations and rights agreed 
between buyers and farmers, and then trains the farmers in Good Agriculture Practices 
(GAP). In addition, Nestlé, Swisscontact, and Kalimajari all provide extension officers (EO) to 
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help farmers with their daily challenges. These non-government actors have a very limited 
number of EO, less than 100 each, so they developed partnerships with other market players 
to scale up the number of EO in order to support the work and increase the total number of 
supervised farmers. 
 
Table 2: Partnerships for extension services. 
Swisscontact 
 
SECO Switzerland, Barry Callebaut, Big Tree Farm, Cargill, Ecom, Guittard, JB Cocoa, Krakakoa, 
Mars, Mondelēz International, Nestlé, Cocoa Sustainability Partnership Indonesia & PISAgro 
Kalimajari  
 
Jembrana District Government, Kerta Semaya Samaniya Union, Barry Callebaut, Pipiltin, 
Valrhona, Cau Chocolate Bali, Rainforest Alliance, UTZ, Indonesia Coffee and Cocoa Research 
Institute. & Cocoa Sustainability Partnership Indonesia 
Nestlé Indonesia Coffee and Cocoa Research Institute, Nestle Research & Development Centre in 
Tours – France, Swisscontact, & PISAgro 
 
 
Findings 
Our study finds that foreign private investments and technology and knowledge transfer in 
these sectors in Indonesia lead to an increased human capacity and productivity rate. 
Swisscontact, with seven years of experience supervising 154,000 cocoa farmers under their 
Sustainable Cocoa Production Program (SCPP), explains that their results vary with time. 
Beginner farmers, with two years of Swisscontact supervision, can achieve average 
productivity of 0.62 tonnes/ha annually. Farmers with six years supervision, can achieve 
average productivity of 0.93 tonnes/ha, and last but not least, professional farmers can 
achieve average productivity as high as 2.5 tonnes/ha annually. By contrast, the Ministry of 
Agriculture (MOA) records national cocoa productivity to be approximately 0.4 tonnes/ha 
annually, so Swisscontact farmers’ average productivity is significantly higher than the 
average productivity rates in Indonesia. Swisscontact-supervised farmers’ productivity is 
recorded at 55% higher for beginner farmers, 133% higher for farmers with six years 
supervision, and 625% higher for professional farmers.  
Kalimajari, which only manages approximately 619 cocoa farmers with each farmer 
possessing less than 1 hectare of land, records productivity not much higher than MOA and 
FAO’s average productivity rates. However, their cocoa beans are bought at much higher 
prices due to their fermented quality. Average productivity is 0.3 tonnes/ha for one harvesting 
period – 0.6 tonnes/ ha annually. Farmers receive 40,000 IDR for each kilo, meaning that 
farmers selling to Kalimajari earn a minimum of 12 million IDR per harvest, and 24 million IDR 
annually. These incomes are far higher than those of cocoa farmers who sell their product for 
only around 20,000 IDR per kilo, and are unable to make up for the low prices per kilo with 
greater productivity. 
Nestlé has supervised 20,000 coffee farmers in Lampung for over 30 years and has achieved 
an average productivity of 1.2 tonnes/ha annually. This number is more than twice as high as 
MOA’s reported average productivity for Indonesian coffee farmers, which is approximately 
0.5 tonnes/ha. It is 20% higher than Colombia’s average coffee productivity, which is 
approximately 1 tonne/ha.  
In plantations supported by foreign enterprises, the productivity rate increased from an 
average of 0.4 tonnes/ha to 2.5 tonnes/ha for cocoa, and from 0.5 tonnes/ha to 1.2 tonnes/ha 
for coffee. The investment also increased awareness of sustainable practices and increased 
trade values through certification, which could strengthen farmers’ ability to meet the EU 
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market’s preference for sustainable commodities and/or Geographic Indicator (GI). Cocoa 
farmers are able to sustainably farm and process the cocoa beans, increasing the value from 
USD 1.42/kg to USD 2.84/kg. Further exploration of these findings can be found in Glorya and 
Nugraha (2019). These case studies illustrate the positive impact that foreign investments can 
bring to Indonesia’s human capital and suggests the need for an I-EU CEPA to facilitate EU-
Indonesia connection in trade and investments. 
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Introduction 
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), officially unveiled in 2013, is China’s landmark foreign and 
economic policy initiative to achieve improved connectivity, regional cooperation, and 
economic development on a trans-continental scale. Six years on, how is the BRI being 
viewed in Asian stakeholding countries? What are the potential impacts of the BRI on 
national economic output? What policy reforms should China and the BRI stakeholding 
countries pursue in order to make the BRI a “win-win” proposition?  
Impacts and implications of the BRI can be assessed either through a survey or through a 
model-based study. This paper uses both approaches (i) to highlight the economic and 
geopolitical impacts of the BRI on Asian stakeholding countries; and (ii) to come up with 
policy recommendations that should be implemented by both China and BRI stakeholding 
countries.   
 
Perception survey of Asian opinion leaders 
We conducted an online perception survey for a month during mid-June to mid-July 2019, 
to which 1230 Asian opinion leaders (defined as policy makers, academics, businesses, and 
media representatives) from 26 East and Southeast, South and Central Asian countries that 
have signed a BRI agreement with China responded. The highest number of respondents 
(more than 100) were from Pakistan, Singapore, Bangladesh and the Philippines. In terms of 
affiliation, academics (56%) and policymakers (23%) made up the bulk of the respondents.    
Among the BRI’s five policy objectives, respondents felt that achieving infrastructure 
connectivity and unimpeded trade are more relevant to their countries than financial 
integration, policy coordination, and people-to-people bonds. On infrastructure types, 
respondents felt that energy, transport, and industrial infrastructure should be the ones on 
which the BRI needs to focus in Asia. 
A majority of the respondents felt that the BRI provides a platform for BRI countries to attract 
trade, investment, and tourists from China and elsewhere. They also expected the BRI to 
stimulate economic growth and technological advancement while closing infrastructure 
gaps. Improved political relations with China due to the BRI was also highlighted as a key 
benefit by close to three-fifths of the respondents. On the other hand, respondents expressed 
concerns over the potential downsides of the BRI like China’s influence expansion, influx of 
Chinese migrant workers, BRI projects’ environmental implications, lack of technology 
transfer opportunities, and debt sustainability risks.  
Overall, the respondents viewed the BRI more favourably than is generally the case. The 
opinion leaders who categorised the BRI as a “net opportunity” significantly outnumbered 
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those who saw the BRI as a “net risk”. Similarly, the respondents were more confident than 
not that the BRI will eventually lead to win-win outcomes. More than four out of ten 
respondents rejected the notion of malicious Chinese “debt-trap diplomacy”. These findings, 
however, must be interpreted with caution because for each of the three questions a large 
chunk of respondents were undecided.  
In terms of policy actions that should be taken to ensure a successful BRI, enhancing 
transparency, offering more capacity building and local employment, adapting the BRI to 
specific needs of foreign partners, and allowing non-Chinese contractors to bid for projects 
topped the list of recommendations for Beijing to maximise the developmental impact of 
the BRI. As for the stakeholding country governments, the respondents felt that they should 
focus on improving governance, negotiating with China for best possible terms, making sure 
that the BRI fits in a national infrastructure development strategy, performing due diligence, 
and insisting that local companies be allowed to bid for BRI projects.  
 
Quantitative assessment of BRI’s economic impact 
We also examined the potential economic impacts of the BRI on stakeholding Eurasian 
countries. For this we used a modified, static Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model to 
quantify the real gross domestic product (GDP) effects of the BRI’s connectivity 
enhancement (i.e. reducing transport cost) and trade liberalisation agenda. Three findings 
are noteworthy.  
First, the results suggest that while reducing transport costs and tariff barriers would both 
contribute to national economic gains, the latter appears to have a greater beneficial impact 
than the former. This finding points to the need for reforming trade policies while investing 
in transport infrastructure by China and BRI stakeholding countries. Second, landlocked 
countries (e.g. Mongolia and Kazakhstan) and countries presently with high tariffs (e.g. Iran) 
are likely to be the largest beneficiaries of the BRI. With respect to the Maritime Silk Road, it 
is projected that countries already well-embedded in the global maritime shipping networks 
(e.g. Malaysian and Singapore) could experience higher real GDP improvement than others. 
Third, the economic implications of India’s stance on the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar 
(BCIM) and Trans-Himalayan (China-Nepal-India) corridors differ. For the BCIM corridor, the 
absence of India has a relatively muted economic impact on the gains accrued to other 
participants. By contrast, for the Trans-Himalayan corridor, the economic impact on Nepal 
depends very much on India’s participation or non-participation in the BRI. 
 
Acknowledgement 
The research was supported by the Academic Research Fund (AcRF) Tier 1 Grant awarded by 
the Ministry of Education, Singapore. 
133 
Achieving complex development goals along 
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Introduction 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a 1 trillion USD project spanning over 70 countries 
framed as a revival of the ancient Silk Road which connected China with the West through 
an expansive network of trade routes. Despite being engrained in the BRI’s vision, its digital 
component known as the ‘Digital Silk Road’ (DSR), is often overlooked while most of the focus 
is placed on roads, ports, and energy infrastructure (Shen, 2018). Moreover, China’s DSR 
aspirations go beyond infrastructure to include: increasing market share for Chinese device 
manufacturers; acquisition of digital companies by Chinese Internet companies; promoting 
e-commerce, and promoting China’s vision of 'Internet Sovereignty' amongst other goals.
China has invited other governments to partner with it along the BRI through Overseas 
Development Assistance (Renwick et al., 2018). This paper analyses DSR activities using 
findings from the literature on trade-offs and synergies between expansion of ICTs and 
achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) to provide insights and advice to 
traditional development donors on how to engage with the DSR. The SDGs include 169 
targets for 17 goals as well an overarching goal of ‘Leave No One Behind’. There is increasing 
recognition of the interlinked nature of the goals and targets and the need to shift away from 
tackling goals in siloes towards holistic approaches (Alcamo et al., 2018). It is possible to 
achieve SDG targets or goals at the detriment of other goals. Similarly, there are potential 
trade-offs between large scale efforts like the Digital Silk Road and achieving SDG goals and 
targets. This research covers potential trade-offs between five DSR activities and the SDGs. 
ICT Infrastructure 
Like other infrastructure aspects of the BRI, it is difficult to know where DSR digital 
infrastructure projects begin and end (Shen, 2018). UNESCAP, (2017) uncovered 13 digital 
infrastructure projects linked to the BRI in Central Asia alone. In 2018, Chinese ICT equipment 
manufactures Huawei and ZTE were the biggest and fourth biggest mobile ICT equipment 
suppliers controlling 40% of the global market (telecomlead, 2018). Huawei accounted for 
over a third of new submarine fibre optic systems installed between 2013 to 2017 including 
cables that link countries in the global south to each other (Huawei Marine, 2018). Chinese 
ICT suppliers have been applauded for their efforts to build infrastructure in places deemed 
unprofitable or risky by other suppliers and have historically provided equipment up to 40% 
cheaper (Cisse, 2012; Kunavut et al., 2018). Chinese financing for ICT infrastructure in Africa 
often surpasses funding from all Infrastructure Consortium for Africa members combined 
which includes the G8 countries and South Korea (ICA, 2017). 
Although China’s 13th five year plan commits to 98% internet coverage within China, China 
has not made similar commitments along the DSR. There is a risk that DSR linked digital 
infrastructure is built mainly in places that serve Chinese geopolitical and economic interests 
(Cisse, 2012), while leaving other geographies behind. As more social, economic, and political 
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experiences and services continue to migrate to digital channels, a lack of access threatens 
to increase inequalities (Hernandez & Roberts, 2018).  
Huawei has aligned itself with the SDGs in its corporate mission. However, there is a risk that 
Huawei is SDG washing its operations while ignoring potential trade-offs between their 
current ICT infrastructure activities the SDGs. Huawei, (2018) conflates correlation with 
causation despite a well-established academic literature suggesting that the causal 
relationship between ICTs and economic growth is unclear (Friederici et al., 2016; Galperin & 
Viecens, 2017). Huawei makes many correlation based causal assumptions about the impact 
of ICTS on achieving multiple SDGs thus presenting ICT infrastructure as end in itself.   
Moreover, Huawei, (2018) calls for more data centres and suggests that cloud services could 
be environmentally beneficial. However, the ICT sector’s emissions unloading from other 
sectors has coincided with the ICT sector emitting more greenhouse gases making its net 
impact unclear (Greenpeace, 2017a; Unwin, 2017). Networks (e.g. digital infrastructure) are the 
biggest electricity consuming sub-component of the ICT sector and its share of energy 
consumption is on the rise thanks to the ever increasing amount of data that passes through 
networks. Andrae & Edler, (2015) project that the ICT sector’s share of global greenhouse gas 
emissions is likely to increase even under the best case scenario and may account for over 
50% of energy consumption by 2030 under the worst. Unless efforts are made to power DSR-
linked infrastructure with green energy, the effort may subtract from environmental SDG 
goals. Lastly, an over-reliance on increasing availability of infrastructure can lead to a lack of 
progress on tackling other access barriers which DSR activities make little if any reference to 
including: affordability of connectivity; awareness of ICTs, ICT applications and their potential 
benefits; abilities and skills to make effective use of ICTs; and the agency to use ICTs amidst 
social and gender norms (Hernandez & Roberts, 2018). Increasing infrastructure availability 
without tackling other barriers threatens to amplify inequalities between well off groups and 
the poorest and most marginalised (Unwin, 2017).  
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Figure 2: SDG synergies and trade-offs: Digital Silk Road Infrastructure Activities 
 
Expansion of Chinese device manufacturers  
Making use of ICT infrastructure requires devices. Chinese device manufacturers have been 
gaining market share over the last few years and are poised to further increase sales across 
the BRI. In 2014, none of the top 9 mobile manufacturers were from Mainland China. In just 
four years, Huawei, Xaomi, Oppo, and Lenovo rose to become the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 7th top 
mobile manufacturers globally35.  Moreover, another Chinese manufactuer, Transsion 
Holdings owns several mobile phone brands including Tecno, Infinix, and Itel which 
combined overtook Samsung as the top manufacturer in Africa in 2017 (Dahir, 2018). 
Transsioon has been applauded for tailoring its phones to African contexts through 
affordable phones with features that cater to African users (e.g. operating systems in local 
languages, cameras calibrated to take better photos of darker skin tones, multiple slim slots, 
long battery life). Moreover, the company has invested in African research and development 
centres in Nigeria and Kenya as well as factories in Ethiopia.  
However, due in large part to Transsion, the share of smart phones sold relative to feature 
phones sold decreased between 2016 and 2017. This is concerning because, feature phones 
offer users less capabilities and opportunities than smartphones and can potentially lead to 
a ‘smartphone divide’ “based on a user’s ability to access and use [and benefit from] an array 
of different services” which threatens to leave feature phone users behind (Sangwon Lee & 
Park, 2015, p. 81). Moreover, there are environmental concerns about Chinese device 
                                           
35 https://gs.statcounter.com/vendor-market-share/mobile/worldwide/ 
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manufacturers. Huawei was the only top 3 device manufacturer that did not report on its 
supply chain or emissions in 2017 and “has yet to set any goal to transition its supply chain to 
renewable energy” (Greenpeace, 2017b, p. 13). Huawei along with Oppo, Xiamoi and Vivo were 
all ranked poorly, in Greenpeace's (2017b) Green Electronics company report card’s three 
main areas: resource intensity, dirty energy consumption, and harmful chemicals found in 
products. These concerns are not limited to Chinese manufacturers. Although other 
manufacturers score higher on average, the sector as a whole are guilty of not taking 
adequate measures to protect the environment or to deal with the e-waste arising from 
current ‘planned obsolescence’ business models.  Furthermore, Huawei, ZTE, and Lenovo (as 
well as manufacturers from other countries) have not taken necessary measures to ensure 
that Cobalt and Lithium ion used to make and power mobile phones is free from forced 
labour or children working in hazardous conditions (Amnesty International, 2016).  
 
 
Figure 3: SDG synergies and trade-offs: Digital Silk Road Mobile Phone Manufacturer Activities 
 
Expansion of Chinese Internet giants 
Whilst Chinese digital infrastructure and device manufacturers have been expanding for 
decades, Chinese Internet companies international expansion was only incentivized and 
promoted by the Chinese government in 2015 when the government urged its internet 
companies to get involved in building a ‘Digital Silk Road’ (Lee, 2017). Chinese Internet 
137 
 
companies have endorsed the call by using the BRI as a mechanism to receive government 
funding, blessing, and diplomatic and political support for their international efforts (Shen, 
2018). Since then, the technology, media and telecommunications sector has outperformed 
all other sectors in regards to attracting Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) (Ernst and Young, 2018). Alibaba and Tencent have acquired 
majority stakes in e-commerce and other Internet companies (e.g. ride-sharing apps, 
messaging apps, music streaming services, etc.) across the BRI including companies in 
Turkey, Indonesia, Singapore, Pakistan, and others and aligning these acquisitions with the 
BRI (Sender, 2018).   
These investments tend to occur in countries that lack local venture capital and sufficient 
finance infrastructure for SMEs. Moreover, Alibaba and Tencent tend to introduce new 
services into the market (e.g. Alipay) after acquisitions. However, Tencent and Alibaba seem 
to be becoming duopoloy funders in some regions creating power imbalances between local 
and Chinese companies (Sender, 2018). These trends fit into larger geo-economic trends 
where five companies (Google, Facebook, Amazon, Tencent, and Alibaba) continue to 
consolidate a majority of the economic gains from the Internet economy while limiting 
opportunities for market entry and competition (Internet Society, 2019).  
 
 
Figure 4: SDG synergies and trade-offs: Digital Silk Road Internet Company Acquisition Activities. 
 
Inclusive globalization through e-commerce 
In 2016, Jack Ma introduced the electronic World Trade Platform (eWTP), labelled it as 
‘inclusive globalisation’ platform for SMEs and aligned it with the BRI. The eWTP seeks to help 
SMEs “overcome complex regulations, processes and barriers that hinder their participation 
in global commerce” (Alibaba Group, 2016). The eWTP includes ‘Digital Free Trade Zones’ 
(DFTZ) which provide import and export services to SMEs akin to those provided to big 
businesses by traditional duty free zones. Moreover, these zones offer SMEs with support and 
training to access international markets. Participating SMEs also benefit from a host of 
138 
 
Alibaba services including e-commerce and digital payment services (Rastogi, 2018). One 
such zone has been launched in Malaysia with mixed results. Yean, (2018) showed that rather 
than being inclusive, 3 of 13 Malaysian states accounted for 67% of all SMEs using the eWTP 
and that SMEs that were already experienced with digital technology and export procedures 
were the most likely to benefit. Moreover, Ma envisions the initiative changing the way goods 
are sold and purchased around the world in way that’s similar to Alibaba’s impact in China. 
However, Alibaba’s e-commerce business model which depends on delivering individualized 
packages may have negative externalities on the environment. “The combined length of 
packing tape used by China in 2015 could circle the equator 425 times” and only 20% of 
Chinese packaging are estimated to be recycled (Luo, 2017).  
 
 
Figure 5: SDG synergies and trade-offs: Digital Silk Road eWTP Activities. 
 
Internet Sovereignty  
Through the DSR, China is also seeking to spread an alternative vision of Internet governance, 
‘Internet Sovereignty’. Internet Sovereignty suggests that sovereign nations should be able 
to govern the Internet within their borders however they see fit, opening up the option for 
an Internet that is heavily state controlled and censored (Hornby, 2017). China already ranks 
last on Freedom House's (2018) freedom on the net index for four years in a row. China has 
partnered with seven like-minded governments, five of which are also ranked ‘Not Free’ on 
the Freedom on the Net Index, while the other two are not scored. Internet Sovereignty goes 
against the ethos that the Internet was founded on regarding openness and net neutrality. 
It also goes against traditional Multi-Stakeholderism approaches to Internet governances 
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which deliberately includes civil society, business, and state actors in decision-making and 
tend to be more palatable with citizens from traditional donor countries (Unwin, 2017). 
There is evidence of China exercising its Internet sovereignty extensively. Its online 
censorship system has been called ‘the great firewall’ with thousands of foreign websites and 
services blocked in the country and all Internet companies in China required to censor any 
material that disturbs the economic or social order”, “endangers national honour”, or may 
contribute to the “overthrow of the socialist system” (Financial Times, 2017; The Economist, 
2018). Moreover, thousands of journal articles from high impact journals are censored 
(Human rights Watch, 2018). There is evidence that the Chinese government actively censors 
content that criticizes the government and content about LGBTQI issues, ethnic and 
religious minorities, and mobilisation for public causes. The Chinese government has also 
been found to shut down the Internet during times of protest (Freedom House, 2018). This is 
especially the case in Xinjiang where a large number of the marginalised Uighur minority 
group reside and facial recognition software has been introduced to prevent any potential 
organising (Freedom House, 2018). Members of the LGBTQI community and ethnic 
minorities are two groups identified as being under threat of being left behind unless 
targeted efforts are made to improve their lives (UNDP, 2016).  
 
Figure 6: SDG synergies and trade-offs: Internet Sovereignty. 
 
Policy Recommendations  
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• Although Chinese actors frame their DSR aligned activities as having positive SDG 
implications, they fail to consider potential challenges and trade-offs. The Chinese 
government could take steps towards requiring Chinese actors seeking to be 
involved in the DSR to consider trade-offs and plan to tackle them from the start. 
• The trade-offs presented by the DSR and the expansion of digital technology more 
generally are complex and will likely require global multi-stakeholder partnerships to 
tackle. 
• Traditional donors need to weigh the risks of being directly involved in BRI-branded 
ICT activities given some projects (e.g. surveillance) and goals (e.g. Internet 
Sovereignty) are not popular amongst the public in traditional donor countries. 
• Traditional donors can add value by being honest brokers between Chinese actors 
and BRI countries, seeking to independently tackle some of the trade-offs presented 
by ICT expansion in BRI countries. 
• Traditional donors should seek to provide off-line alternatives for people that remain 
disconnected and risk being left behind.  
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Pakistan’s relations with the EU and China: On 
the path towards sustainable connectivity 
Agnieszka Nitza-Makowska 
Collegium Civitas, Poland 
 
With its strengths in environmental sustainability and challenges related to financial and 
people-to-people connectivity, Pakistan lags behind most Asian countries. Can the European 
Union (EU) and China, through their long-term multifaceted relations with Pakistan, help the 
country catch up with its peers? This paper investigates the contemporary dynamics of the 
EU–Pakistan and China–Pakistan relationships to identify their contribution to the realization 
of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) in Pakistan. 
The study is motivated by (i) Pakistan’s characteristics as a pivotal and fragile state. Despite 
its geopolitical and nuclear potential, the country is beset by severe domestic (terrorist and 
separatist activities) and external (rocky relations with India and Afghanistan) threats. As 
Pakistan’s security situation has global implications, the fulfilment in the country of the SDGs, 
especially SDG 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions), will have a positive impact on the 
region and beyond. Another reason to conduct the study is (ii) the poor global recognition of 
the EU–Pakistan relationship. While Pakistan maintains strategic relations with the US and 
China, its relationship with the EU lacks significant political dynamics. Finally, (iii) the 
development of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) also motivates the study. Its pilot 
project, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), cannot be ignored when discussing 
Pakistan’s international connectivity. 
 
SDGs and foreign policy 
Sustainable development is a demanding and attractive (if not utopian) world order project 
(Hass, 1996, p. 239), but the global response to foster development as outlined by the 2030 
Agenda has not been ambitious enough (UN, 2019). Also, as it is primarily each nation’s own 
responsibility to implement the SDGs (Schaller, 2019), expectations that countries will help 
their peers achieve the Goals may be unrealistic. However, foreign policy, especially vis-à-vis 
fragile states, which to a large extent depend on external actors, can significantly affect 
countries’ capabilities to achieve the SDGs.  
Despite the evident interdependence between foreign policy and SDG implementation, “the 
foreign policy dimensions of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda have not been 
sufficiently broached by foreign ministries to date” (Carius, Ivleva, Pohl, Rüttinger, Schaller, 
Tänzler & Vivekananda, 2018, p. 1). Nor has this topic been adequately addressed by political 
and social scientists. This paper analyses contemporary EU–Pakistan and China–Pakistan 
relations through the lenses of Pakistan’s sustainability and the nexus between the two 
bilateral connectivity. Based on scholarly literature and primary sources (e.g. the CPEC Long-
Term Plan and the EU–Pakistan Strategic Engagement Plan), the paper assesses the two 
relationships against the ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting) Connectivity Index and Sustainability 
Index (Becker, Dominguez-Torreiro, Neves, Tacao Moura & Saisana, 2018, pp. 24–25).  
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Pakistan-EU and Pakistan-China: What connectivity? 
Covering physical, economic/financial, political, institutional and people-to-people pillars, the 
Connectivity Index demonstrates the multidimensional characteristics of Pakistan’s relations 
with and the EU and China (Table 1). 
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Table 1: Pakistan’s bilateral connectivity with the EU and China. Source: Becker et al., 2018. 
 Indicators Origin Destination Data Symmetry Stronger connectivity 
P
h
ys
ic
al
 
International flights’ passenger 
capacity (seats) 
Pakistan EU 476500 Yes Pakistan-EU 
EU Pakistan 440100 
China Pakistan 157100 Yes 
Pakistan China 157100 
Trade in gas (thousand kg) EU Pakistan 194.9 No Pakistan-EU 
China Pakistan 13.5 No 
E
co
n
om
ic
/F
in
an
ci
al
 
Trade in goods (bn USD) EU Pakistan 5.8 No Pakistan-China 
Pakistan EU 6.9 
China Pakistan 17.2 No 
Pakistan China 1.6 
FDI (m USD) EU Pakistan 1600.0 No Pakistan-China 
Pakistan EU 13.0 
China Pakistan 3100.0 No 
Pakistan China 108.0 
Personal remittances (m USD) EU Pakistan 2800.0 No Pakistan-EU 
China Pakistan 22.0 No 
P
ol
it
ic
al
 
Embassies network EU Pakistan 18 Yes equal 
Pakistan EU 19 
China Pakistan 1 Yes 
Pakistan China 1 
P
eo
p
le
-t
o-
p
eo
p
le
  
International students’ mobility in 
tertiary education (n. of students) 
Pakistan EU 13400 No n/a 
Pakistan China n/a No 
Research outputs with 
international collaborations 
EU Pakistan 6300 - Pakistan-EU 
China Pakistan 1978 - 
Patents with foreign co-inventor EU Pakistan 4 - Pakistan-EU 
China Pakistan 0 - 
Trade in cultural goods (m USD) Pakistan EU 410.0 No Pakistan-China 
EU Pakistan 54.0 
China Pakistan 677.0 No 
Pakistan China 5.0 
Migrant stock Pakistan EU 842200 No Pakistan-EU 
EU Pakistan n/a 
China Pakistan 312 No 
Pakistan China 4500 
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Selected indicators of the Connectivity Index (Table 1) demonstrate Pakistan’s stronger 
economic connectivity with China, which surpasses the EU in trade in goods and bilateral 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows. However, the EU holds the position of Pakistan’s top 
export partner. Also, the EU has developed stronger person-to-person relationships 
(measured by research outputs with international collaborations and patents with foreign 
co-inventor) and physical connectivity (measured by international flights’ passenger capacity 
and trade in gas) with Pakistan than China has. Both bilateral relationships are highly 
asymmetrical, which is characteristic of the cooperation between the parties, whose political 
and economic capabilities differ significantly. However, in some cases, such asymmetry can 
harm the weaker party.  
 
Pakistan’s sustainability 
Pakistan’s unfortunate geopolitical heritage has resulted in a high impact of external actors 
on the country’s performance. The impact was assessed at 8.8 out of 10 by the Fund for Peace 
(2019). Consequently, external actors have the potential to affect Pakistan’s achievements in 
SDG implementation and its performance on the Sustainability Index (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. The correspondence between the SDGs and the ASEM Sustainability Index. Source: Becker, et 
al., 2018 p. 25.  
Environmental SDG 7 (affordable and clean energy), SDG 12 (responsible consumption and 
production), SDG 13 (climate action), SDG 15 (life on land) 
Social SDG 1 (no poverty), SDG 4 (quality education), SDG 5 (gender equality), SDG 10 
(reduced inequalities), SDG 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions) 
Economic/Financial SDG 8 (decent work and economic growth), SDG 9 (industry, innovation and 
infrastructure) 
 
However, topics related to Pakistan’s sustainability have been hardly recognized within most 
bilateral agreements. Salik (2016, pp. 123-124) notes that this gap has harmed Pakistan’s social 
sustainability, as “external factors adversely affected [the] government’s development efforts 
and further pushed the vulnerable groups into poverty”. 
In their own commitments to multifaceted connectivity with Pakistan, China and the EU do 
notice the country’s sustainability. However, they approach the social pillar of sustainability 
differently. Unlike China, the EU seeks to exchange best practices with Pakistan on gender 
equality (SDG 5). While both seek to contribute to reducing inequalities (SDG 10) in Pakistan, 
only Brussels highlights the place of minorities in that context. These differences result from 
the respective characteristics of the EU's and China's foreign strategies. While Brussels’s 
schemes emphasize conditionality—for instance, improving the standards of democracy 
(SDG 16) and human rights (SDG 10)—China’s initiatives do not attach any political strings. 
China’s and the EU’s ambitious plans to support the Islamic Republic’s sustainability, as 
declared in the bilateral agreements, are challenged by the contemporary trajectories of the 
two relationships. Brexit will significantly decrease EU–Pakistan physical, economic, political 
and people-to-people connectivity, as the UK served as the engine of the overall bilateral 
dynamics. It will be followed by a decrease in the EU’s capabilities to affect Pakistan’s 
sustainability. Unlike the EU, China with its CPEC is pivoting towards Pakistan. Wolf (2018, p. 
87) notes, "The CPEC influences many aspects of state and society: it relates to the economic, 
political, and social spheres, as well as foreign policy objectives and geopolitics”. The initiative 
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promises to improve economic and social sustainability, but it poses a serious threat to 
environmental sustainability, which is the primary sustainability domain in Pakistan. 
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Leveraging IT to preserve cultural heritage in 
ASEAN 
La-or Kovavisaruch and Rinnapatch Khongsuksipas 
National Electronics and Computer Technology Center, National Science and Technology 
Development Center, Pathum Thani, Thailand  
 
Introduction 
Aggregating cultural information for the purposes of knowledge sharing and 
documentation is a noble pursuit but is often very challenging to implement. In a study 
conducted in the US by Günter Waibel (2010), efforts to encourage even a few museums and 
art collections to share their collections spanned over 40 years. Europe saw more success 
with a full implementation of the Europeana project (2005), a digital platform for preserving 
and providing education on European cultural heritage. The project was fundamentally 
driven by a top-down approach, initiated in 2005 by Jacques Chirac, President of France, in 
conjunction with the premiers of Germany, Spain, Italy, Poland and Hungary, and with the 
support of the President of the European Commission. Since its conception, involved leaders 
have continuously updated the strategy behind the Europeana project to sustain their 
partnership and inspire ongoing dialogues between art and science. Using the execution of 
Europeana as a model, we hope to move forward a similar pilot project that will result in a 
sustainable platform to leverage information technology (IT) in the preservation of cultural 
heritage in the ASEAN region. 
The National Electronics and Computer Technology Center (NECTEC) of Thailand would like 
to emphasize the significance of preserved cultural information, in both intangible and 
tangible forms. In 2007, a flagship project, dubbed Digitized Thailand (2007), was initiated 
with four phases: Accumulation, Knowledge Management, Data Processing and 
Recommendations. The first phase, Accumulation, consists of content development, R&D on 
related technology for structuring digital information (e.g. creative content), data collection, 
standardization, and digital rights management. Many smaller projects were funded under 
Digitized Thailand; with one being the development of a smart museum guide. The guide 
was built out under the name “Museum Pool,” which per details in Thitipong Wongsatho et 
al. (2015), formed a platform for museum curators to effectively manage media assets for an 
improved visitor experience. A key benefit for end users is the centralized medium, as visitors 
can access information from any participating museum in the network via a mobile 
application. In 2017, “Museum Pool” was officially launched with three founding locations. It 
now boasts a network of over 20 participating museums in Thailand and plans to expand 
within ASEAN. Ultimately, we hope that the application can serve as a primary source for 
cultural knowledge sharing across the region. 
More recently, we received funding from the Thai Ministry of Higher Education, Science, 
Research, and Innovation (MHESI), formerly the Ministry of Science and Technology, as part 
of an ASEAN cultural tourism initiative to start a pilot project that would leverage IT. We 
contacted partner universities and government agencies in Myanmar and Lao PDR for the 
opportunity to grow the impact of our pilot. Applying IT in the cultural context is a 
challenging task for these partners as they are required to involve various bureaucratic 
agencies for approval in the project’s implementation. However, with the necessary efforts, 
we have expanded our platform to Myanmar. 
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In navigating the sensitivities of handling cultural information over the course of our project, 
we have made some modifications to our primary goal of sharing cultural information, and 
shifted our focus to researching opportunities to improve museum visitor experience via a 
mobile application. Using aggregated data on navigation patterns within museum grounds, 
we hope to be able to draw recommendations for increasing engagement, such as a 
suggestion feature for other exhibits that may be of interest to a given visitor. 
 
Methodology 
We received two years of funding from MHESI to study the possibility of using IT in a 
collaborative project promoting cultural heritage education amongst ASEAN. “Museum 
Pool” forms the foundation of this larger research initiative, as the technology provides a 
space for storing and accessing museum metadata. 
Initially, we were faced with the challenge of sourcing a suitable research partner for our 
planned assignment. Fortunately, our international collaboration officer was able to 
introduce us to active candidates from a prior ASEAN gathering.  
In the first year of implementation, we partnered with both university and research 
institutions. As shown in Figure 1, the project started with a kick-off meeting to align on 
project objectives and the possibility of collaboration regarding the topic of museum guides 
within each country. From the kick-off meeting, we ascertained that there were no existing 
digital museum guides or equivalent in these countries. Therefore, our partner countries 
found the proposal to deploy our Museum Pool solution as a museum content management 
tool attractive. 
 
 
Figure 1. Project implementation process. 
 
After the kick-off meeting, partners made the requisite effort to connect to relevant agencies 
to ensure the successful implementation of “Museum Pool” in their home country. We then 
visited the site to validate the readiness for transfer of our technology, and subsequently 
provided remote assistance and support to allow for smooth adoption. 
Due to the extensive network of involved parties, there are a multitude of factors affecting 
the project’s success, such as technology, human resources for maintenance, availability of 
content creators as well as funding. After evaluating the readiness of our partner countries, 
as shown in Table 1, we planned to use these contributing factors as rough criteria in our 
rubric to recruit partners for our project expansion. So far, only Myanmar has been 
successfully implemented, with the details of our progress to be published in a planned 
collaborative paper. 
 
Kick off
- Share project objectives
- Validate circumstances 
in participating countries
Site visit
- Check readiness of the 
site
- Transfer technology
Implementation
- Installation and 
information upload
- Remote assistance
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Table 1: Readiness index using for technology transfer. 
Readiness Myanmar Lao PDR 
Technology Ready to receive the technology transfer 
from Thailand 
Ready to receive the technology transfer 
from Thailand 
Human resources Students None 
Content creators Connection with a content provider Connection with various content providers 
Funding None None 
 
In the second year of this project, we hope to build on the success modelled by Myanmar by 
sourcing a comparable university in Lao PDR with a similar implementation environment. 
However, due to socioeconomic and political nuances, a “comparable” environment may be 
difficult to identify. Within this same time period, we have also extended invitations to a 
research institute from Indonesia that appears to meet the criteria we have developed in our 
rubric. This institute exhibits a similar infrastructure to NECTEC, and in accordance to our 
index, it owns the technology, human resources and content creators, to make it an excellent 
candidate for a successful implementation. In early discussions, we also discovered that 
Indonesia has independently explored plans to implement a digital museum guide; 
providing the opportunity for us to exchange databases and share metadata for more robust 
project development.  
 
Results 
Our partner in Myanmar successfully deployed “Museum Pool” technology in Bagan and 
Schwedagon with the permission of the Myanmar Ministry of Culture, while Lao PDR and 
Indonesia are currently still in the planning stage.  Since Indonesia has an independent 
museum guide database, an initial planned step would be for both parties to develop an 
Applications Program Interface (API) that would allow for the exchange of metadata based 
on the work of La-or K. et al. (2018).  So far, we have received a large quantity of statistical 
information from Myanmar’s museum visitors, which we hope to use in the improvement of 
museum visitor engagement in each country.   
 
Conclusions and Lessons Learned  
We believe that our project so far is just beginning to forge the path forward for IT 
implementation in ASEAN cultural heritage preservation. Although this topic is considered a 
sensitive issue, we hope that the platform that we are working on will provide a basis for 
unification, following in the footsteps of the successful Europeana project. With two 
museums implemented in Myanmar, we have significantly expanded traffic to the network, 
which provides us with more data to help us scope and build our next step towards 
improving visitor engagement: a recommendation system for the visitor navigation.  
So far, there are a few key takeaways that we can glean from our progress: 
• Establishing trust and professional rapport between partner teams is a vital indicator 
of the project’s likelihood for success. 
• Funding is a critical factor in project continuity. 
• International collaboration is not a linear equation; in a synergistic environment, there 
can be exponential returns (1+1 = 5), or with misalignment, can turn into a resource 
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drain (1+1 = 0).  We are in the process of learning and hope to discover the right inputs 
for high impact results.  
• We proved that diplomacy can facilitate R&D activities.  Once scientific developments 
are encouraged to extend across borders, we are empowered with tools for solving 
broad social challenges.  
Since raising our last round of funding, we received support for only two years. In order to 
take advantage of the momentum we have achieved so far, each country needs to be able 
to source independent financial support. Unlike the European Union, ASEAN does not have 
a funding model for interdisciplinary projects, which may prove to be the most difficult 
challenge in our project’s continuity. 
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Bridge the Cross-Culture Understanding: Study 
Case of BIPA Program in Ambon 
Maria Martha Nikijuluw 
Pattimura University, Ambon, Indonesia  
 
Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to present a systematic perspective of BIPA students about 
cultural understanding. The result of this research will contribute ideas to improve the BIPA 
program, also the international cooperation in the exchange student programs. Thus, this 
study investigated the relation between BIPA and culture understanding based on field 
experience among BIPA students and staff. The ethnographic research design with a 
qualitative descriptive approach was adopted for the study. The technique carried out in this 
research is based on a direct survey via a workshop of cross-cultural understanding in Ambon 
in September 2019 and a short course BIPA Plus program in Thailand in November 2019 as 
well as direct observation in the field of study. Findings revealed that live and experienced 
cultures are a good way to understand another culture. There are both differences and 
similarities in culture, among others taboo and non-taboo. Thus, the workshop of culture 
understanding is needed to avoid the gap among cultures and understanding foreign 
cultures. The participants need to understand the foreign culture at the beginning of the 
program. Bridge cross-culture understanding is a crucial issue in terms of the BIPA program 
in Indonesia. While the BIPA program could become a link for interconnectivity among 
language, culture and friendship; so that the institutions are linked for the best mutual 
cooperation and people from one country could understand another culture.  
 
Introduction 
Pattimura University in the framework of internationalization of the university and to support 
the university accreditation, there needs an effort to get international students. Thus, the 
international program such us the BIPA Darmasiswa and BIPA Plus programs play a crucial 
role. The BIPA Darmasiswa is a scholarship program organized by the Indonesian Ministry of 
Education and Culture (MoEC) in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA). This 
program started in 1974, which admit only students from ASEAN. Then, in 1976 the program 
extended to other countries. Nowadays, it has been extended further to include all countries 
which have diplomatic relationship with Indonesia, with a total of 135 countries. The 
scholarship holder will learn BIPA (Bahasa Indonesia untuk Penutur Asing, translated in 
English, Indonesian Language for Foreigners); language, art, and culture for one year at a 
selected university. The program aims to promote the Indonesian language and culture; also 
it has been designed to provide stronger cultural links and understanding among 
participants countries (see https://darmasiswa.kemdikbud.go.id/about-us-2/). The 
Indonesian government continues to work with various activities related to BIPA, including 
Darmasiswa RI scholarship, the KNB scholarship, and sending BIPA teachers abroad. 
While BIPA PLUS is organized specially for Pattimura University's cooperation partners. The 
program has been established by the Language Centre of Pattimura University in 2017, which 
has been an annual program. This program has been conducted in the form of a short course 
program for ten days. The aim is to provide stronger cooperation with the university’s 
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partners such as the university partners in Australia, Thailand, Germany, etc. Through this 
program, the participants will learn Indonesian language and one topic related to Maluku, 
such as the economic empowerment of people on the coastal, traditional fishing trap, or 
traditional cultures in the Moluccas.   
Related to the BIPA program, the supporting facilities, teachers, and their teaching method 
as well as management of the program are needed to accomplish the BIPA program at 
university. One but not least is the intercultural competency of teachers and students. There 
are a lot of problems related to the BIPA program, among others are the mental and physical 
sickness students sent to join this program, and also cultural misunderstanding between 
students and staffs. For instance, the BIPA students from Europe prefer to travel even during 
the class run and often complain. Thus, this article aims to discuss the relation between BIPA 
and culture understanding based on the field experience among BIPA students and staffs. 
 
Literature Review: BIPA and Cross-Culture Understanding 
 
BIPA- Indonesian Language for Foreigners 
In Indonesia, the BIPA program is accommodated by an institution or university. The BIPA 
program has developed rapidly in the last years. Many institutions that provide BIPA program 
are no longer mainly based in Java and Bali or other regions in Western Indonesia, but have 
expanded to Eastern Indonesia, including Maluku. Pattimura University is the only institution 
that organizes the BIPA program in Eastern Indonesia since 2016 (see Latupapua, 2020). BIPA 
is a bridge to introduce the Indonesian Language for foreigners formally. Language learning 
for foreigners is included in the second language learning after students master the first 
language or their mother tongue (Suyitno 2004, in Nirmalasari 2018: 42).  
Further, BIPA or Indonesian language learning for foreign speakers learns Indonesian from 
the most basic knowledge about words until they are capable to arrange them into a good 
and comprehensible sentence. The level language skills are A1, A2, B1, B2, and C1, which is 
framed toward the European language proficiency frame. Those levels will be accomplished 
during a specific duration of time like one year program. For those reasons, in BIPA learning, 
there has to be a good method used to deliver the learning material. One of many important 
issues in organizing BIPA learning program is providing teaching materials or textbooks as 
learning resources that integrate local cultural material into language proficiency. 
Furthermore, for the framework of learning BIPA the students must be mastered not only 
the language competency but also culture and intercultural communication competency.   
 
The scientific data shows that the research on BIPA has been done relating to different issues 
and perspectives, and most of the researches had been done to improve the program itself. 
Sumarti, et.al. (2018:361) stated that there is a lot of researches that have been pointed out of 
BIPA, among others about the development of the authentic teaching materials, which is 
based on local culture, the local culture “pamali” as media communication, etc. While 
Sumarti et.al. have been developed research on cross-cultural understanding of BIPA 
participants. They stated that “teaching language cannot be separated from culture”. Thus, 
teaching BIPA should be not oriented only in language competency but also in intercultural 
competency. Further, BIPA encouraged teachers to be able to build “intercultural 
competency”. Moreover, the research on BIPA, which is pointed out on grammatical 
Indonesian Language toward BIPA students from Tiongkok was done by Yohanna 
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Nirmalasari (2018), and the critically outline the issue, including showing the efforts that have 
been made to create teaching materials that give more space to local culture elements 
(Latupapua, 2020). 
 
Culture and Cross-Culture Understanding 
"Culture is society's way of creating social connectivity among a group of people through the 
origin, belief, institutions, religion, music, and art" (Tuleja 2019 in notredameonline.com). Thus, 
in international connectivity, culture can be defined by linking interactions among people 
from institutions such as a university. Eriksen (2004) emphasized the culture is not easy to 
grasp. He added that from the identified 162 different definitions provided in that book 
Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions by Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952, no 
definition of the culture concept that most anthropologists seem to agree upon. He argues 
that the most famous definitions of culture stems from the English anthropologist EB Tylor 
1871 that "Culture or Civilization, taken in its widest ethnographic sense, is that complex whole 
which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, custom, and any other capabilities and habits 
acquired by man as a member of society".  
Further, many theoretical perspectives on the conceptualization of culture and approaches 
can be found in academic literature relating to the concept of culture, which identified 
cultural differences from different aspects; beliefs, values and behavior (e.g. Wyer, et al. 2009). 
The interesting part contributed a concept of culture contrast with views of culture as a 
psychological variable as Schwartz noted as follows: 
“These views see culture as beliefs, values, behaviors, and/or styles of thinking distributed in 
a distinctive pattern among the individuals in a society or other cultural group. Culture, as I 
conceptualize it, influences the distribution of individual beliefs, actions, goals, and styles of 
thinking through the press and expectations to which people are exposed” (Schwartz 
2009:128). 
Moreover, recent research about culture has been done based on the 5 dimensions of culture 
proposed by Hofstede, which are the power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty 
avoidance, and long-term orientation (e.g. Ulijn et al. 2010, notredameonline 2019 ). Ulijn et al. 
2010 (96-120) research about cultural differences between German and the Netherlands 
identified some aspects of cultural differences among other differences in languages, 
dialects, religion, food habits, mentality, norms, behavior, and mutual perceptions. This 
research deals only with a less intense way of perception. Moreover, the reviewed perception 
literature implies the intercultural perspective that "what you see might not be what it is", for 
instance, "how the Germans and the Dutch see each other" Limaye (2000) and Ulijn and St 
Amant (2000) in Ulijin et al. (2010: 107-108). In addition, the interesting concept is the 
preparation of people for intercultural experiences by Richard W. Brislin 2009. The writer 
summarized Brislin’s concept that people live in a culture is the best way to experience and 
understand a different culture. Besides, the cultural misunderstanding arose because people 
involved have the wrongly assumed that their own beliefs and values were normal. While 
understanding cross-culture recognized three steps, firstly “knowing yourself” is the crucial 
step towards bridging the culture gap. Secondly, the acknowledgment of the way you and 
your compatriots look at the world that is not universal, and thirdly, to find out as much you 
can about other culture’s value and beliefs (Carté, Penny & Fox, Chris, 2008: 161). 
However, this article aims to try to respond to some of the questions posed by Ulijin et al. 
(2010) and Brislin’s concept (2009), explored through BIPA students and staff during the BIPA 
program. Thus, this research is conducted based on this concept within, "how the BIPA 
 
155 
 
students and staffs see each other". For instance, what they think about their own culture, 
foreign culture, and so on. Those concepts above help to figure out the cross-culture 
understanding as result of this research. 
 
Methodology 
The ethnographic research design with a qualitative descriptive approach was adopted for 
the study. Because the ethnographic research focuses on culture "how the BIPA students 
and staffs see each other”, the researcher analyzed the following steps: (1) collect data, (2) 
reading the data again, (3) categorized (4) compare the data, (5) seeking the relationship and 
categories, (6) finding the descriptions and (7) interpretation to find the meaning (Fielding, 
1993, in Setyowati, 2006). Further,  to enrich the research result, the second additional 
research was conducted during the BIPA Plus program in Thailand in November 2019. Then, 
the researcher tried to put seven questions that were addressed both to 12 BIPA Plus 
students from three universities of Thailand and 4 students from a German university to 
structurize the research′s finding. Those research questions refer to the theory about 
qualitative research questions; a central question and associated sub-questions (Creswell, 
2002:120). 
Sample description 
The research subjects were the 4th BIPA students from Congo, Sudan, Ukraine, and the 
Czech Republic, 2 Mandarin Teachers from China and 8 BIPA organizer staffs have 
contributed to the direct survey. Further, the additional research was addressed both to 12 
BIPA Plus students from three universities of Thailand and 4 students from a German 
university. 
Survey instrument 
The technique carried out in this research based on a direct survey via a workshop and short 
course program as well as direct observation in the field. The first data collection contains 
responses to a series of tasks that were addressed both to BIPA students and organizer staffs 
in September 2019 workshop concerning the understanding of the own culture and the 
foreign culture, Taboo and Non-Taboo. To enrich the research result, the second additional 
research was conducted during the BIPA Plus program in Thailand in November 2019. The 
participants were given a paper with seven questions. These questions in my direct open 
questions survey among 2 suggested countries of Thailand and Germany in November 2019 
through a short course of BIPA Plus in Thailand consisted of three general parts as follows:  
(i) The first 4 questions were about the program itself; the benefit of the program, 
teaching material, interesting topic, and teaching method 
(ii) The second 1 question was about the needs to conduct such program at their 
university 
(iii) The third 1 question was about participant's opinion if the BIPA program can 
strengthen the relationship between universities or countries 
(iv) The last 1 question was about what participant's thinking about Indonesia, 
Thailand, and Germany before and after (Thailand to Indonesia and Germany, on 
contrary Germany to Thailand and Indonesia). 
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Results 
Table 1 shows an ongoing work in conjunction with the participant's opinion about the 
foreign culture (what the BIPA students know about Ambon (Indonesian culture), and on the 
contrary, the staffs wrote about Congo, Sudan, Ukraine, the Czech Republic, and China; the 
second of expected participants own culture what taboo and non-taboo for themselves, and 
the third expected participant's perception of the workshop. 
 
Table 1: The participant's opinion about the foreign culture. 
 Country Habits & Behaviour Values Appearance Arts/nature  Knowledge 
BIPA Students      
Czech Rep. Friendly, punctual,  
consistent 
 People like beer, 
white skin 
Artistic place  
Ukraine Calm and friendly 
Punctual and 
consistent 
 Calm voice 
White skin 
Like classical music  
Congo  Unpunctual  Fat, black skin, 
curly hair 
Dancing skill African part, 
hot weather, 
tasty food 
Sudan Smile, unpunctual, 
stylish 
 Black skin,  Like dancing, 
fashionable 
African part, 
rich fuel, 
women in 
cover 
China Always smile Business skill, 
stingy 
Looks very 
simple, white 
skin, beautiful 
girl 
Creative, like 
dancing 
Tasty food 
 
Indonesia 
(Ambon) 
Kind, polite, 
generous 
people, 
friendly, 
different 
understanding 
of time and 
schedule 
highly 
respected 
family, land of 
love, teacher 
relationship, 
particular 
culture, live 
relax 
         Tan skin            Fresh air,      
beautiful beach, 
speak Arabic 
many Moslem 
and mosque, hot 
and wet weather, 
city of songs, 
stylish and luxury 
wedding 
       Tasty food 
 
The result suggested that participants understand the foreign culture in the way, how they 
look at other people’s appearance (e.g. hair, white or dark skin, big size body/fat or thin, 
beautiful), habits, behaviour, values, activities, arts, and nature. While participants see their 
own culture as shown in Table 2, what taboo and non-taboo for themselves from what they 
normally did, compared to what they see other people doing as follows: 
 
Table 2: The expected own culture (taboo and non- taboo). 
Countries Taboo Non-Taboo 
Czech 
Sitting on ground, taking someone place when 
waiting in line, no talking to strangers, being too late 
disobeying rules, almost no taboos, everything very 
open and honest 
Addressing someone mistake, use tissue 
more, ask a lot of questions, calling 
teacher by name, stand up late, make 
fun for everything, all people same level, 
no hierarchy 
Congo  
Its normal to ask too much questions 
about privacy, Its normal to eat in the 
same plate, say something if you don’t 
like 
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Sudan 
Using your left hand to offer things, e.g. food, 
smoking among guests, compliment an item in 
Sudanese house 
Stand up when greeting, shaking hands, 
respect elder people, Friday is the most 
popular day for visit, family gathering at 
least in one meal 
Ukraine Almost no way to say “no” directly to express dislike or critics 
honestly not taking things personally 
China 
No green hat, don’t eat by using hand, don’t ask the 
age, income, marital status when you meet a person 
in first time, don’t use chopsticks to knock the bowl or 
plate, don’t like the number “4, 14, 24, 34… 
 
Indonesia 
(Ambon) 
Fart is impolite when you having meal, greetings 
elder people by name, not seat in front of the door, do 
not talk during eat, do not sweep the feet of people, 
don’t married with “gandong”, don’t give Moslem 
“meat pork” to eat, no using left hand by giving 
things, laughing loudly with open mouth. 
Like chitchat, gossip among  people 
 
The result regarding the expected participant's perception of the workshop suggested that; 
(1) the workshop of cross-culture understanding must be done for BIPA Darmasiswa 
students, thus the foreign student who learns at the Pattimura University don’t blame each 
other, (2) all participants accept the workshop as a great idea and a great chance within, they 
know other culture, (3) the workshop participants (staffs) are realizing that there are some 
similarities between foreign culture and culture in Indonesia, and (4) acknowledging that 
"every city or country has a specialty, for that reason, we shall tolerance and understand", 
wrote one Mandarin teacher. 
Further, the additional research revealed that the first 4 questions about the program itself; 
the benefit of the program, teaching material, interesting topic, and teaching method that 
was varied answers. The author prefers to describe the interesting topic for themselves that 
Thailand's students from 3 different universities (Khon Kaen University, Buriram Rajabaht 
University, and Lampang Rajabaht University) stated different topic as an interesting topic 
for them, such as foods, family and traveling (3 persons of 12 participants, or 25%). While most 
of the German's student (75%) wrote that the "traveling" was as an interesting topic for 
themselves. 
 
Table 3: The direct open questions survey – questions 5 - 7 
No. Questions 
Answers 
Thailand’s Students Germany’s Students 
5 
What about the needs 
to conduct such as the 
program of BIPA at 
your university? 
Thailand’s Students 
answered only shortly, "yes, 
this is a great program and 
a great chance for students 
at my university", 
German's students answered it with 
arguments; (a)"just pay attention that the 
group is not getting too big", (b)"getting to 
know Asian culture can be a valuable thing 
which can help someone develop their 
personality and strengthen intercultural 
relationship", (c) It's a great experience to be in 
a totally different group of students in an 
unknown country. Everybody should do such 
as trip in his study time".  
6 
The participant's 
opinion on whether 
BIPA program can 
strengthen the 
relationship between 
universities or countries. 
Thailand's students said "yes, 
we exchange language and 
culture, means that we are 
friend" 
"It’s a good part of an intercultural team at 
universities and it builds bridges between 
countries. Even if the students accept it, it is a 
win-win-win situation for students, universities, 
and whole countries". 
7 What participant's 
thinking about 
Thailand's students said that 
before they thought that the 
(a) “Thai people are very friendly, every time 
smile, welcoming, and Indonesians are similar; 
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Indonesia, Thailand and 
Germany before and 
after? 
Germans are quite serious 
and hard to smile, but after 
met and learned together, 
they are also friendly and 
humourist. 
(b)"The stereotypes in Germany are mainly 
Chinese or Japanese- stereotypes for 
Europeans Asia is just too big to separate 
each country from another if you have never 
been there". 
 
Discussion 
The results of descriptive analysis showed that the bridge cross-culture understanding is a 
crucial issue in terms of the BIPA program in Indonesia. The participants need to understand 
the foreign culture at the beginning of the program. Thus, teaching BIPA should not be 
oriented only on language competency but also in cross-culture understanding. 
Based on the analysis, then the research’s finding are structured based on the central 
questions and associated sub-questions; “how the BIPA students and staffs see each other”, 
what they think about their own culture and the foreign culture, what about the benefit of 
the program for themselves, and the connectivity of their universities and countries such as 
the benefit of the program, teaching material, interesting topic and teaching method. For 
the answer to the question “how the BIPA students and staffs see each other” refers to the 
concept of Brislin (2009) that people who live in a culture is the best way to experience and 
understand a different culture. Besides, the concept of “knowing yourself”, “the 
acknowledgment” and the way to look at other culture’s value and beliefs by Carté, Penny & 
Fox, Chris (2008: 161) has proved the findings. The first research finding through the workshop 
builds the intercultural competency of BIPA students and teachers or staff. In fact, there are 
not only differences, but also similarities in some aspects of culture, for instance what taboo, 
and non-taboo. Thus, the BIPA students and staffs should pay attention on both differences 
and similarities during the communication or during the program. Whether the culture 
understanding through the workshop is effective, the BIPA students from other countries 
are capable to understand the local culture where they will live in. In other word, culture 
understanding gives benefit for both the BIPA students and staff that they can understand 
each other from the perspective of taboo and non-taboo for themselves and for others. 
Besides, the staffs have knowledge about BIPA student’s country without visiting or living 
there. 
For the benefit aspects of the program, teaching material, interesting topic, and teaching 
methods that were varied answers. Those aspects showed that the institution should pay 
extra attention, improve the management of the program and prepare teachers for this 
program. While the topic will be dependent on individual interest but also the country’s 
image of interest such as Germany. This country is also known for people like to spend time 
for traveling. Further, the BIPA program could become a link for interconnectivity among the 
language, culture and friendship; so that the institutions are linked for the best mutual 
cooperation and people from one country could understand another culture.  
 
Conclusions 
In summary, one find outs two main points as follows: 
1) Participants understand foreign culture in the way how they look at other people. So, 
live and experienced cultures are a good way to understand another culture. 
Moreover, the workshop understanding culture is needed to avoid the gap among 
cultures and understanding foreign culture. 
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2) Understanding international cultural can be linked with the exchange culture 
programme among institutions such as a university. 
 
References 
Carté, Penny & Fox, Chris (2008). Bridging the Culture Gap: A Practical Guide to International Business 
Communication. ed. London and Philadelphia. Kogan Page. 
Creswell, Jhon W. 2002. Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Methods Approaches. 2nd Ed. 
Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Sinagpore: SAGE 
Eriksen, Thomas Hylland (2004). What is Anthropology? London: Pluto Press. 
Latupapua, Falantino. (2020): In Searching of Appropriate to Local Cultures Teaching Materials: 
Problematics of BIPA Teaching in Maluku. Arbitrer Journal. April  2020,  Volume  2, Nomor  1, Pg. 233-
244 
Morgan, Carol & Cain, Albane (2000). Foreign Language and Culture Learning From a Dialogic 
Perspective. Clevedon. Bufallo. Toronto. Sydney: Multilingual Matters LTD. 
Nirmalasari, Yohanna, (2018). Pola Kalimat Bahasa Indonesia Tulis Pembelajar BIPA Tingkat Pemula 
Asal Tiongkok di Universitas MA Chung.  Journal KLAUSA: Kajian Linguistik, Pembalajaran Bahasa, dan 
Sastra. Volume 2 No. 1. 2018. Pg. 41-50.  
Setyowati, (2006). Etnografi Sebagai Metode Pilihan Dalam Penelitian Kualitatif di Keperawatan. 
[Ethonographie as a Chosen Method in Qualitative Research in Nurshing]. Jurnal Keperawatan 
Indonesia, Vol. 10. No.1. March 2006. P. 35-40 
Sumarti, et.al. Lintas Budaya (Interkultural) Dalam Pembelajaran Berbicara Bagi Peserta BIPA 
Darmasiswa di Universitas Lampung. International Conference topic on Teaching Indonesian 
Language 
Ulijn, Jan., Duysters, Geert., & Fèvre, Jean- Marie (2010). Culture and its perception in strategic alliances: 
does it affect performance? An exploratory study into Dutch–German ventures. In: Strategic Alliances, 
Mergers and Acquisitions: The Influence of Culture on Successful Cooperation. Edited by Ulijn, Jan., 
Duysters, Geert., & Meijer, Elise. UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. ISBN 9781848443365, 96-120. 
Wyer, Robert S., Chiu, Chi-yue., & Hong, Ying-yi (2009). Understanding Culture Theory, Research, and 
Application.  New York. London: Psychology Press Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. 
Notredameonline.com. (2019. October 8th). The 5 Dimensions of Culture with Dr. Elizabeth Tuleja. 
Accessed on 29th January 2019, https://www.notredameonline.com/resources/intercultural-
management/exploring-the-five-dimensions-of-culture/ 
 
160 
 
Co-Creating Lightboard Media for a Singapore- France Education Collaboration 
Fun Man Fung1,2, Christoph Dominik Zimmermann3, Hui Ru Tan1,4, Etienne Blanc5, 
Thierry Koscielniak6 and Xavier Coumoul5 
1Department of Chemistry, National University of Singapore, Singapore 
2Institute for Application of Learning Sciences and Educational Technology (ALSET), 
National University of Singapore, Singapore 
3Department of Materials Science and Engineering, Singapore 
4Department of Food Science and Technology, National University of Singapore, 
Singapore 5Université de Paris, UFR des Sciences Fondamentales et Biomédicales, Paris, 
France 6Conservatoire national des arts et métiers (Le Cnam), Nationale du Numérique, 
Paris, France 
 
Abstract 
We present a unique joint Singapore-France education project that uses technology to 
make more engaging student content as well as leveraging an intercontinental 
collaboration to gain a greater understanding of students from different cultural 
backgrounds and their respective learning process. 
The Lightboard is a recently developed means of making tutorial-style learning videos 
which enable eye-contact, rather than students seeing lecturer’s back, handwritten and 
informal teaching, which have been associated with benefits for students' learning. 
Lightboard videos have a more informal, conversational style, which could yield better 
results even than high production quality/cost videos. 
Understanding the student and catering to their expectations is an important part of 
being an empathetic and effective teacher. Students' differences in their cultural 
backgrounds can have an impact on their preferences when it comes to teaching style, 
understanding the content and instructional design. Our cross-continental collaboration 
between lecturers in Singapore and France allows to gain a deeper understanding of 
how cultural background affects teaching style. The experienced lecturers from both 
countries each bring their own unique understanding of their respective local student 
population and spark new ideas. 
 
Introduction 
The use of videos in education has been promoted as early as 1980 (Rossi, 2015), where 
video technique and equipment was explained to the layman to promote greater use of 
this technology among instructors. Over the past years, video has become a popular 
supplement to traditional teaching methods such as didactic teaching, since they can 
be watched and re-watched anytime by students at their own pace. This also frees up 
valuable student-teacher time for guided practice and questions, rather than 
instruction. For this reason as well as videos combining both the auditory and visual 
sense, videos are often used in the flipped classroom setting as replacements to live 
lectures (Gloudeman, Shah-Manek, Wong, Vo, & Ip, 2018). 
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In this joint France-Singapore, collaboration, we filmed chemistry toxicology videos with 
the Lightboard. Simply speaking. A Lightboard is a glass writing board used for recording 
video lectures (Fung, 2017). Lightboard setup consists of a mounted LED-lit glass board, 
monitoring device, video recording device, and fluorescent markers to write annotations. 
It is pioneered by Michael Peshkin, a professor at Northwestern University (Peshkin, 2013). 
A step-by-step guide on how to build a Lightboard can be found in his website: 
Lightboard.info. 
 
Method, Result and Discussion 
In this paper, we experimented with the Lightboard to produce several video styles using 
the Lightboard as a tool for educational videos. The two styles are 1) the Interview-style 
and 2) the multi-presenter style (Figure 1). The rationale for the different video styles are 
explained in further detail in the proceeding section. 
 
Figure 1. Top, from left to right: Interview- style and multi- presenter Lightboard videos. Bottom, 
from left to right: Schematic diagram of the recording setups for each video style. Presenters are 
positioned behind the glass board and annotate normally on the board, i. e. not writing 
backwards. Dashed lines on the diagram refer to the camera frame representing the area 
around the  Lightboard that  are  captured on video. 
 
First, the interview-style. Unlike conventional single-presenter Lightboard videos, the 
interview-style involves a more interactive, two-way conversation between the presenter 
and the interviewer. With another person supporting the dialogue, the presenter is able 
to receive verbal cues and prompts from the interviewer in case the presenter forgets to 
say something or is stuck in a particular part of the dialogue. Furthermore, the 
interviewer can help to moderate the dialogue being recorded, making sure that what 
is being said is accurate and relevant. This makes it easier for the presenter to deliver 
content as opposed to delivering a lecture individually, where the presenter has to be 
aware of their own verbal cues with no one to support them in case they make mistakes 
in the middle of recording. 
Another added benefit is that with interview-style videos, the presenter can channel their 
eye contact to the interviewer instead of the camera, which can reduce the awkwardness 
normally felt when recording a conventional straight-to-camera Lightboard lecture 
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video. However, interview-style video recording would not help to moderate the content 
of the video, if both the interviewer and the presenter are unprepared and/or nervous, or 
if the interviewer is easily swayed by digression. In addition, due to the question-and- 
answer interview format, the presenter may take longer to deliver their message what 
could have been done shorter in a shorter period. 
When recording our interview-style Lightboard video, the presenter found that having 
the interviewer verbalize questions helped to segmentate his content, making it easier 
for him to present as he could worry less about forgetting his content or flow of speech 
as opposed to recording a conventional single presenter video. One drawback he found 
was that writing on the Lightboard became more difficult as he had to split his attention 
between the interviewer and the Lightboard. He also noted that sitting down also 
reduces the amount of text that he could write on the Lightboard. Understanding this 
limitation, one improvement that we propose is to reduce the restriction of movements 
in the presenter, by making both the interviewer and presenter stand up normally. This 
would make this very similar to the multi-presenter style video. 
Second, the multi-presenter style. Generally, there are only slight distinctions between 
interview-style and multi-presenter videos. One difference is that interview-style videos 
focus on a question-and-answer format and are typically recorded with both speakers 
seated. 
In the multi-presenter style recording, the dynamics of content delivery is further 
increased as the presenters are not bound to taking turns to speak on camera, but are 
instead able to engage in interactive conversations to engage their audience further. 
Similar to the interview-style videos, having multiple presenters in the recording allows 
them to support each other in case one forgets or deviates from the topic of interest. This 
is assuming that all presenters have self-control over their content and are not easily 
swayed away by digressions. 
 
Discussion 
One disadvantage of multi-presenter videos we found was the minimal space available, 
both for the presenters to move and for them to annotate on the Lightboard. In fact, 
having annotations on the Lightboard becomes more challenging as the number of 
presenters increase, as not only does the amount of space to write becomes limited; 
having the amount of elements present in the video distracts viewers and makes it 
harder for the writing on the Lightboard to stand out. This is further aggravated when 
the presenter wears light coloured clothing, which makes annotations on the Lightboard 
less legible (Figure 2). 
One measure to counter these limitations would be to ensure that presenters all wear 
dark coloured clothing. Besides that, allowing more freedom of movement, for instance 
by situating themselves outside the camera frame or further back from the Lightboard 
at certain moments during recording. Limiting the number of presenters to four people 
would also help to ensure sufficient space during recording. 
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Figure 2. Photo of interview style setup. During the recording, the camera is zoomed in to show 
only the presenter/interviewee’ s  visage. The interviewer’ s  face remains out of  the  camera. 
 
 
Conclusion 
According to current research, the Lightboard itself is a tool that enables lecturers to 
create more engaging video content due to the instantaneous handwriting and face-to-
face explanations. Different recording styles—interview- and multi-presenter, were 
created between the French and Singapore faculties to generate various modes of 
instructional teaching. Despite their minor limitations, these exploratory experiments 
show that there is a large variety of video types that the Lightboard allows to create. In 
conclusion, we experimented with several novel styles to use the Lightboard device. 
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Abstract 
In this abstract, we present a cutting edge method of immersive learning in tertiary STEM 
education, using interactive 360° videos immersive environments, based on a cross-
continental collaboration between Singapore and France. The motivation for using 
immersive learning is that it provides learners the opportunity to experience learning 
content overseas virtually - such as remote locations or restricted-access labs - which they 
otherwise would not get to explore in real time. The interactive and experiential learning 
journey that is enabled through immersive learning environment could provide novel, and 
potentially powerful, ways of conveying topics to learners, while potentially positively 
affecting their motivation.  
 
Introduction 
Field trips are commonly used activities for environmental teaching. They are a great way for 
instructors to engage students and give them a first-hand understanding of a subject. 
However, the execution for a field trip in a compact schedule renders it logistically 
challenging and resource-intensive. On top of that, it is common for students and instructors 
to have back-to-back lectures. As such, the tight schedule restricts the implementation of a 
local field trip, let alone an overseas one. The lack of visual engagement with the environment 
deprive students who are interested to see the real scene in the environment to stimulate 
critical thinking (Ernst & Monroe, 2004). Because of the challenge, our France-Singapore 
team applied immersive learning field trip with the use of the individual VR gear for their own 
exploration to a real site where the 360° media are captured by the instructors across both 
countries (Figure 1). 
Method 
This immersive field trip was carried out on a cohort of 74 third- and fourth-year chemistry 
students over the duration of two lessons across three weeks, each ranging from 1 to 1.5 hours 
in duration. The course code/title is CM3261/Environmental Chemistry. The first lesson’s 
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objectives were to introduce the idea of VR in the classroom setting using immersive 360° 
video media and to allow students to familiarize themselves with both the VR gear and the 
online 360° media application. During the first lesson, the instructor led the students through 
the various 360° photospheres and 360° elements. Then, students were then left to explore 
the virtual site for themselves https://tinyurl.com/uptale-CM3261.  
 
Figure 1: View of the 360o media (Left). The split screen show two pictures for each eye. By doing so it 
creates an immersive environment. VR gear—goggle (A) and lenses (B) on the right. 
 
For the second lesson, students were given a unique code to access a new module 
containing the set of 360° photospheres filmed in Ungaran, a rural city in Indonesia 
(Zimmermann, Ardisara, Fung, & Leang, 2019). During the lesson, the instructor directed 
students to specific areas of the photosphere to draw further emphasis to specific areas of 
interest. Students were then allowed to explore the field trip on their own (Figure 2). After the 
second lesson, students were then required to answer environmental chemistry questions 
regarding their field trip (Fung et al., 2019).  
 
Figure 2. Students immersed in the virtual field trip at their own pace. 
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Result  
After conducting the second VR class, a voluntary anonymous survey was posted to gather 
feedback on using the 360° immersive video (response rate: 80%). The feedback primarily 
revolved around the enthusiasm towards the first use of VR in a chemistry course at NUS. On 
a Likert scale of 1—5, students rated their virtual field trip experience (Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Students’ Perceptions Regarding the Virtual Field Trip. 
Question for Student Response Responses by Scorea N (Total N = 59)b 
5 4 3 2 1 
On a scale from 1 to 5, how would you rate your experience based on 
today’s virtual field trip class? 5 33 14 6 1 
a The scores from 5 to 1 represent the following agreement levels: “very good”; “good”; “neutral”; “poor”; and “very 
poor”, respectively. The total number of responses for each level of agreement are tabulated. b Response rate = 
80%. 
 
From the data, it suggests that the students were generally receptive towards the use of the 
immersive technology in the virtual field trip. From a user experience perspective, the main 
challenges faced were disorientation and app limitations. The reported disorientation could 
be caused by the 15-minute virtual excursion that was conducted without intervals. A possible 
solution is to punctuate the session into 5-minute chunks. In this way, students can afford a 
break from the virtual world, look into the real world, and return to the virtual excursion when 
ready. Due to the lack of functionality such as a zoom element, students were unable to view 
clearly, certain images or objects within the photospheres. A possible workaround is to check 
the mobile app that is monitoring the recording to preview that the 360o camera captures 
all salient objects (Ardisara & Fung, 2018). Nevertheless, majority of the students gained a 
positive experience.  
 
Discussion 
Faculties in France and Singapore annotated 360° videos which provide learners limited 
interaction and "movement" within the 360° environment. Using 360° videos to create 
immersive learning environments presents a - albeit low-fidelity - low-cost alternative to fully-
developed virtual reality environments commonly found in advanced games or training 
simulations. We presented annotated 360° video media as a feasible alternative to virtual 
reality environments, as it provides a way to create immersive learning content in shorter 
time and significantly cheaper. Furthermore, the ease-of-use of 360° videos allows even non-
technical instructors to create custom content that follows their current curriculum. 
Potentially, they can even choose to co-create immersive 360° experiences with students, 
which has been shown to be beneficial. 
     
Conclusion 
We co-created this immersive 360° video project as a fruitful cross-continental collaboration 
between teaching teams in Singapore and France. The understanding of different cultural 
backgrounds in this collaboration can lead to an understanding of unquestioned 
assumptions of what teaching means. Our project being used both in Singaporean as well 
as French lecture halls, we can gain a better understanding of whether our teaching 
approaches and students' responses to them are "universally" applicable or culturally specific.  
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Summary 
HODLNG, a Blockchain-based solution for the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) industry; with 
smart contract, we address contracting issue, triggering an innovative and fair profit-sharing 
mechanism. Our utility tokens generate additional revenue; contributing to positive social 
impact. 
 
Context: exports and imports of gas 
The report “Exploring ASEM sustainable connectivity” (Becker et al., 2018) states that trade in 
gas is essential for many countries, which may have little or no natural resources of their own 
to draw on. It is frequently a central topic in energy interdependency and international 
politics. The gas trade includes gas exported via pipelines, as well as in liquid forms via other 
means of transport. HODLNG subsumes in its logic an inherent European dimension due to 
the purpose of its tool: natural gas. Tackling anti-competitive provisions, our solution solves 
issues raised during events; as the workshop co-organized by the European Commission 
Directorate General for Energy and METI, Japan on global LNG market. Our proposition is 
cross-border and multi-country integrated. It serves to fulfil the European Union (EU) single 
market, addressing fragmented domestic markets and providing flexibility in destination (re-
export).  
 
Introduction 
LNG markets are going through momentous changes. The phasing out coal approach is 
leading to meaningful effect transition policies. This industry is undergoing a major transition 
where LNG may be re-sold several times on an individual spot cargo basis or through a chain 
of short contracts. The competition comes from a wide range of suppliers and options in the 
markets, and moves towards more destination flexibility in contracts. Governments should 
pay close attention to LNG project structure and the long-term LNG sale and purchase 
agreements between LNG producers and off-takers. In particular, the practice of diverting 
LNG cargos to more lucrative export markets than the ones initially designated in off-take 
agreements should be regulated and monitored by governments to balance the financial 
incentives to LNG sellers with the interests of LNG-exporting countries. The market has to 
cope with the anti-competitive provisions prohibiting diversion. This is why we decided to 
tackle this issue, with Blockchain technology; and, introducing innovative fair profit-sharing 
mechanisms. 
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Blockchain solutions 
We intent to develop a Blockchain based-solution to govern diversion; introducing 
innovative profit-sharing mechanisms, and more diversified and advanced pricing formulas 
and contracts. In order to solve the problem we identified, we will use a public Blockchain. 
We create a native utility token and a wallet, to manage the scarcity and managing additional 
revenue, to be transferred to the selected NGOs, local communities, and indigenous or 
marginalized people. The novelty is to transfer to a permission-less Blockchain with a smart 
contract language the existing excessive contentious clauses on the paper contract; by 
upholding the concerns of exporting countries, particularly low-income countries. 
Thanks to the Blockchain technology, our disruptive approach is to link additional revenue 
get from natural resources to development and social impact; bringing more transparency 
in contracting process and revenue sharing. To achieve that, we will use Blockchain for 
transparency, traceability and tamper-proof. We are building the path toward more 
standardized, efficient and cost-competitive practices, consolidating major trends of the LNG 
market: growing liquidity and efforts to simplify supply agreements.  
HODLNG is a Blockchain start-up incorporated in Tallinn, Estonia. We’re fully dedicated to 
fixing problems in one market - the Liquefied Natural Gas, or L N G, industry, at both the EU 
and global levels. We’re doing that by developing a Blockchain-based, smart contracting 
regime for L N G logistics. We help L N G stakeholders to address contracting issues, while 
also creating a space for an innovative and fair profit-sharing mechanism, generating 
additional revenues and contributing to positive social impact, including sustainable 
development and climate change. HODLNG Solutions are tackling contracting (anti-
competitive provisions), enhancing the flexibility of the LNG market. 
LNG Market, inefficiencies and lack of transparency 
LNG is about shipping gas via tankers, from LNG producers to importers; and there is big 
demand for it. 2019 was a record year for LNG supply growth, and the sector has tripled since 
2000. Here is currently some 1.4 trillion dollars being invested in it. For the fifth consecutive 
year, global LNG trade set a record, reaching far more than 3 hundreds (316.5) million of 
millions BTU. LNG is also growing in terms of diversity, from a limited number of importers – 
less than 10 in 2000 – to over 40 last year, and 50 in the coming decade. So you have a fast-
growing sector with more and more exporters and importers every year. A study published 
recently stressed that the market is anticipated to reach nearly 20 Billons US Dollar by 2026. 
To unleash the huge potential of this sector, it is crucial to allow gas to flow where it is valued 
most, and when it is needed most. Global LNG procurement trends are undoubtedly shifting 
toward shorter contracts with smaller volumes and increasingly flexible commercial terms 
(destination, resale rights, price indexation, take-or-pay clauses, and volume flexibility). 
National governments in LNG-producing economies need better insight into the valuation 
of LNG sales and the corresponding impact on their revenues. They also need to better 
monitor and control the routing of their valuable natural resource. Blockchain is the ideal 
way to do this.  
So you have an important resource that brings a lot of benefits, and could represent a 
significant driver of prosperity for the Global South. The problem is that a complex supply 
chain has arisen in LNG, with many inefficiencies and a lack of transparency. 
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It is typically developing countries like Trinidad and Tobago, Papua New Guinea and 
Mozambique (to name a few) that are producers. So you have an important resource that 
brings a lot of benefits, and could represent an important driver of prosperity for the Global 
South. The problem is that a complex supply chain has made LNG far too tempting in terms 
of corruption; “suffering” of lack of transparency; and unfair redistribution. 
Corruption is a gigantic social evil - an estimated 2.6 trillion US dollars is stolen annually 
through corruption – a sum equivalent to more than 5 per cent of the global GDP. But its 
impact on the LNG economy is extremely pernicious; lastly in December, news raised that 2 
billion dollars is believed to have been lost to the treasury of an ASEAN country by the actions 
of its former Minister of energy, because of corrupt LNG contracts.  
As raised by an Ambassador of an LNG exporter, our tool will support them for fighting 
corruption; another Ambassador echoed by saying that our solution supports their efforts for 
transparency enhancement.   
In fact, HODLNG’s technology has been specifically designed to facilitate a more secure, 
flexible, fair and balanced LNG contracting environment, powering a truly transparent global 
LNG market. This would benefit producing economies, as well as make the overall market 
more efficient. Governments should push for these agreements to maximize the price 
flowing back to the LNG plant. 
An innovative solution to incentive diversion 
We remove destination restriction in LNG contracts; diversion clauses will now being 
governed by smart contracts. In particular, the practice of diverting LNG cargos to more 
lucrative export markets than the ones initially designated should be balanced between the 
financial incentives to LNG sellers with the interests of LNG-exporting countries, especially 
the least developed ones. 
HODLNG does this by a truly smart contract allied with the foundations of a truly fair profit-
sharing mechanism. We propose a move to a smarter and more sophisticated approach for 
contracting LNG.  This will benefit producing economies, as well as making the overall market 
more efficient. LNG is an important, growing sector that offers great opportunities for 
developing countries, but that opportunity could be tragically wasted if the market is not 
made more trustworthy and fair. 
Technical solution 
We propose a 3-layer architecture, integrating a full stack of existing open-source 
technologies. At layer 1, the consensus protocol from a public chain. At layer 2: smart contract, 
with a scalable and private off-chain process. At layer 3, a utility token to incentive contractors; 
managing profit-sharing agreements. Blockchain technology is needed to program smart 
contracts, to stack native token, and to provide the security, immutability, transparency and 
tamper-proof when needed. By migrating almost all activities off-chain, our solution is fully 
scalable and highly flexible. In order to assure privacy of permissioned sets of participants, 
data recorded in the Blockchain are cryptographic hashes; only users who validate contract 
execution can see all of the chain data.  
Additionally, using an off-chain solution, we address main constraints of Blockchain: 
scalability, speed, privacy, and minimizing transaction costs; increasing the contract's 
capacity and greatly reducing transaction costs, without significant load on the main chain. 
We have selected Off-chain Labs solution. It acts as a second layer on any block chain 
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(Blockchain agnostic), allowing it to process programs and transactions off-chain, either 
through side-chains or state channels, through enhanced privacy and scalability. It’s allowing 
them to push services, dApps, or tokens from Ethereum to arbitrage exploiting the benefits 
of OffChain Labs solution – better privacy and scalability.  
Next steps: stable coins and digital hub 
We are exploring to issue an asset-backed stable coins; a both crypto-collateralized to 
stabilize the coins, and backed by a gas ledger reserve. Additionally, LNG stakeholders view 
us as a potential promising LNG digital hub. Interestingly, we could address issue raised in 
your report regarding data gathering and statistics (quoting) “This is a recognized issue in 
energy statistics, which is why we have omitted the study on gas networks in this edition 
until it is possible to assemble a more reliable data set.” 
Conclusions 
Our solution will make it possible to facilitate the interactions in the LNG market. With our 
service, LNG diversion clauses are now governed by smart contracts; managing a fair profit-
sharing mechanism, benefiting to projects with social impact. Our service will render more 
transparent extracting industry activities and generate more revenue from natural resources; 
leveraging development projects. In the context of the UN SDGs, we focus on goals 7 & 8; as, 
financing low-carbon technology for underserved regions. HODLNG can be a force multiplier 
to address the requirement of the global energy system: de-carbonization. Additionally, our 
service can be a virtual global LNG hub; serving as a catalyst across all industry stakeholders. 
It will serve also as a LNG pricing benchmark; moving away from the prevalence of oil index 
pricing. Lastly, our service is viewed as a solution for a more “commodified” global LNG 
market. We participate to a more secure, flexible, fair and balanced LNG trade system. 
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